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chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Understanding economic preferences in human behavior is key in explaining
economically relevant phenomena. Over recent years, a vast interest among
economists has been to advance our understanding of how decisions are made.
The influence of preferences on individual decision-making and decision-
making in a social context has attracted a lot of attention, as economic
preferences (such as i.e., time or risk preferences) have been shown to have
wide-ranging implications for an individual’s economic success (see e.g.,
Heckman and Smith, 1995; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999a; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002). Experimental economics has created
effective methods to analyze human behavior by isolating decisions in a
controlled environment. Tools in experimental economics allow for data
elicitation in two ways: One setting is the laboratory experiment, where the
experimenter is able to exercise tight control over incentives, information
provided to subjects, and interactions between participants. Laboratory
experiments use a standard subject pool of university students, testing
game-theoretic models in a cost effective way. Field or lab-in-the-field
experiments take place in a natural environment with non-standard subject
pools, bridging findings from laboratory experiments and naturally occurring
data (see e.g., Harrison and List, 2004; Levitt and List, 2007; Falk and
Heckman, 2009; Levitt and List, 2009).
This thesis builds on two separate pillars, contributing to the literature on
economic preferences by eliciting data in a laboratory and in lab-in-the-field
experiments. The first part of this thesis analyzes preferences for the support
of the welfare state. Increasing inequality provokes a lively debate about what
can be considered a fair distribution of income. Preferences for redistribution
typically depend on the perceived causes of income inequality and vary in
the extent of the support for redistributive policies. Chapter 2 investigates
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the influence of potential immoral self-serving behavior on distributional
preferences, where the source of the inequality is either determined by luck
or cheating.
The second part of this thesis considers individual decision-making in
children and adolescents. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 advance knowledge in the
understanding of how behavior and economic preferences evolve with age
by analyzing decision-making in children and adolescents in lab-in-the-
field experiments. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the experimental
literature with children, giving detailed insights into common behavioral
patterns and the development of economic preferences with age. Chapter 4
investigates a strategic setting with children and adolescents in the context of
a coordination game, measuring the influence of age and strategic uncertainty
on efficient play. Chapter 5 focuses on the individual decision-making
component in early childhood, analyzing effort provision and time preferences
under either exogenously imposed or endogenously set time schedules.1
OVERVIEW AND MAIN FINDINGS
Chapter 2 (Too lucky to be true – Fairness views under the shadow of
cheating) is joint work with Stefania Bortolotti, Ivan Soraperra, and Matthias
Sutter.2 We study how fairness views and the extent of redistribution are
affected by a hitherto overlooked, but relevant factor: immoral self-serving
behavior that can lead to increased inequality. We focus on situations
in which the rich have potentially acquired their fortunes by means of
cheating. In a laboratory experiment, we let third parties redistribute
resources between two stakeholders who could earn money either by choosing
a safe amount or by engaging in a risky, but potentially more profitable,
investment. In one treatment, the outcome of the risky investment is
determined by a random move, while in another treatment stakeholders
can cheat to obtain the more profitable outcome. Although third parties
cannot verify cheating, we find that the mere suspicion of cheating changes
1All authors contributed to each chapter to an equal extent.
2We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the C-SEB Start-up Grant.
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fairness views of third parties considerably and leads to a strong polarization.
When cheating opportunities are present, the share of subjects redistributing
money from rich to poor stakeholders triples and becomes as large as the
fraction of libertarians – i.e., participants who never redistribute. Without
cheating opportunities, libertarian fairness views dominate, while egalitarian
views are much less prevalent. These results indicate that fairness views and
attitudes towards redistribution change significantly when people believe
that income inequality is the result of cheating by the rich.
Chapter 3 (Economic behavior of children and adolescents – A first
survey of experimental economics results) is joint work with Daniela Gla¨tzle-
Ru¨tzler and Matthias Sutter. In recent years economic literature focusing
on the decision-making process of children has progressed rapidly. The
investigation of the development of economic preferences throughout child-
hood and adolescence identifies behavioral patterns, providing important
insights for policy makers. We give a detailed overview of experimental
studies in the field of economics conducted with children and adolescents,
highlighting the development of behavioral findings by age cohorts, and
investigating how interventions foster behavior. Children are already capable
of making somewhat rational decisions and of drawing correct inferences
about the partner’s strategy, providing the basic requirements for a so-
phisticated decision-making process. Early childhood is mostly dominated
by very selfish behavior, as children aim to maximize their own utility by
keeping payoffs to themselves. As children grow older, they do not only
display increasingly more patient and less risk-seeking behavior, but develop
stronger other-regarding preferences. The majority of elementary school-aged
children prefer the egalitarian choice, showing strong aversion to unequal
payoff distributions even when the inequality is based on varying levels of
exerted effort. In adolescence concerns for efficiency and social-welfare form,
with subjects making increasingly more pro-social and altruistic choices.
Differences by gender are especially prevalent when regarding competitive
preferences, as females of any age group are less willing to compete in a
tournament setting.
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Chapter 4 (Coordination games played by children and teenagers – On
the influence of age, group size and incentives) is joint work with Daniela
Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler and Matthias Sutter. We investigate how increasing age,
varying incentives, and group size affect the ability to coordinate on the
efficient equilibrium. Over 800 children and adolescents, aged nine to
eighteen, played two coordination games – a stag-hunt game – where the
group size differs between two players or five players. Incentives are varied
between-subjects, making either the efficient equilibrium more profitable or
reducing risk by increasing the payoff in case of coordination failure. We
find that coordination on the efficient equilibrium becomes less likely with
increasing age, unless it is exceedingly profitable to do so. Coordination
with one partner yields more efficient outcomes compared to when children
have to coordinate in groups of five. Hence, children are able to account
for strategic uncertainty when coordinating in large groups. This concern
is more pronounced in older children as they choose the efficient strategy
less frequently in large groups, which is driven by pessimistic beliefs about
the other players’ choices. Our results are largely in line with findings on
incentives in coordination games in adult subject pools, and provide deeper
insights into the development of coordination strategies with age.
Chapter 5 (Busy little bees – An experiment on diligence and endogenous
time scheduling in early childhood) is joint work with Matthias Sutter and
Anna Untertrifaller. In an experiment with over 400 children between the
ages of three and six, we study the development of diligent behavior and
how it is influenced by endogenous time scheduling. Displaying high levels of
diligent behavior has been found to positively affect educational attainment
and hence is an important determinant of economic success. To measure
diligence children worked on a real effort task, collecting tiny yellow beads
from a bowl filled with multicolored beads. Children were instructed to
spend as much time and effort on the task as they wanted to. In a treatment
variation a subset of children was able to decide when to do the real effort
task – today or tomorrow. We find that children who postpone the task
to the next day exert substantially less effort, displaying lower levels of
diligence than children who choose to (or are told to) do the task right
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away. While procrastination behavior is more profound in the younger age
cohort of three and four year-olds, procrastinators of all ages exert less effort.
Children who are willing to challenge themselves in an unrelated task are
furthermore more likely to show more diligent behavior in the real effort
task. These results suggest that with age children become more proficient
in their self-management.
6
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chapter 2
TOO LUCKY TO BE TRUE – FAIRNESS VIEWS UNDER
THE SHADOW OF CHEATING
Abstract
Income inequalities within societies are often associated with
cheating on the side of the rich. We study how fairness views and
preferences for redistribution are affected when cheating may be the
cause, but it cannot be proven. In our experiment, we let third
parties redistribute income between a rich and a poor stakeholder. In
one treatment, income inequality was only due to luck, while in two
others rich stakeholders might have cheated. The mere suspicion of
cheating changes third parties’ fairness views considerably and leads
to a strong polarization that is even more pronounced when cheating
generates negative externalities.
This chapter is joint work with Stefania Bortolotti, Ivan Soraperra, and
Matthias Sutter.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
The unequal distribution of income within countries has become a major
issue in the academic as well as the public debate in recent years (Corak,
2013; Chetty et al., 2014; Piketty, 2014). While one side of the debate
focuses on the reasons for the widening gap between haves and have-nots,
another side addresses the important question of what would constitute a
fair distribution of income between the rich and the poor (Cappelen et al.,
2013). The answer to the latter question hinges to a large degree on the
factors that generated the inequality in the first place, meaning that both
sides of the debate are necessarily intertwined.
It has been shown that fairness views with respect to redistribution of
income depend on whether or not income inequalities have been caused by
differences in effort and hard work (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005), or whether
someone can be held accountable for one’s (mis)fortune (Konow, 2000;
Cappelen et al., 2013; Mo¨llerstro¨m et al., 2015; Akbas¸ et al., 2016; Lefgren
et al., 2016; Tingho¨g et al., 2017). Judgments about the fairness of an income
distribution are also highly sensitive to the available information about,
and the subjective perception of, the income distribution (Kuziemko et al.,
2015). Moreover, fairness views about the preferred extent of redistribution
within a society have been found to be affected by concerns about procedural
fairness or efficiency (Bolton et al., 2005; Balafoutas et al., 2013; Alm˚as et al.,
2016; Cassar and Klein, 2016), cultural background or political orientation
(Rey-Biel et al., 2011; Alma˚s et al., 2016; Cappelen et al., 2016; Konow
et al., 2016; Klimm, 2018), or conflicts between social classes (Fehr, 2018).
It is noteworthy that none of the studies mentioned above has looked
at how fairness views are affected if suspicion about the integrity of one’s
fortunes arises. This is surprising given the evidence from leaks about offshore
financial activities such as the “Panama papers”, showing that tax evasion
rises with wealth (Alstadsæter et al., 2017), thus increasing the income
inequality within societies in favor of the rich. Another prominent example
where immoral and illegal behavior was the source of undeserved wealth was
the common practice at banks such as Wells Fargo to open up fake bank
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accounts to meet the monthly targets of sales personnel (http://fortune.
com/2017/04/13/wells-fargo-report-earnings/). Seen from a broader,
macro-level perspective, there seems to be even a positive correlation between
inequality in a given country – measured by the Gini coefficient – and
the perceived level of cheating and corruption (see country-level evidence
supporting this relationship in Figure A-1 in the Appendix). Yet, at the
macro-level, this correlation could be influenced by several country-specific
factors, e.g., the quality of formal institutions, the level of trust, or cultural
differences. These factors make it difficult to assess properly how the
perception of cheating affects fairness views and the desire to redistribute
between rich and poor. For this reason, we are going to present a carefully
controlled experimental study in which we have rich and poor subjects, where
in some treatments the rich may, but need not, have acquired their income
by cheating. We study how unbiased third parties redistribute income from
rich to poor subjects in our experiment. We are particularly interested in
situations in which it is untraceable for third parties whether the source of
a person’s high income may have originated from cheating or from honest
behavior. We hence talk about redistribution under the shadow of cheating
and not in the obvious presence of cheating. To our knowledge, we are the
first to test the effect the shadow of cheating casts on fairness views, a topic
of great relevance for the design of the welfare state and incentive schemes.
In our experiment, we let stakeholders choose between a safe option and
a potentially more profitable, but risky investment. This choice is intended
to capture many real-world situations, ranging from job choices to health or
farming decisions, where subjects have to trade off risk and expected return.
For instance, one could think of people having to select either into a low-pay,
but secure job, or a potentially lucrative, but highly risky sector.
We exogenously manipulate the availability of cheating opportunities
and hence the causes that can create income disparities among stakeholders.
In one treatment – called the Nature treatment, which follows Cappelen
et al. (2013) – the outcome of the risky investment is determined by a
random computer draw that yields either a high or a low income for the
stakeholder with 50% probability, respectively. The safe option, in contrast,
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yields an intermediate income for sure. In the other treatments – Self-Report
and Externality – stakeholders face the same choice between a safe option
and a risky investment. Here, the investment’s outcome is resolved by the
stakeholders themselves by flipping a coin and self-reporting the outcome.
They are explicitly asked to report the outcome truthfully, which yields either
the high or low income with 50% probability. Our request is, nonetheless,
non-verifiable – mimicking many real-world situations in which monitoring
is too costly.
Both Self-Report and Externality captures situations where cheating
is possible.1 Yet, both treatments differ from one another with respect
to the costs cheating imposes on other players. Self-Report is a very mild
manipulation as no harm is done to anybody in case of cheating. Misreporting
the outcome of the lottery is a violation of a rule but such a rule is not meant
to protect the other parties. The Externality treatment takes cheating a
step forward: a stakeholder who cheats automatically appropriates resources
that were allocated to another (idle) player. This mimics situations where
the perpetrators benefit from their dishonest action at the expense of other
people’s income. Misreporting the high income here is a violation of a more
important rule aimed at protecting vulnerable parties. Consider again the
example of Wells Fargo where incentives and sales targets for employees led
to the opening of fake bank accounts, engaging in harmful behavior towards
the bank and its investors. This kind of illegal and immoral behavior led
to high costs, imposing consequences not only on the offenders, but also on
uninvolved parties.
After the stakeholders’ decisions, we let third parties – henceforth called
spectators – redistribute the total sum of earnings within a pair of stake-
1This aspect of our design – i.e., the possibility for stakeholders to lie – links our
project to the flourishing literature on deception and cheating (Gneezy, 2005; Fischbacher
and Fo¨llmi-Heusi, 2013; Ga¨chter and Schulz, 2016; Abeler et al., 2018). Virtually all
papers on this topic test how cheating depends on different contextual cues and conditions,
including the structure of incentives (Conrads et al., 2013), loss avoidance (Grolleau
et al., 2016), the nature of the task (Kajackaite, 2016), the costs associated with cheating
(Gneezy et al., 2018), or the role of collaboration (Weisel and Shalvi, 2015). We take a
completely different stand on the problem by not focusing on the causes of cheating, but
rather on the consequences of dishonesty on fairness views and distributional preferences
of unaffected bystanders.
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holders. Spectators in the Self-Report and Externality treatment, however,
cannot identify whether a high income of a stakeholder was the consequence
of either a lucky coin toss or of misreporting the true (i.e., low) outcome of the
coin toss. Although spectators can form expectations about the likelihood of
cheating, there is no certainty. This ambiguity creates a difficult challenge
for those spectators who want to eliminate income inequality whenever the
high income resulted from dishonest behavior, but simultaneously want to
refrain from redistribution if a stakeholder’s high income was righteously
acquired.
A recent paper by Cappelen et al. (2017) is related to ours as they
also consider redistribution in groups composed of honest and dishonest
stakeholders.2 The authors report that spectators (i.e., third parties who
decide upon redistribution) care more about rewarding the honest group
members – thus accepting that dishonest group members also benefit from
more redistribution – rather than being concerned with punishing dishonest
group members at the expense of honest ones. Our experiment departs
from Cappelen et al. (2017) in three main aspects. First, we consider
situations in which cheating is on the side of the rich, while Cappelen et al.
(2017) investigates the case in which cheating is on the side of the poor.
We concentrate on cheating by the rich because the sentiment against the
so-called elites in many countries is fueled by the poorer people’s concerns
that the rich have achieved their fortunes also through dishonest means.
Second, we implement ambiguity about whether income inequalities are
the consequence of cheating, while in Cappelen et al. (2017) there was
full disclosure of cheating behavior at the group level, leaving no room for
ambiguity as to whether cheating was involved or not. Finally, we enlarge
the choice set by having a safe option, while in Cappelen et al. (2017) all
group members were asked to work on a real effort task and were then paid
according to a lottery system. This implies that a common ground of both
papers is to consider a situation where two (groups of) stakeholders choose
a risky option and one earns the high income and the other the low income;
2Their paper and ours were developed at the same time and independently of each
other.
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however, our set-up allows us to extend such a paradigm to include cases
in which the stakeholders make different choices in the first place (i.e., one
chooses a safe and the other a risky option), which is intended to mimic
different types of behavior in the field, such as in educational or professional
choices.
We report three main findings in ascending order of importance. First,
in line with previous evidence about the incidence of dishonesty, we find
cheating among stakeholders in the Self-Report and Externality treatment,
but not to the full extent (Gneezy, 2005; Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi,
2013; Abeler et al., 2018; Gneezy et al., 2018). In line with stakeholders’
behavior, we also provide evidence that spectators correctly expect cheating
in this set-up.
Second, spectators are more likely to reduce inequality in the Self-Report
and the Externality treatment than in the Nature treatment in cases where
a stakeholder with high income – who might have cheated – is paired with
a stakeholder who chose the safe option with the intermediate income.
Interestingly, we do not observe any kind of reward for genuinely honest
stakeholders who truthfully indicate a low income (through reporting an
unlucky coin toss).
Third, and most importantly, we document a strong and significant
shift in fairness views across treatments. We use a discrete choice random
utility model to estimate three types of spectators (Cappelen et al., 2007,
2013): Libertarians are spectators who never redistribute, independent of
the degree of income inequality between stakeholders. Egalitarians always
redistribute resources equally, while Choice Egalitarians redistribute only
among stakeholders who chose the risky investment, but do not redistribute
if one stakeholder chose the risky option and the other the safe option.
The share of Libertarians is practically the same across all treatments,
capturing about 40% of spectators. However, the other types differ sharply
across treatments. The share of Egalitarians is three to four times larger in
Self-Report and Externality than in Nature. Hence, if income inequalities
might have been generated from cheating behavior, the fraction of egalitarian
fairness views increases substantially. At the same time, Choice Egalitarians
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are much more frequent in Nature than in the treatments where the shadow
of cheating prevails. Overall, therefore, the shadow of cheating leads to
a strong polarization of fairness views where two diametrically opposing
views – Libertarians who never redistribute and Egalitarians who always
redistribute equally – become about equally strong in the population of
spectators. As a consequence, the shadow of cheating might increase social
tensions with respect to the question of how to deal with income inequalities.
Interestingly, the polarization already arises in a situation where cheating
has no negative externality on another, powerless third party. Yet, it is even
more pronounced when cheating imposes such negative externalities, as in
the Externality treatment. The latter treatment reflects a typical feature of
real life as cheating often harms another party.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes
the experimental design and data collection. Section 2.3 presents the results
for both stakeholders and spectators. Section 2.4 reports the results of a
discrete choice random utility model estimating fairness views. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our design builds on Cappelen et al. (2013). We have two types of players –
stakeholders and spectators – and two stages. We start by presenting the
details of the first stage, in which stakeholders made their decisions. After
that, we introduce the three experimental treatments. We then explain
the second stage where spectators made a series of redistributive decisions.
Finally, we describe the experimental procedures.
2.2.1 STAGE 1: STAKEHOLDERS’ RISK-TAKING DECISIONS
Each stakeholder independently had to make five ordered decisions between
a safe and a risky option, as shown in Table 21. The risky option paid
either a high income of 800 tokens or a low income of 0 tokens, each with
50% probability. While the risky option remained fixed in all five decisions,
the intermediate income paid by the safe option varied across decisions.
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This amount increased linearly from 100 tokens in the first decision to 500
tokens in the fifth decision, making the safe option more attractive as the
stakeholders proceeded through the five decisions. After all five decisions
had been made, the risky option – if chosen – was resolved for each decision
separately. The resolution of the risky option and its consequences depended
upon the experimental treatment.
Table 21: Stakeholders’ decisions
Decision Safe option Risky option p
# 1 100 800 or 0 p = .50
# 2 200 800 or 0 p = .50
# 3 300 800 or 0 p = .50
# 4 400 800 or 0 p = .50
# 5 500 800 or 0 p = .50
Notes: p is the probability of earning the high income in the
risky option. All amounts are expressed in tokens. Tokens
are converted at the rate of 1 Euro = 300 tokens. In the Na-
ture treatment, the outcome of the risky option is determined
by a random draw of the computer. In the Self-Report and
Externality treatments, the outcome is determined by a self-
reported coin toss where Heads yields the high income of 800
tokens, and Tails the low income of 0 tokens.
2.2.2 EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS
We ran three between-subjects treatments: Nature, Self-Report, and Ex-
ternality. The first two – Nature and Self-Report – differ only in the way
in which the outcome of the risky option was determined. The External-
ity treatment builds on Self-Report and imposes negative consequences on
another player in case of cheating.
• In the Nature treatment, the outcome of the risky option was deter-
mined by a random draw performed by the computer. The probability
of the high or low income was 50% for each level. The outcome of
each random draw was shown to the stakeholder after all decisions
between the safe and risky option had been made.
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• In the Self-Report treatment, the outcome of the risky option was
determined by a self-reported coin toss. The coin tosses had to be
performed only after all five decisions had been made. Stakeholders
were asked to get a coin or to use an online website (justflipacoin.
com) to flip a coin for each decision in which they had chosen the risky
option. We explicitly requested stakeholders to report the results of the
coin tosses truthfully (see Instructions in the Appendix). Misreporting
was hence a clear violation of the rules. Under the assumption of honest
reporting, our procedure guarantees the same likelihood (of 50%) of
earning the high income across treatments, conditional on choosing
the risky option. However, our request for honest reporting could not
be enforced as there was no possibility to detect lies at the individual
level (for further details, see the experimental procedure below). This
set-up mimics situations in which rules are not enforceable or the cost
of monitoring is too large.
• In the Externality treatment, the outcome of the risky option was
determined by a self-reported coin toss as in Self-Report. This time,
we built in an externality of cheating. Each stakeholder was matched
with an idle player whose earnings might depend on the choices of the
stakeholder. The idle player was informed about the rules but was
not eligible to make any decision. Stakeholders knew that the idle
player received a bonus payment of either 0 or 800 tokens which was
determined as follows:
(i) if the matched stakeholder chose the safe option, the earnings
of the idle player were independently determined by a random
draw of the computer and both outcomes (0 and 800 tokens) were
equally likely;
(ii) if the matched stakeholder chose the risky option, the earnings
of the idle player were negatively correlated with the ones of
the stakeholder. This means that if the stakeholder reported
a winning coin toss, the matched idle player received the low
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income of 0 tokens. If the stakeholder reported a losing coin toss,
the matched idle player received the high income of 800 tokens.
While the latter treatments – Self-Report and Externality – both allow
for cheating, it is important to remark the differences between the two.
In the Self-Report treatment, one might see cheating as a rather innocent
deviation from the rules, as it does not entail any loss for any other player.
In the Externality treatment, falsely reporting a winning coin toss yields a
high income for the stakeholder at the expense of the idle player’s earnings.
In this case, stakeholders are imposing a negative externality on someone to
(illegitimately) seek their own profit.3
Note that in all treatments the rules used to resolve the outcome of the
risky option were common knowledge from the beginning of the experiment
– i.e., before stakeholders made any decision. In line with Cappelen et al.
(2013), we also informed stakeholders at the beginning of the experiment
that the study comprised two stages. For comparability, we use the same
wording as in the reference paper (Cappelen et al., 2013): “Stage 2 of the
experiment concerns the distribution of earnings from Stage 1. Details of
the second stage will be provided after the first stage is complete.” Only at
the end of a session were stakeholders informed about the rules of stage 2.
2.2.3 STAGE 2: SPECTATORS’ REDISTRIBUTION DECISIONS
In stage 2, spectators decided how to redistribute the sum of earnings
within a pair of stakeholders. For each pair, the spectator was informed
about the stakeholders’ choices in each decision (see Table 21) and of the
outcomes if the risky option had been chosen. In the Externality treatment,
3It is not impossible to imagine that a fair minded stakeholder might want to choose
the risky option and purposefully report a losing coin toss to ensure the high income for
the idle player. A stakeholder with very high costs of cheating and high sensitivity to
inequality might choose this option. However, in a Fehr and Schmidt (1999b) framework,
a stakeholder would never choose such an option, unless the reputation cost of being
mistakenly associated as a cheater is larger or equal to the high income itself. Yet in this
case a stakeholder might simply choose the safe option. Downward cheating to favor the
idle player seems unlikely, also in light of the fact that the idle players are not especially
deserving, as they are drawn from the same population and do not make any decision.
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for stakeholders who chose the risky option, the earnings of the idle player
were reported. If the stakeholder chose the safe option, the consequences for
the idle player read: “outcome determined by the computer.” No further
information about the exact amount for the idle player was given in this case.
When redistributing money between the two stakeholders (not between the
idle players with which the two stakeholders were paired), spectators could
redistribute the sum of the earnings of the two stakeholders from stage 1
in steps of 25 tokens. The payment for spectators themselves was a fixed
amount and they were not affected by the stakeholders’ decisions, and hence
had no material self-interest at stake. This avoids any kind of personal
self-serving bias on the part of spectators and allows us to elicit impartial
and unbiased fairness views (Konow, 2000, 2009).
In the Nature treatment, spectators were informed that the mechanism
used to determine the outcome of the risky option was a random draw
performed by the computer, yielding the high or low income with equal
probability. In the Self-Report and Externality treatment, instead, they were
informed that stakeholders had to self-report the outcome of a coin toss to
resolve the risky option. In the Externality treatment, spectators were also
informed about the idle players and how their earnings were determined.
Each spectator was exposed to only one treatment and had to make
20 redistribution decisions (see Table A-1 in the Appendix for further
details). One of these redistribution choices was payoff-relevant for a pair of
stakeholders, but spectators were not informed which one was relevant.
2.2.4 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
STAKEHOLDERS. Stakeholders were recruited via Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk, henceforth) using the behavioral research platform TurkPrime
(Litman et al., 2016).4 For our study, we recruited a total of 600 online par-
4MTurk has gained momentum among social scientists and it is increasingly regarded
as a valid alternative to other data collection techniques, with over 1,000 peer-reviewed
papers relying on the platform (Litman et al., 2016). MTurk participants – often referred
to as “workers” – represent a massive dataset of potential participants from a wide range
of countries and with a diverse backgrounds. Monetary incentives for MTurk workers
are often lower (at least in absolute terms, much less so in relative terms) than in the
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ticipants - 120 in Nature and 240 each in Self-Report5 and in Externality. In
Externality, 120 online participants were assigned to the role of stakeholders
and the other 120 to the role of idle players. The latter were asked to read
the instructions given to the stakeholders and to answer the same control
questions. They were made aware of how their potential bonus payment
was generated but had no decision to make.
Participation was restricted to subjects from the U.S. with a high comple-
tion rate to minimize attrition.6 Decisions were collected via SoSci (Leiner,
2014). Only participants who were able to answer all control questions
correctly were allowed to participate. After two incorrect trials, stakehold-
ers were automatically excluded from the study and were prevented from
re-taking it. The stakeholders’ average payment was about $2, including a
$0.60 participation fee. The task lasted on average 8 minutes (implying an
average hourly rate of about $15, which is comparable to many laboratory
experiments). Idle players spent on average 7 minutes until completion, and
earned on average $1.20, including a $.30 participation fee.
We believe the task in Stage 1 is particularly well suited for MTurk
for two main reasons. First, the task is extremely simple and short, hence
reducing potential concerns about understanding and concentration. Sec-
ond, conducting the experiment on MTurk grants a degree of privacy to
participants that would be difficult to achieve in the lab. Stakeholders
were identified by a code and they completed their assignment over the
internet from home or a place of their choice. Hence, there was no possi-
bility for the experimenter to observe the result of the coin toss used in
the Self-Report and Externality treatments to determine the outcome of
the risky option. Given the complete separation between participants and
laboratory; however, there is evidence that reduced incentives have little or no effect on
behavior (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2011; Litman et al., 2015).
5Initially, we had 120 online stakeholders in Self-Report, as in the other two treatments.
After feedback from seminar participants, we added 120 more participants in Self-Report
because we wanted to collect beliefs among spectators. That also required additional
data collection of stakeholders on MTurk.
6We recruited only experienced online workers. All of them had taken part in at least
50 previous assignments and had successfully completed at least 95% of these assignments.
The average completion rate was 97.5%.
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experimenter, stakeholders could easily infer that the experimenter had no
way to detect cheating.
SPECTATORS. We recruited 237 students from the University of Cologne
to act as spectators. Two sessions, with a total of 57 subjects, were assigned
to the Nature treatment.7 Four sessions, with a total of 120 subjects, were
assigned to the Self-Report treatment. Two further sessions, with a total
of 60 participants, were assigned to the Externality treatment. All sessions
were conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER)
a few days after collecting data on MTurk. Subjects were recruited using
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the experiment was programmed using z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to a
cubicle and no form of communication was allowed. A paper copy of the
instructions was distributed to spectators and instructions were read aloud
to assure common knowledge (see Appendix). Spectators could proceed
to the proper experiment only after having answered all control questions
correctly. Socio-demographic characteristics and personality traits (HEX-
ACO Personality Inventory-Revised, Ashton and Lee 2009) were collected at
the end of the experiment. Spectators were paid a fixed amount of e10 for
the redistribution part, including a show-up fee of e4. The average session
lasted about 45 minutes.
In two of the four Self-Report sessions (60 spectators) and in both
Externality sessions (60 spectators), we additionally elicited beliefs and risk
aversion. After making their redistribution choices, spectators were asked
to answer the two following questions about the stakeholders:
• What is the percentage of participants in the online assignment that
chose the risky option?
• Consider now only the online participants who have chosen the risky
option: what is the percentage of participants who reported Heads?
7Due to a low show-up rate in one Nature session, we have only 57 spectators in this
treatment. The number of pairs of stakeholders from MTurk was instead 60. The three
extra-pairs were paid exactly the amount they had earned in Stage 1, as if there was no
redistribution.
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Please recall that Heads yielded an income of 800 tokens and Tails 0
tokens.
For the sake of simplicity, we elicited beliefs only for a safe level of 300
tokens. Beliefs were incentivized with a stepwise quadratic scoring rule
(see Instructions in the Appendix) and six randomly selected spectators per
session – of 30 subjects each – were paid based on one of the two questions.
To elicit a spectator’s risk aversion (as a control variable for the redis-
tribution choices), we followed the task proposed by Eckel and Grossman
(2008). Spectators were presented with five options, of which they had to
pick one. In each option, there was a 50% chance of a low payoff and a 50%
chance of a high payoff. The low and high payoffs changed for each option.
Higher expected payoffs were associated with higher risk. One randomly
selected spectator per session was paid for this task. On average, spectators
earned additionally e4 from the belief-elicitation and risk task.
2.3 RESULTS
In this section, we first present the results for the stakeholders’ behavior.
Then we continue with the discussion of redistribution patterns among
spectators.
2.3.1 STAKEHOLDERS’ RISK-TAKING AND CHEATING BEHAVIOR
The bars in Figure 21 show the relative frequencies with which stakeholders
choose the risky option, conditional on the income from the safe option
(ranging from 100 to 500 tokens) and on the treatment (left for Nature, right
for Self-Report, bottom for Externality). We observe a clear downward trend
in the relative frequencies of choosing the risky option in all treatments,
dropping from 75-79% for a safe income of 100 tokens to 17-27% for a safe
income of 500 tokens. A series of χ2 tests fail to reveal any significant
difference in risk-taking between Nature and Self-Report as well as between
Nature and Externality for any safe income level (the p-values ranges from
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p = 0.122 to p = 0.875).8 For the comparison between Self-Report and
Externality, χ2 tests reveal a significant difference only for the safe income
level of 500 (p = .042), while the other four comparisons are insignificant.
The fraction of stakeholders who always choose the safe option is also similar
across all three treatments, with 17% in Nature, 20% in Self-Report and 18%
in Externality. Moreover, stakeholders display a high degree of consistency
in their choices in all treatments, as less than 7% switch more than once
between the risky option and the safe option.
Result 1. The relative frequency of choosing the risky option is not sig-
nificantly different between Nature and the other two treatments. In all
treatments, risk-taking drops as the income from the safe option increases.
Figure 21 also shows the relative frequency of getting the high income
from the risky option (see circles for averages and whiskers for confidence
intervals). On the left-hand side, we see that in the Nature treatment this
relative frequency is not significantly different from 50%, due to the fact
that the outcome of the risky option was determined by a random computer
draw. On the right-hand side of Figure 21, we note instead that in the Self-
Report treatment stakeholders report having been lucky in their coin toss
significantly more often than chance would predict (see Confidence Intervals
in Figure 21). In fact, conditional on choosing the risky option, they claim
the high income in 72% of cases. Among all stakeholders in Self-Report,
32% declared having been lucky in all instances where they chose the risky
option. In the bottom part of Figure 21, we can observe that the behavior
in the Externality treatment is remarkably similar to Self-Report. Among
the stakeholders who chose the risky option in Externality, 76% claimed the
8It is interesting to note that the possibility to report a favorable outcome at one’s
discretion does not induce a change in risk-taking behavior in Self-Report and Externality.
Compared to Nature, one would think that stakeholders in the two treatments with
cheating opportunities only switch from the safe option to the risky one, but not vice
versa. However, if subjects have a preference for being seen as honest, even risk-lovers
could prefer to choose the safe option to avoid looking dishonest when reporting a lucky
draw. In line with the evidence by Abeler et al. (2018) and Gneezy et al. (2018), our
results suggest that direct costs of lying and reputation concerns are not negligible for a
sufficiently large fraction of stakeholders, which could explain that the relative frequency
of choosing the risky option does not differ between treatments.
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Figure 21: Relative frequency of risky choices and high income
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high income (significantly more than predicted by a fair coin) and 35% of
the stakeholders report to always have been lucky. This seems to suggest
that the presence of negative externalities did not deter stakeholders from
cheating.
Result 2. Many stakeholders cheat in the Self-Report and Externality treat-
ments as the observed fraction of stakeholders reporting the high income
from the risky option is significantly larger than 50% in these two treatments.
Yet, stakeholders do not cheat to the full extent, as in roughly one quarter of
the cases they report the low income (of zero tokens) when they could have
easily claimed the high income.
2.3.2 SPECTATORS’ REDISTRIBUTION DECISIONS
Our 237 spectators made a total of 4,740 redistribution decisions. In 316
cases, there was nothing to redistribute because both stakeholders had
earned the low income of zero tokens from the risky option. In addition,
there are 1,133 cases where both stakeholders had the same positive income
(either by having chosen the same safe option or by having earned the high
income from the risky option). In virtually all of these instances (97.3%),
spectators did not redistribute any income from one stakeholder to the
other, as they had the same income to begin with. Therefore, we have a
total of 3,291 (out of 4,740) cases with income inequality between the two
stakeholders. In the majority of these cases (59%), spectators modified the
initial distribution of earnings and their intervention was almost always
aimed at reducing disparities. Only in less than 5% of cases (169 in total)
did they increase inequality.
For the cases with strictly positive inequality, we can distinguish between
three types of pairs in order to provide a more detailed analysis of redistribu-
tive behavior. In the first pair, henceforth called 800-0, both stakeholders
chose the risky option, but only one stakeholder earned the high income
of 800 tokens, while the other earned the low income of zero tokens. The
second pair is labeled Safe-0. One stakeholder in such a pair chose the safe
option and received an intermediate income in the range from 100 tokens to
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Figure 22: Redistribution Index by pair composition and treatment
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500 tokens. The other stakeholder earned zero tokens after having chosen
the risky option. The third pair is denoted as Safe-800. In this pair, one
stakeholder earned the high income of 800 tokens from the risky option, and
the other one chose the safe option with an intermediate income from 100
tokens to 500 tokens.
Figure 22 reports the extent of redistribution, depending on the type of
stakeholders’ pair. The vertical axis presents a measure of redistribution
that we call Redistribution Index (RI) which is defined as follows:
RI =
piRpre − piRpost
piRpre −X/2
where piRt are the earnings for a stakeholder R before (t = pre) or after
(t = post) the redistribution stage, and X are the pair’s total earnings. We
indicate as the richer stakeholder R the person in the pair with the larger
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earnings before the redistribution stage.9 An index RI = 0 indicates no
redistribution at all, while RI > 0 indicates that spectators have shifted
resources to the poorer stakeholder. An RI = 1 means that spectators have
implemented an equal split of the pair’s total earnings. For RI > 1 the
pre-redistribution ranking of stakeholders is reversed – what used to be the
richer stakeholder before the redistribution is now the poorer one.10
In Figure 22, we observe the highest degree of redistribution – RI = 0.67
on average – in the pairs of the type 800-0. Furthermore, in these pairs
there are only minor differences in the extent of redistribution across the
three treatments.
In the Safe-0 pairs, the redistribution is much smaller, RI = 0.42 on
average, compared to the case in which both stakeholders made the same
ex-ante decision. In Safe-0 pairs we observe only a moderate increase
in redistribution in Self-Report compared to Nature. This is noteworthy
because stakeholders reporting the low income of zero tokens in the Self-
Report treatment are almost certainly honest subjects who resisted the
temptation of cheating about their income. Spectators would have had the
chance to reward such honest stakeholders by redistributing more money in
their favor in the Self-Report treatment than in the Nature treatment, since
spectators can infer honesty in the Self-Report treatment, but not in the
Nature treatment. The introduction of externalities triggered a somewhat
higher level of redistribution (RI = 0.52 versus RI = 0.35 in Nature). This
could be explained by the fact that a stakeholder reporting a low income
in the Externality treatment automatically grants a high income to an idle
player. Such an action can hence be interpreted as an additional sign of
kindness and not only of honesty, suggesting that spectators reward kindness.
Although spectators do not seem to reward honesty, they strongly react
to potential dishonesty. We see this in the right-most bars in Figure 22,
9Please recall that we only consider cases with pre-redistribution inequality and
therefore can always uniquely identify the richer stakeholder in the pair.
10For 800-0 and Safe-0 pairs the RI can only take values between 0 and 2. Negative
values, as well as values larger than 2, are possible only for the Safe-800 pairs. Overall,
we observed a negative RI index in 5.45% of the Safe-800 pairs and a RI > 2 in 5.25%
of the Safe-800 cases.
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where the redistribution in pairs of the type Safe-800 is shown. Here we
note that the average redistribution index is only 0.30 in Nature, but that
it increases to 0.48 in Self-Report and even to 0.62 in Externality. Hence,
when a high income of 800 tokens is potentially caused by cheating and the
respective stakeholder is paired with someone who chose the safe option,
spectators are much more willing to take away money from such a stakeholder
than when they can be sure that the stakeholder had no means of earning
such a high income through dishonest behavior.
Table 22 reports a series of GLS estimations providing statistical support
for the evidence in Figure 22. In Table 22, the dependent variable is the
Redistribution Index and the main explanatory variables of interest are
dummies for the Self-Report treatment, the Externality treatment, for Safe-0
pairs, and for Safe-800 pairs, thus taking 800-0 pairs as benchmark. In ad-
dition, we are interested in the interaction between Self-Report, respectively
Externality, and the dummies for pair composition. Model 1 in Table 22
only considers treatment dummies. Both for Self-Report and Externality the
coefficients are positive, but only for Externality it is significant – showing
that the level of redistribution gets larger when cheating is associated with
externalities on powerless third parties. In Model 2, we add dummies for
Safe-0 and Safe-800 pairs and both coefficients are negative and highly
significant, thus suggesting less inequality reduction as compared to 800-0
pairs. In Model 3, the positive and highly significant coefficient for the
interaction between the treatments (Self-Report as well as Externality) and
Safe-800 confirms the observation from Figure 22 that there is more redis-
tribution in these pairs in the Self-Report and Externality treatments than
in the Nature one. Redistribution remains significantly larger in Externality
than in Nature (see post-estimation test at the bottom of the Table), but
the differences between Self-Report and Externality fail conventional signifi-
cance (with p-values slightly larger than 0.1; see bottom of Table 2). These
results from models 1 to 3 are robust after controlling for socio-demographic
characteristics and personality traits (Model 4) and after introducing fixed
effects for the safe income level (Model 5).
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Result 3. Redistribution is lowest in Nature, intermediate in Self-Report,
and highest in Externality. This general pattern is most pronounced in
pairs where one rich stakeholder (with high income of 800) is paired with
a poorer one who chose the safe intermediate amount. In these pairs, the
possibility of cheating on the side of rich stakeholders triggers significantly
more redistribution through spectators than when cheating is not an option
(in Nature).
2.4 ESTIMATION OF FAIRNESS VIEWS
Our experimental design allows estimating spectators’ fairness views based
on their 20 redistribution choices. We are going to introduce a discrete
choice random utility model (following Cappelen et al. 2007, 2013) and
then present the distribution of fairness views, showing how the shadow of
cheating leads to a strong shift in this distribution. At the end of this section,
we will examine how the estimated fairness views depend on spectators’
beliefs, their personality traits, and their political orientation.
For the estimation of different types, we assume spectators are only
motivated by fairness views, because self-interest does not play a role in
our set-up, given the flat payment of spectators. Specifically, if X is the
total income in the pair of stakeholders to which a spectator is assigned, we
assume that the spectator’s utility from giving y to the first and X − y to
the second stakeholder is given by:
V (y; ·) = −β(y − F k)2/2X
where F k is the fair amount allocated to the first stakeholder according to
the spectator’s fairness view k and where β is the weight attached to fairness.
A spectator’s utility is decreasing in the distance between the amount (y)
allocated to the first stakeholder and the fair amount F k prescribed by the
fairness view k.
Spectators can differ along two dimensions: (i) how much they care
about fairness (β); and (ii) their fairness views (F k). In line with previous
papers, we consider three possible types of fairness views:
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Table 22: Determinants of the Redistribution Index
Dependent variable:
Redistribution Index
(RI)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Self-Report treatment
(d)
0.117 0.115 0.052 0.079 0.065
(0.087) (0.086) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094)
Externality treatment
(d)
0.221** 0.219** 0.114 0.158 0.146
(0.100) (0.099) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108)
Safe-0 pair (d) -0.233*** -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.308***
(0.028) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
Safe-800 pair (d) -0.195*** -0.319*** -0.319*** -0.359***
(0.021) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049)
Self-Report x Safe-0 0.033 0.033 0.057
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066)
Self-Report x Safe-800 0.132** 0.132** 0.160***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.061)
Externality x Safe-0 0.053 0.053 0.078
(0.076) (0.076) (0.077)
Externality x Safe-800 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.227***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.067)
Constant 0.412*** 0.559*** 0.618*** 0.994*** 0.976***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.077) (0.327) (0.326)
Controls No No No Yes Yes
Safe level fixed effect No No No No Yes
Post-estimation F-tests
Self-Report vs. Exter-
nality †
– – p = .107 p = .108 p = .187
Nature vs. Externality § – – p < .001 p < .001 p < .001
N.obs 3291 3291 3291 3291 3291
R2 (overall) 0.011 0.025 0.027 0.049 0.053
Notes: GLS regression with individual random effects. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗ and ∗∗ indicate
significance at the 1% and 5%, respectively. The regressions only include pairs with
strictly positive pre-redistribution inequality. Dummy variables are indicated by
(d). Controls include the following variables: Male takes value 1 for males and 0 for
females. Political orientation was measured on a scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right) in
the final questionnaire. Center takes value 1 for participants that indicated a value
between 4 and 7, and 0 otherwise. Right takes value 1 for participants that indicated
a value between 8 and 10, and 0 otherwise. The Honesty-Humility score is based
on the HEXACO-PI. “Persons with very high scores on the Honesty-Humility scale
avoid manipulating others for personal gain, feel little temptation to break rules, are
uninterested in lavish wealth and luxuries, and feel no special entitlement to elevated
social status.” (http://hexaco.org/scaledescriptions) Inequality (questionnaire)
is a self-reported variable ranging from 1 (a society should aim to equalize incomes)
to 10 (a society should not aim to equalize income). † Self-Report vs. Externality,
test of joint significance: Safe-0 = Safe-800 & Self-Report x Safe-0 = Self-Report x
Safe-800 & Externality x Safe-0 = Externality x Safe-800. § Nature vs. Externality,
test of joint significance: Externality = 0 & Externality x Safe-0 = 0 & Externality x
Safe-800 = 0.
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• Libertarians never support redistribution, and no matter what the
severity of, and the reasons for, the inequality are, they leave the
earnings within a pair of stakeholders unaltered. If x is the income of
the first stakeholder before redistribution, we have FLibertarians = x,
which yields the optimal choice y = x.
• Egalitarians always eliminate inequality within a pair and split the
earnings equally: FEgalitarians = X/2, which yields the optimal choice
y = X/2.
• Choice Egalitarians eliminate inequality only when the disparities
are generated by luck in case two stakeholders have chosen the same
option (i.e., the risky option), but do not redistribute if inequality
reflects differences in choices (safe option vs risky option):
FChoiceEgalitarians =
X/2 if C1 = C2x if C1 6= C2
where Ci takes value 1 if stakeholder i chooses the risky option and 0
if he/she chooses the safe option with the safe income level.
Looking at the descriptive data, we observe that 73.1% of all decisions
correspond exactly to one of the three types (68.8% in Nature, 75.4% in
Self-Report and 71.5 % in Externality).11 These fractions correspond to
the number of decisions consistent with the action prescribed by at least
one fairness view, and they do not indicate the fraction of spectators being
classified as pure types.
Since we let all spectators make 20 redistribution decisions, we can
estimate the likelihood with which a spectator belongs to any of the three
different types of fairness views. Given a spectator’s fairness view k, we
consider a discrete choice random utility model of the form
U(y; ·) = V (y; ·) + εiy for y = 0, 25, . . . , X (2.4.1)
11Note that our fraction of 73.1% of decisions that match at least one type is remarkably
similar to the 71.1% reported in Cappelen et al. (2013) for their experiment in Norway.
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where εiy is assumed to be i.i.d extreme value distributed and, to control
for individual heterogeneity in noisy behavior, β is assumed to be log
normally distributed with log(β) ∼ N (ζ, σ2). Denoting by Li,k the individual
likelihood conditional on being of type k, we can obtain the total likelihood
of an individual by considering the finite mixture of types Li =
∑
k λ
kLi,k,
where λk is the probability of being of type k.12
Figure 23: Estimation of fairness views
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%). The results are based on a discrete choice
random utility model.
Figure 23 and Table A-2 in the Appendix report the estimated proportion
of types, λk13. Libertarians account for a fairly large share of the spectators
in all treatments, ranging from 40% in Self-Report and Externality to 46%
in Nature. Apart from this similarity, the distribution of fairness types
differs substantially between Nature and the two treatments where cheating
is possible (likelihood ratio tests: Nature versus Self-Report, χ2(4) = 13.696;
p = .008; Nature vs. Externality, χ2(4) = 17.468, p = .002).
12For further details on the estimation strategy, please refer to section 2.5 in the
Appendix or see Cappelen et al. (2013).
13Numerical integration is performed using 100 Halton draws for each observation
(Train, 2009)
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In Nature, only 12% of spectators are Egalitarians, while a large share of
spectators (41%) are Choice Egalitarians. This pattern is completely reversed
when cheating is possible. In Self-Report, 36% of spectators are classified as
Egalitarians and only 24% as Choice Egalitarians. When cheating comes
with an externality, the reversal becomes even more striking, as in Externality
we classify 45% as Egalitarians, and only 15% as Choice Egalitarians. In
other words, under the shadow of cheating spectators are much less likely
to condition their redistribution decision on whether the two stakeholders
chose the same action – i.e., the risky option – or not. Rather, unconditional
egalitarianism becomes much more prominent. As a consequence, there are
two diametrically opposed fairness views that dominate in the treatments
with a possibility to cheat (to get rich): Libertarians who do not want to
redistribute anything, and Egalitarians who prefer redistribution to the
fullest extent.
We observe a difference also in the distribution of fairness views between
Self-Report and Externality – albeit this difference is much smaller than the
one between Nature and the other treatments. The fact that cheating imposes
negative consequences on an idle player leads to an even stronger shift in
spectators’ fairness views compared to costless cheating (χ2(4) = 9.282,
p = .054 for Self-Report versus Efficiency). The potentially illegitimate
claim of the high income now intercepts another person’s income, making
cheating not just an unethical, but also harmful action. This leads spectators
to redistribute more than when stakeholders only cheated for their own
benefit, without causing negative externalities on others.
Result 4. The shadow of cheating produces a large and statistically signif-
icant shift in fairness views. While the fraction of Libertarians is similar
across treatments, the share of Egalitarians becomes three to four times as
large in the treatments where cheating is an opportunity. This implies that
the shadow of cheating creates a polarization of fairness views, even more so
in Externality than in Self-Report.
To test the accuracy of our type classification, we compute the ex-
post probability of any specific spectator to belong to a particular fairness
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Figure 24: Fairness types and posterior probabilities
(a) Nature
 7% 35%
37%
Egalitarian ChoiceEgalitarian
Libertarian
(b) Self-Report
30% 19%
34%
Egalitarian ChoiceEgalitarian
Libertarian
(c) Externality
40%  5%
33%
Egalitarian ChoiceEgalitarian
Libertarian
Notes: Each vertex of the triangle represents a fairness type
and the bubbles in the corners report the relative frequency of
spectators for whom we estimate a posterior probability higher
than 90% of being of that particular type.
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type. Figure 24 reports the simplex with the posterior probability for each
spectator – see Conte and Hey (2013) for a similar exercise. Each vertex
of the triangle represents one fairness type and each dot represents one
spectator. The bubbles in the corners report the percentage of spectators
who have a posterior probability higher than 90% of being that type. We
can observe that the vast majority of the spectators – 79% in Nature, 83% in
Self-Report, and 78% in Externality – are located in one of the three corners,
hence suggesting that types are identified with great precision. The shift in
fairness types from Nature to the other two treatments is illustrated on the
horizontal axis at the bottom of all triangles in Figure 24 where we see the
shift from Choice Egalitarians (in Nature) to Egalitarians (in Self-Report
and Externality).14
THE ROLE OF BELIEFS. Next, we present some further analysis to inves-
tigate what might determine a spectator’s fairness views. A straightforward
candidate to drive one’s fairness views is beliefs. It could be that spectators
with different fairness views hold significantly different beliefs about the
likelihood with which a stakeholder’s high income might have been caused by
cheating. For instance, one could imagine that Libertarians want to abstain
from any kind of redistribution because they expect stakeholders to be
(mostly) honest and therefore see no reason to take money away from them.
Similarly, one could argue that Egalitarians favor extensive redistribution
because they expect high income to be undeserved and (mostly) the result
of cheating.
Figure 25, however, suggests that there is no correlation between beliefs
and types.15 This figure is based on data from two Self-Report and two
Externality sessions in which we asked a total of 60 spectators in each treat-
ment to guess (in an incentive compatible way) the fraction of stakeholders
14Actual and predicted redistribution choices are reported in the Appendix in Figures
A-2 to A-4.
15See also Tables A-3 and A-4 in the Appendix for regressions. Both in Figure 25 and
Tables A-3 and A-4 we define types based on posterior probabilities. Each spectator is
assigned to a particular type if the posterior probability of being of that type is at least
0.5. The results are robust to more demanding cut-offs of 0.7 and 0.9, for instance.
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who choose the risky option and how many of the latter report the high
income. To avoid any priming or experimenter demand effect, we elicited
beliefs only at the end of the session, after spectators had made all their
distributive choices. For the sake of brevity, we elicited beliefs only for the
income level of 300 tokens in the safe option.
For this safe level, spectators expect 58% of stakeholders to choose the
risky option in Self-Report and 59% in Externality. The expected fraction
is quite close to the actual frequency (of 52% in Self-Report and 51% in
Externality) with which stakeholders choose the risky option when the
safe option pays 300 tokens (see right-hand side and bottom of Figure 21).
Spectators expect on average that 74% of stakeholders who choose the risky
option in Self-Report report the high income (70% in Externality), even
though truthful reporting would yield a 50% chance for the high income.
The expected fraction of reporting the high income (74%, respectively 70%)
is again very close to the actual share of stakeholders reporting the high
income (in case the safe option pays 300 tokens: 67% and 71% in Self-Report
and Externality, respectively).
Interestingly, Figure 25 reveals that there are no differences in the beliefs
of spectators with different fairness views and this is true for both treatments.
We consider this a noteworthy finding. For instance, both Libertarians and
Egalitarians expect three quarters of stakeholders who choose the risky option
to report the high income. Evidently, both Libertarians and Egalitarians
infer from this large fraction of high income that cheating is going on, but
they nevertheless make opposite redistribution choices. Hence, fairness views
are obviously not significantly driven by the beliefs about the risk-taking
behavior and the expected honesty of stakeholders.16
16In order to address potential concerns about spectators’ beliefs being elicited only
after 20 redistribution choices, we also elicited beliefs among students not involved
in the redistribution task. For that purpose, we invited 289 additional students from
an Introductory Microeconomics course at the University of Cologne to predict (in an
incentive compatible way) the stakeholders’ behavior, conditional on the different levels
of income from the safe option. For the safe amount of 300 tokens, they expected 66%
of stakeholders to choose the risky option (where the actual relative frequency is 52%).
Students estimated that on average 69% of stakeholders who choose the risky option
would report the high income while, in fact, the actual number is 67%. Hence, these new
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Figure 25: Spectators’ beliefs about stakeholders’ behavior
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of spectators’ beliefs
about the percentage of stakeholders choosing the risky option
(light gray) and about the percentage of stakeholders reporting
the high income (black), by fairness views. The white line
inside the boxes indicates the median of the distribution, the
box represents the interquartile range, and the whiskers extend
to the most extreme data point which is no more than 1.5
times the interquartile range. Dots indicate outliers, i.e., data
points lying outside the whiskers.
Result 5. Libertarians, Egalitarians, and Choice Egalitarians hold very
similar beliefs about risk-taking and cheating among stakeholders (in the
Self-Report and in the Externality treatment), but nevertheless make different
redistribution choices.
2.5 CONCLUSION
The growing gap between the haves and have-nots has revived a debate about
what constitutes a fair level of redistribution to alleviate income inequalities
students who had not taken part in any of our treatments before were very capable of
predicting the relative frequency of cheating among stakeholders, even when they were
not asked to make redistribution choices themselves. This evidence suggests that our
design did not induce any bias in spectators’ beliefs.
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within societies. This debate does not reject the possibility that income
inequalities per se may actually work as an incentive for increasing efforts on
the side of the less well-off. Accordingly, it is understood that there is a trade-
off between efficiency and equality (Balafoutas et al., 2013). Whether a given
society leans more towards incentives for efficiency – by largely refraining
from redistribution from the rich to the poor in the hope of increasing
effort levels – or favors more equality – by supporting more redistribution –
depends largely on the perceived sources of income inequality (Konow, 2000;
Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Cappelen et al., 2013; Mo¨llerstro¨m et al., 2015;
Alma˚s et al., 2016; Konow et al., 2016).
In this paper, we have introduced the possibility of cheating as a poten-
tially important source of income inequality into the framework. We have
studied how the shadow of cheating affects fairness views and the desired
level of redistribution from the rich to the poor. A major motivation for
our study was the observation that citizens in countries with larger income
inequalities are also more likely to perceive their fellow citizens as corrupt
and dishonest. Hence, cheating behavior can be suspected to be a source
of income inequality. While it seems undisputed that income inequalities
clearly caused by cheating should be eliminated, the situation becomes much
less clear when it cannot be proven whether income inequalities have been
caused by wealthy subjects cheating, or whether the wealthy acquired their
income by honest means. Such ambiguous situations are hard to study in
the field because too many other factors (such as institutional and legal
frameworks, or the effectiveness of the legal system to detect cheating) come
into play to isolate the effect the shadow of cheating casts on fairness views.
For this reason, we have presented the first controlled laboratory experiment
on how potential cheating as the source of income inequalities affects fairness
views of impartial spectators who can redistribute money in pairs of rich
and poor stakeholders. Our experimental treatment variation has allowed
us to implement two otherwise identical conditions: one in which income
inequalities cannot be caused by cheating, and another one in which cheating
may well be the reason for income inequalities, but where spectators have
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no means to detect it. This implies they must take the shadow of cheating
into consideration while making their redistribution decisions.
We have found a substantial shift in the distribution of fairness views
when spectators know that cheating is possible. More precisely, under the
shadow of cheating, we have observed a split of the spectators into two
diametrically opposed subpopulations. On one side of the spectrum are
Libertarians who abstain from any redistribution, no matter what might be
the source of income inequalities. On the other side of the spectrum are
Egalitarians who implement perfect equality.
The polarization of fairness views under the shadow of cheating is mainly
driven by a strong shift from Choice Egalitarians – who do not redistribute
between stakeholders when they have generated their income from different
actions – to Egalitarians. Under the shadow of cheating, spectators face
the conundrum of whether to take money away from a rich person who has
either rightfully earned it or who may have purposefully acted dishonestly
to profit from an unobservable situation. The strong increase in Egalitarian
fairness views in such an environment may reflect the spectators’ wish to
reward stakeholders who chose the safe option and thus refrained from the
temptation of falsely reporting their earnings. This tendency is even more
pronounced in Externality, hence suggesting that a considerable portion of
the population might feel especially strongly about supporting the welfare
state when innocent parties suffer losses as a byproduct of someone else’s
unethical behavior.
While the shadow of cheating has led to a large increase in the number
of Egalitarians, we find it remarkable that the proportion of spectators with
a Libertarian point of view has remained practically the same across all
treatments. The fairness views of these spectators have not been significantly
altered by suspected unethical behavior. This suggests that either dishonesty
itself is not a good reason for these spectators to reduce inequality or they are
concerned to wrongfully take money away from truly lucky stakeholders who
have truthfully reported their income. We can rule out that Libertarians have
different beliefs about the honesty of stakeholders than Egalitarians or Choice
Egalitarians have. We consider the lack of differences in beliefs an important
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finding. Indeed, Libertarians deliberately refrain from redistributing despite
knowing that some of the income disparities are caused by cheating on the
part of the rich. Likewise, Egalitarians support an equal distribution of
income although they acknowledge that some inequalities were not caused
by dishonesty on the part of the rich.
Overall, the shadow of cheating has created a polarization of fairness
views at opposite ends of the spectrum, having Egalitarians on the one
end and Libertarians on the other end. This polarization has been most
pronounced in the case where cheating had a negative externality on a
powerless third party (in treatment Externality). We consider it a plausible
assumption that negative externalities of cheating are rather the rule than
the exception, for which reason we argue that the extent of the polarization
of fairness views observed in Self-Report is most likely measuring a lower
bound.
Overall, our findings suggest that the shadow of cheating could lead
to increased social tensions and more disruptive changes in redistribution
policies when political majorities swing back and forth between one camp
(of Egalitarians) and the other camp (of Libertarians). Politicians might
want to take this factor into account when setting the legal and institutional
framework that is intended to prevent illicit behavior of citizens. In fact,
failing to fight dishonesty will not only cause more illicit activities, but
– according to our findings – it will also contribute to a polarization of
fairness views and a demand for redistribution. The latter effect is likely
an overlooked side-effect of failed attempts to fight corruption and illegal
activities, which are often at the root of large income inequalities (Glaeser
et al., 2003).
39
APPENDIX A: TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure A-1: Gini Index and Corruption Perception Index
Notes: The graph reports data for 120 countries. The coefficient and
significance level are obtained from an OLS regression. Data for the
Gini coefficient are from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID
release 3.4 https://www.wider.unu.edu/data). For each country, we
considered the most recent year available. For the sake of homogeneity,
we excluded countries with data only prior to year 2010 from the analysis.
In case of multiple sources for the selected year, we computed the Gini
coefficient as the average of all available sources. A coefficient of 0%
indicates complete equality, a coefficient of 100% indicates complete
inequality. The Corruption Perception Index is based on data from
Transparency International (https://www.transparency.org/) and
refers to year 2016 for all countries. An index of 0 indicates that a
country is perceived as highly corrupt, while an index of 100 indicates
that a country is perceived as very clean.
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Figure A-2: Actual and predicted income redistribution - Nature treatment
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Notes: “Actual” refers to the choice made by the spectators. “Pre-
dicted” refers to simulated choices obtained using the discrete choice
random utility model and the estimated parameters in Table A-2.
For each spectator, we run 1000 simulations of the 20 choices he/she
faced. In each simulation, we randomly draw a fairness view F k
and a β in accordance with the estimated parameters. Panel (a)
shows actual and predicted choices in pairs of the type 800-0 ; Panel
(b) shows actual and predicted choices in pairs of the type Safe-0 ;
and Panel (c) shows actual and predicted choices in pairs of the
type Safe-800.
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Figure A-3: Actual and predicted income redistribution - Self-Report treat-
ment
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(c) Safe-800
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Notes: “Actual” refers to the choice made by the spectators. “Pre-
dicted” refers to simulated choices obtained using the discrete choice
random utility model and the estimated parameters in Table A-2.
For each spectator, we run 1000 simulations of the 20 choices he/she
faced. In each simulation, we randomly draw a fairness view F k
and a β in accordance with the estimated parameters. Panel (a)
shows actual and predicted choices in pairs of the type 800-0 ; Panel
(b) shows actual and predicted choices in pairs of the type Safe-0 ;
and Panel (c) shows actual and predicted choices in pairs of the
type Safe-800.
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Figure A-4: Actual and predicted income redistribution - Externality treat-
ment
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(c) Safe-800
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Notes: “Actual” refers to the choice made by the spectators. “Pre-
dicted” refers to simulated choices obtained using the discrete choice
random utility model and the estimated parameters in Table A-2.
For each spectator, we run 1000 simulations of the 20 choices he/she
faced. In each simulation, we randomly draw a fairness view F k
and a β in accordance with the estimated parameters. Panel (a)
shows actual and predicted choices in pairs of the type 800-0 ; Panel
(b) shows actual and predicted choices in pairs of the type Safe-0 ;
and Panel (c) shows actual and predicted choices in pairs of the
type Safe-800.
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Table A-1: Procedures and generation of decision sequence
Nature Self-Report and Externality
Scenario Stakeholder 1 Stakeholder 2 Safe level Stakeholder 1 Stakeholder 2 Safe level
Based on pilot experiments
1 Safe 800 300 Safe 800 400
2 800 0 200 Safe 0 300
3 0 0 200 Safe 800 200
4 0 0 100 800 0 300
5 800 0 100 800 0 200
6 0 0 100 Safe Safe 400
7 Safe 800 300 0 800 200
8 Safe 800 100 800 800 100
9 0 Safe 100 800 800 200
10 Safe Safe 400 800 Safe 100
11 800 Safe 500 Safe 800 400
12 0 0 100 800 Safe 400
13 0 Safe 500 Safe Safe 500
14 0 0 300 Safe 800 500
15 800 0 100 Safe 800 400
16 Safe 0 400 800 800 200
Pre-defined by the experimenter
17 Safe 0 Si Safe 0 Si
18 800 Safe Si 800 Safe Si
19 0 800 Si 0 800 Si
Relevant for stakeholders’ earnings
20 stakeholder 1 stakeholder 2 S stakeholder 1 stakeholder 2 S
Notes: Each stakeholder faced 20 scenarios. Scenarios 1 to 16 were based on a pilot
experiment with 30 stakeholders per treatment and ran a few weeks prior to the proper
experiment. Even though the sequences were pre-determined, all pairs were a possible
outcome. Each scenario was generated by randomly drawing a pair (with reposition)
and by randomly selecting a safe level for each chosen pair. The relevant outcomes for
the selected pairs and safe level are reported in the table. The first 16 scenarios were
treatment specific. Data from the pilot experiment on MTurk and the code to generate
the sequence are available upon request from the authors. The outcomes (Safe, 800, 0)
for the scenarios 17 to 19 were defined by experimenters and represent pairs with initial
inequality. The safe level for these scenarios, Si, was randomly drawn. An independent
random draw was performed for each spectator. The randomly selected safe level was
kept constant across scenarios 17 to 19. Finally, the last scenario was the payoff-relevant
one. Each spectator was assigned to one pair of stakeholders.
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Table A-2: Estimation of types
Nature Self-
Report
Externality Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Nature
& Self-
Report
Nature &
External-
ity
Self-
Report &
External-
ity
All
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
λLibertarians 0.463 0.403 0.399 0.418 0.419 0.401 0.411
(0.071) (0.047) (0.069) (0.039) (0.049) (0.039) (0.034)
λEgalitarians 0.123 0.356 0.447 0.282 0.293 0.216 0.323
(0.048) (0.046) (0.068) (0.036) (0.045) (0.034) (0.032)
λChoiceEgalitarians 0.415 0.241 0.154 0.300 0.288 0.384 0.266
(0.072) (0.043) (0.057) (0.038) (0.047) (0.038) (0.032)
ζ 4.635 5.297 5.026 5.110 5.019 5.092 5.082
(0.117) (0.059) (0.062) (0.051) (0.059) (0.040) (0.038)
σ 3.161 3.351 2.937 3.103 2.978 3.045 3.049
(0.127) (0.070) (0.077) (0.058) (0.065) (0.047) (0.044)
logLik -1871.573 -5413.893 -3064.689 -7292.313 -4944.996 -8483.223 -10362.72
Degrees of freedom 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Notes: The likelihood is maximized in R using the BFGS method with mle2 function (bbmle package).
One population share and its standard error are calculated residually. Numerical integration is perfomed
using 100 halton draws for each observation (Train, 2009). Models 1 to 3 report estimates separately
by treatment: Nature, Self-Report, and Externality. Model 3 to 6 estimate pooled data from a pair of
treatments, while Model 7 pools all the data.
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Table A-3: Beliefs and fairness views – Self-Report treatment
Dep. var.: Risky choices High income
Ex-post beliefs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Egalitarians (d) -1.506 -0.266 -1.979 -0.424
(5.109) (5.728) (5.127) (5.705)
Choice egalitarians (d) -0.245 0.216 -1.527 0.691
(5.250) (5.853) (5.268) (5.829)
Male (d) -3.201 3.818
(4.948) (4.928)
Age (years) -0.007 0.207
(0.869) (0.866)
Honesty-Humility score -1.254 -0.052
(0.926) (0.922)
Center (d) 1.835 2.488
(5.426) (5.404)
Right (d) 4.764 1.064
(8.249) (8.215)
Inequality (survey) -0.986 0.970
(1.090) (1.086)
Risk aversion -1.996 -2.300
(1.637) (1.632)
Constant 58.941*** 85.837*** 75.122*** 71.084***
(3.336) (25.859) (3.348) (25.754)
N.obs. 60 60 60 60
R2 0.002 0.068 0.003 0.082
Notes: OLS regression. In Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the
estimated frequency of risky choices; in Models 3 and 4, the dependent
variable is the estimated fraction of subjects who report the high income
from the risky investment. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates significance at the 1%
level, respectively. Dummy variables are indicated by (d). Risk aversion
takes values from 1 to 6, where 1 indicates risk aversion and 6 risk loving.
See Table 22 for the explanation of the other regressors. Post estimation
tests for Egalitarians = Choice Egalitarians: Model 1: p = .824; Model 2:
p = .938; Model 3: p = .937; Model 4: p = .857.
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Table A-4: Beliefs and fairness views – Externality treatment
Dep. var.: Risky choices High income
Ex-post beliefs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Egalitarians (d) 1.964 -1.072 -1.007 3.945
(3.899) (4.362) (3.955) (4.553)
Choice egalitarians (d) 4.784 0.923 1.688 8.513
(6.137) (7.258) (6.225) (7.575)
Male (d) -1.598 9.247**
(4.081) (4.259)
Age (years) -1.000*** -0.065
(0.329) (0.343)
Honesty-Humility
(score)
0.179 -0.396
(0.766) (0.799)
Center (d) 0.612 -0.283
(4.724) (4.931)
Right (d) -3.328 -4.074
(6.667) (6.959)
Inequality (survey) 0.223 1.144
(1.088) (1.136)
Risk aversion 1.516 -0.359
(1.456) (1.520)
Constant 57.217*** 75.430*** 69.872*** 66.304***
(2.837) (15.394) (2.877) (16.067)
N.obs. 60 60 60 60
R2 0.011 0.213 0.004 0.161
Notes: OLS regression. In Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the
estimated frequency of risky choices; in Models 3 and 4, the dependent
variable is the estimated fraction of subjects who report the high income
from the risky investment. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗ and ∗∗ indicate significance at
the 1% and 5%, respectively. Dummy variables are indicated by (d). Risk
aversion takes values from 1 to 6, where 1 indicates risk aversion and 6
risk loving. See Table 22 for the explanation of the other regressors. Post
estimation tests for Egalitarians = Choice Egalitarians: Model 1: p = .636;
Model 2: p = .759; Model 3: p = .656; Model 4: p = .502.
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APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
In this Appendix, we provide further details about the estimation of fairness
views (based on Cappelen et al. 2007, 2013).
Given the random utility model in equation (2.4.1) and under the assump-
tion that εiy is i.i.d. extreme value distributed and that log(β) is N (ζ, σ2),
we can write the likelihood contribution of a spectator i conditional on
fairness view k as follows:
Li,k(ζ, σ) =
∫ ∞
0
 ji∏
j=1
eV (yij ;F
k,β,·)∑
s∈Yij e
V (s;Fk,β,·)
 f(β; ζ, σ)dβ (2..1)
where f(·) is the density function of the log normal distribution and yij is the
allocation chosen by spectator i from the choice set Yij = {0, 25, . . . , Xij}
that spectator i faces in the redistribution decision j.
To calculate the total likelihood contribution of spectator i, we take the
weighted sum of the conditional likelihood Li,k
Li(λL, λE, λCE, ζ, σ) =
∑
k∈{L,E,CE}
λkLi,k (2..2)
where λk is the population share of spectators with fairness view k ∈
{L,E,CE}. kL corresponds to Libertarians view, kE corresponds to Egali-
tarians view, and kCE corresponds to Choice Egalitarian view. Finally, the
total log-likelihood is obtained by taking the sum of the log of the total
likelihood contributions of each spectator.
Parameters are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood with 100
Halton draws for each observation (Train, 2009). One population share and
its standard error are calculated residually. The estimation is performed in
R using the BFGS method with mle2 function (bbmle package).
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APPENDIX C: INSTRUCTIONS
Instructions for stakeholders (MTurk)
The study comprises two stages. Please find below the instructions for stage 1. Stage
2 of the study concerns the distribution of earnings from stage 1. Details of the second
stage will be provided after the first stage is completed.
STAGE 1
If you complete the study, you will earn a fixed amount of $0.60 plus a bonus that
depends on your choices. All earnings are expressed in tokens that will be converted into
real money at the end of the study ($1=300 tokens).
The study will take about 10 minutes to complete (including the time for reading
the instructions). You will receive a code to collect your payment via MTurk upon
completion.
YOUR TASK
You will face five decisions. In each decision, you have to choose between two options:
option A and option B (see Table B-1).
Table B-1
Decision Option A Option B
1 100 for sure 800 with prob 50% or 0 with prob 50%
2 200 for sure 800 with prob 50% or 0 with prob 50%
3 300 for sure 800 with prob 50% or 0 with prob 50%
4 400 for sure 800 with prob 50% or 0 with prob 50%
5 500 for sure 800 with prob 50% or 0 with prob 50%
OPTION A IS SAFE. The safe amount changes in each decision: it ranges from
100 tokens in decision 1 to 500 tokens in decision 5.
OPTION B IS RISKY. Option B is the same for all five decisions. If you select
option B, you have a 50% probability of earning 0 tokens and a 50% probability of earning
800 tokens. [Nature only: If you choose option B for a given decision, the computer
will resolve the lottery. The outcome will be reported in the end.] [Coin & Ext. only:
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If you choose option B for a given decision, after the last decision you have to flip a coin.
If the coin lands face-up on Tails you get 0 tokens, if it lands face-up on Heads you get
800 tokens. Please notice that you have to report the outcome of the coin flip truthfully.
You may also use justflipacoin.com to virtually flip a coin.]
[Ext. only:
You will be matched with another worker. The other worker will be informed about the
rules and will have to answer control questions.
The bonus of this other worker will be either 0 or 800 tokens. The bonus is determined as
follows:
• If you choose Option A (safe), the bonus for the other worker is randomly
determined by the computer (each outcome has the same probability of being drawn).
That is, your choice will not affect the bonus of the other worker;
• If you choose Option B (risky), your bonus and the bonus of the other worker
will depend on your coin flip:
– If you report that the coin landed face-up on TAILS, you earn 0 tokens and
the other worker earns 800 tokens;
– If you report that the coin landed face-up on HEADS, you earn 800 tokens
and the other worker earns 0 tokens
]
At the end of the study, the computer will randomly select one decision that will be
relevant for stage 2. Further details about stage 2 will be provided later.
If the instructions are clear, please enter your MTurk worker ID and proceed to the
control questions for stage 1.
=⇒ ——— new screen ——— ⇐=
Suppose you chose Option A (safe) in decision 2. What is your outcome in this
decision?
2 The outcome is 200 for sure
2 The outcome is 800 for sure
2 The outcome can be either 0 or 800
2 There is no bonus for sure
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=⇒ ——— new screen ——— ⇐=
Suppose you chose Option B (risky) in decision 4. What is your outcome in this
decision?
2 The outcome is 400 for sure
2 The outcome is 800 for sure
2 [Coin & Ext. only: You will toss a coin to determine] [Nature only: A
random draw of the computer will determine] the outcome that can be either 0 or
800
2 There is no bonus for sure
=⇒ ——— new screen ——— ⇐=
Ext. only Suppose you chose Option B (risky) in decision 4. You flip a coin and
self-report HEADS. What is the outcome?
2 You will receive 0 and the other worker 800
2 You will receive 800 and the other worker 0
2 Both, you and the other worker will receive 800
2 Both, you and the other worker will receive 0
=⇒ ——— new screen ——— ⇐=
Ext. only Suppose you chose Option A (safe) in decision 4. What is the outcome?
2 You will receive 0 and the other worker 400
2 You will receive 400 and the other worker 0
2 You will receive 800 and the other worker 0
2 You will receive 400 and the bonus of the other worker will be determined by the
computer
=⇒ ——— text in case of wrong answer ——— ⇐=
=⇒ ——— new screen: sample screen for decision 1 ——— ⇐=
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DECISION 1 Please decide between option A and B.
# Option A (safe): 100 tokens
# Option B (risky): 0 or 800 tokens
Please remember that in option B the two outcomes (0 and 800 tokens) are equally
likely. [Nature only: If you choose option B, the computer will resolve the lottery. The
outcome will be reported in the end.]
[Ext. only: If you choose option A you will receive that amount for sure while the other
worker will determine his outcome independently.] Coin and Ext.: If you choose option
B after the last decision you have to flip a coin. If it lands face-up on Tails you will get
0 tokens [Ext. only: and the other worker 800]. If it lands face-up on Heads you get
800 tokens [Ext. only: and the other worker 0]. Please notice that you have to report
the outcome of the coin flip truthfully. You may also use justflipacoin.com to virtually
flip a coin.
=⇒ ——— new screen: sample screen for result 1 ——— ⇐=
DECISION 1 – COIN FLIP [COIN AND EXT. ONLY] You chose Option B
(risky) in decision 1.
Please flip a coin and indicate the outcome. If it lands on Heads you receive 800 tokens,
if it lands on Tails you will receive 0 tokens.
Please report your answer truthfully.
# Tails: 0 tokens [Ext. only: for you and 800 tokens for the other worker ]
# Heads: 800 tokens [Ext. only: for you and 0 tokens for the other worker ]
You may also use justflipacoin.com to virtually flip a coin.
=⇒ ——— new screen: stage 2 and beliefs ——— ⇐=
STAGE 2
Thank you for completing stage 1 of the study. We will now explain stage 2. In stage
2 you will be randomly matched with another worker (partner, henceforth), who has
completed the exact same study as you have. One of the 5 decisions will be randomly
selected.
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A third person will be informed about the assignment, the rules, your choice and
your partner’s choice in the selected decision. In case you or your partner chose option B
(risky), the third person is also informed about the [Coin & Ext. only: self-reported]
outcome of the [Nature only: random draw.] [Coin & Ext. only: coin toss.]
The third person will be given the opportunity to redistribute the total amount of
tokens generated between you and your partner. The total amount redistributed to you
and to your partner must be equal to the sum of tokens you two got in the selected
decision. The third person can leae everything as it is, or he/she can give some of your
tokens to your partner or vice-versa. The redistribution done by the third person will
determine your bonus for the present assignment. You will receive your bonus within one
week from the completion of the assignment.
Please answer the following questions for stage 2:
In decision 3 you selected Option [A safe/B risky - and your [Coin &Ext.
only: self-reported] outcome was [XX] tokens]. Suppose your partner chose Op-
tion A (safe) for decision 3. A third person will now redistribute the sum of tokens,
which equals [SUM], between you and your partner. How do you think the tokens will be
redistributed?
(NOTE: The distributed tokens must sum up to [SUM] tokens.)
Amount of tokens you will receive: [blank]
Amount of tokens your partner will receive: [blank]
In decision 3 you selected Option [A safe/B risky -and your [Coin & Ext.
only: self-reported] outcome was [XX] tokens]. Suppose your partner chose Op-
tion B (risky) with the [Coin & Ext. only: self-reported] outcome of 0 tokens
for decision 3. A third person will now redistribute the sum of tokens, which equals
[SUM], between you and your partner. How do you think the tokens will be redistributed?
(NOTE: The distributed tokens must sum up to [SUM] tokens.)
Amount of tokens you will receive: [blank]
Amount of tokens your partner will receive: [blank]
In decision 3 you selected Option [A safe/B risky - and your [Coin & Ext.
only: self-reported] outcome was [XX] tokens]. Suppose your partner chose Op-
tion B (risky) with the [Coin & Ext. only: self-reported] outcome of 800
tokens for decision 3. A third person will now redistribute the sum of tokens, which
equals [SUM], between you and your partner. How do you think the tokens will be
redistributed?
(NOTE: The distributed tokens must sum up to [SUM] tokens.)
Amount of tokens you will receive: [blank]
Amount of tokens your partner will receive: [blank]
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=⇒ ——— new screen: validation code ——— ⇐=
VALIDATION CODE. Please enter this code <code here> in the MTurk
HIT to complete the study.
IMPORTANT: you need to enter this code to collect your payments.
=⇒ ——— new screen: last screen ——— ⇐=
Thank you for completing this study. Your answers were transmitted. You may
close the browser, window or tab now.
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Instructions for idle stakeholders (Ext. treatment only)
If you complete the study, you will earn a fixed amount of $0.30 plus a bonus
which can be either 800 tokens or 0 tokens. All earnings are expressed in tokens that will
be converted into real money at the end of the study ($1=300 tokens).
In this HIT there are two types of roles: worker 1 and worker 2. You have been
assigned to the role of worker 2.
YOUR TASK:
Your task is to read worker 1’s instructions. The instructions will give a detailed explana-
tion of the task carried out by worker 1 and are also important for you as they explain
how your bonus – either 0 tokens or 800 tokens – is determined. It is important that you
read the instructions for worker 1 carefully, as you will be asked to answer a number of
questions concerning these instructions.
The study will take about 10 minutes to complete (including the time for reading the
instructions). You will receive a code to collect your payment via MTurk upon completion.
You will only be able to receive the code if you answer all questions correctly.
=⇒ ——— new screen ——— ⇐=
Please read the instructions for worker 1 below and then proceed to the next page to
answer the questions.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR WORKER 1
Worker 1 will face five decisions. In each decision, he has to choose between two options:
option A and option B (see Table B-2).
OPTION A IS SAFE. The safe amount changes in each decision: it ranges from
100 tokens in decision 1 to 500 tokens in decision 5.
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Table B-2
Decision Option A Option B
1 100 for sure 800 with prob 50% or 0 with prob 50%
2 200 for sure 800 with prob 50% or 0 with prob 50%
3 300 for sure 800 with prob 50% or 0 with prob 50%
4 400 for sure 800 with prob 50% or 0 with prob 50%
5 500 for sure 800 with prob 50% or 0 with prob 50%
OPTION B IS RISKY. Option B is the same for all five decisions. If worker 1
selects option B, he has a 50% probability of earning 0 tokens and a 50% probability of
earning 800 tokens. If he chooses option B for a given decision, after the last decision he
has to flip a coin. If the coin lands face-up on Tails he gets 0 tokens, if it lands face-up
on Heads he gets 800 tokens. Please notice that he has to report the outcome of the coin
flip truthfully. He may also use justflipacoin.com to virtually flip a coin.
Worker 1 will be matched with another worker - worker 2 (you). Worker 2 will be
informed about the rules and will have to answer control questions.
The bonus of worker 2 will be either 0 or 800 tokens. The bonus is determined as follows:
• If worker 1 chooses Option A (safe), the bonus for worker 2 is randomly
determined by the computer (each outcome has the same probability of being
drawn). That is, his choice will not affect worker 2’s bonus;
• If worker 1 chooses Option B (risky), his bonus and worker 2’s bonus will
depend on your coin flip:
– If worker 1 reports that the coin landed face-up on TAILS, he earns 0 tokens
and worker 2 earns 800 tokens;
– If worker 1 reports that the coin landed face-up on HEADS, he earns 800
tokens and worker 2 earns 0 tokens
=⇒ ——— new screen ——— ⇐=
Suppose worker 1 chose Option A (safe) in decision 2. What is worker 1’s outcome
in this decision?
2 The outcome is 200 for sure
2 The outcome is 800 for sure
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2 The outcome can be either 0 or 800
2 There is no bonus for sure
=⇒ ——— new screen ——— ⇐=
Suppose worker 1 chose Option B (risky) in decision 4. What is worker 1’s outcome
in this decision?
2 The outcome is 400 for sure
2 The outcome is 800 for sure
2 Worker 1 will toss a coin to determine the outcome that can be either 0 or 800
2 There is no bonus for sure
=⇒ ——— new screen ——— ⇐=
Suppose worker 1 chose Option B (risky) in decision 4. Worker 1 flips a coin and
self-reports HEADS. What is the outcome?
2 Worker 1 will receive 0 and worker 2 receives 800
2 Worker 1 will receive 800 and worker 2 recieves 0
2 Both, worker 1 and worker 2 will receive 800
2 Both, worker 1 and worker 2 will receive 0
=⇒ ——— new screen ——— ⇐=
Suppose worker 1 chose Option A (safe) in decision 4. What is the outcome?
2 Worker 1 will receive 0 and worker 2 receives 400
2 Worker 1 will receive 400 and worker 2 receives 0
2 Worker 1 will receive 800 and worker 2 receives 0
2 Worker 1 will receive 400 and worker 2’s bonus will be determined by the computer
=⇒ ——— text in case of wrong answer ——— ⇐=
=⇒ ——— new screen ——— ⇐=
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Your bonus. Your bonus is XX tokens.
=⇒ ——— new screen: validation code ——— ⇐=
VALIDATION CODE. Please enter this code <code here> in the MTurk
HIT to complete the study.
IMPORTANT: you need to enter this code to collect your payments.
=⇒ ——— new screen: last screen ——— ⇐=
Thank you for completing this study. Your answers were transmitted. You may
close the browser, window or tab now.
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Instructions for Spectators1
Welcome. The purpose of this study is to investigate how people make decisions.
From now until the end of the study, any communication with other participants is not
allowed. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your
desk to answer it. [Nature & Self-Report sessions without beliefs only: Upon
completion of the study, you will receive a payment of e10, including e4 show-up fee.]
[Ext. & Self-Report sessions with beliefs only: For showing-up on time, you will
receive e4. This study comprises three parts and you can earn additional money during
the study. Payments will be made upon completion of the study, anonymously, and in cash.]
[Ext. & Self-Report sessions with beliefs only:
Instructions for Part 1
For Part 1, you will receive a fixed payment of e6.]
OVERVIEW. You will be presented with 20 decisions, one after the other. In each
decision, your task is to decide how to redistribute the money between an ORANGE
and a BLUE player. One of these decisions will have real monetary consequences for
two individuals that we recruited via an international online marketplace to conduct
an assignment. We will first explain in detail the task we gave to the individuals [Ext.
only:, ORANGE and BLUE,] who participated in the online assignment. After that, we
will provide you with further information about your task.
ONLINE ASSIGNMENT. A few days ago we recruited participants via an in-
ternational online marketplace to conduct an assignment. They were offered a fixed
participation compensation of $0.60. [Ext. only: We will now describe the assignment
for ORANGE and BLUE. Each ORANGE and BLUE player was also matched with a
GREEN player, whose task will be described later on.]
The [Ext. only: ORANGE and BLUE player’s] assignment consisted of 5 decisions.
In each decision, they had to choose between two options: option A and option B (see
Table 1). All values in the assignment were expressed in tokens. Tokens are exchanged at
the rate of $1=300 tokens. Please notice that the amount of money at stake is above the
average amount for similar tasks in the same online marketplace.
1Translated from German. Original instructions are available upon request from the
authors.
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Table B-3: Online decisions
Decision Option A Option B
1 100 for sure 800 with prob. 50% or 0 with prob. 50%
2 200 for sure 800 with prob. 50% or 0 with prob. 50%
3 300 for sure 800 with prob. 50% or 0 with prob. 50%
4 400 for sure 800 with prob. 50% or 0 with prob. 50%
5 500 for sure 800 with prob. 50% or 0 with prob. 50%
Option A is safe. The safe amount changed in each decision: it ranged from 100 tokens
in decision 1 to 500 tokens in decision 5.
Option B is risky. Option B was the same for all five decisions. If option B was
selected, the participant had a 50% probability of earning 0 tokens and a 50% probability
of earning 800 tokens. [Nature only: If a participant chose option B for a given decision,
the computer resolved the lottery at the end of the assignment.] [Self-Report only: If
a participant chose option B, for a given decision, he/she was asked to flip a coin. If the
coin landed face-up, on Tails, the outcome was 0 tokens; if it landed face-up on Heads,
the outcome was 800 tokens. Participants were asked to report the outcome of the coin
flip truthfully and were given a link to flip a coin virtually in case they did not have a
coin with them (see sample screen shot in Figure B-1).]
[Ext. only: Each ORANGE and BLUE player was matched with a GREEN player.
The GREEN player was informed about the rules and had to answer the same control
questions but did not make any decisions. The outcome for GREEN was either 0 or 800
and it was determined as follows:
• If ORANGE or BLUE chose Option A (safe) it did not affect GREEN’s outcome.
GREEN’s outcome (0 or 800) was then randomly determined by the computer
(each outcome has the same probability of being drawn).
• If ORANGE or BLUE chose Option B (risky) he affected GREEN’s outcome:
– If ORANGE or BLUE reported Tails, his outcome was 0 tokens and GREEN’s
outcome was 800 tokens.
– If ORANGE or BLUE reported Heads, his outcome 800 tokens and GREEN’
outcome was 0 tokens.
]
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Figure B-1: Sample screen shot from the online assignment (Self-Report
only)
Figure B-2: Sample screen shot from the online assignment (Ext. only)
Participants were allowed to take part in the assignment only if had they correctly
answered all control questions. After collecting all the data, we randomly formed pairs and
selected at random one of the 5 decisions. After completing the assignment, participants
were told that a third person would be informed about the rules and the outcome of the
assignment, and would be given the opportunity to redistribute the earnings and thus
determine how much they were paid for the assignment.
YOUR TASK. You are the third person and we now want you to choose whether to
redistribute the tokens for the assignment between [Nature & Self-Report only: two
people] [Ext. only: ORANGE and BLUE ]. Your decision is completely anonymous. The
[Ext. only: ORANGE and BLUE ] people who participated in the online assignment
will receive the payment that you choose for them within a few days, but will not receive
any further information.
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Figure B-3: Sample screen shot (Self-Report treatment)
Notes: In the Nature treatment, the sentence “ORANGE reported HEADS” was not
displayed.
Figure B-4: Sample screen shot (Ext. treatment)
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Figure B-3 shows a sample decision screen. In the upper part of the screen, you can
see the initial situation for the ORANGE and BLUE player. For each player, you can see
whether they chose option A (safe) or option B (risky). In each decision, you will be able
to see the amount of tokens yielded by the safe option A. In this example, the safe level
is 500 tokens. [Ext. only: You can also see who determined the outcome for GREEN 1
and GREEN 2.]
In the example in Figure B-3, ORANGE chose option B and BLUE chose option A.
Recall that the outcome of option B is determined [Nature only: by a random draw of
the computer and both outcomes –0 and 800 tokens– have the same probability of being
randomly selected.] [Self-Report & Ext. only: by the toss of a coin. Participants
[Ext. only: ORANGE and BLUE,] in the online assignment, were asked to toss a coin
and self-report the outcome truthfully. If a participant reported TAILS the outcome of
option B was 0 tokens, [Ext. only: and 800 tokens for GREEN]. If the participant
reported HEADS the outcome of option B was 800 tokens [Ext. only: and thus GREEN’s
outcome was 0 tokens].] In this example, the outcome for ORANGE was 800 tokens
[Self-Report & Ext. only: – as he reported HEADS] – [Ext. only: and hence
the outcome for GREEN 1 was 0. BLUE chose option A (safe) yielding an outcome of
500 tokens. Thus GREEN 2’s outcome was determined by a random draw of the computer.]
In the central part of the screen you can see the sum of the tokens by ORANGE
and BLUE players. In the example, the sum of tokens is 1300. Your task is to
decide whether and how to redistribute the total amount of tokens between
ORANGE and BLUE. You can choose any positive amount in steps of 25 tokens,
as long as you redistribute all tokens. In our example, the sum of what you give to
ORANGE and BLUE must be exactly 1300 tokens.
You have to make 20 decisions and one decision will be relevant – that is, it will
have actual monetary consequences – for two individuals who have completed the online
assignment. You will not know in advance which decision is relevant for the earnings of
other individuals. This means that you have to pay attention to every decision.
Before starting, please answer a few control questions.
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=⇒ ——— new section ——— ⇐=
Control Questions
1. Suppose a participant in the online assignment chose Option A (safe) in decision 2
(see Table B-2). What is the outcome of this decision?
2 The outcome is 200 for sure.
2 The outcome is 800 for sure.
2 The outcome can be either 0 or 800.
2 The outcome is 0 for sure.
2. Suppose a participant in the online assignment chose Option B (risky) in decision
4. What is the outcome of this decision?
2 The outcome is 400 for sure.
2 The outcome is 800 for sure.
2 [Self-Report & Ext. only: The participant had to toss a coin to determine]
[Nature only: A random draw of the computer determined] the outcome
that can be either 0 or 800.
2 The outcome is 0 for sure.
3. You are the third person who has to choose how to redistribute the tokens from
the assignment
2 Your identity will be revealed to the participant in the online assignment.
2 One of your decisions will have real monetary consequences for two partici-
pants in the online assignment.
2 You have to make only one decision.
4. Suppose ORANGE chose option A in decision 3. BLUE, instead, chose option
B and [Nature only: the computer selected at random the low amount.] [Self-
Report & Ext. only: self-reported TAILS.] What is the total number of tokens
earned in this situation? (e.g., the sum of the tokens by ORANGE and BLUE)
2 The total number of tokens is 200.
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2 The total number of tokens is 800.
2 The total number of tokens is 1100.
2 The total number of tokens is 300.
5. Suppose the total number of tokens earned in a situation is 1600.
2 You can give 0 tokens to both ORANGE and BLUE.
2 The sum of the tokens you give to ORANGE and BLUE has to be exactly
1600.
2 The sum of the tokens you give to ORANGE and BLUE can be larger than
1600.
2 The sum of the tokens you give to ORANGE and BLUE can be smaller than
1600.
Ext. only:
6. Suppose a participant chosen option B (risky) and self-reported HEADS. What is
the outcome of this decision?
2 The participant receives 0 and GREEN receives 800.
2 The participant and GREEN both receive 800.
2 The participant and GREEN both receive 0.
2 The participant receives 800 and GREEN receives 0.
7. Suppose a participant chose option A (safe) in decision 4. What is the outcome of
this decision?
2 The participant receives 400 and GREEN’s outcome will be randomly deter-
mined by the computer.
2 The participant receives 800 and GREEN 0.
2 The participant receives 400 and GREEN 0.
2 The participant receives 0 and GREEN 400.
8. Which of the following statements is not correct?
2 You will redistribute the sum of tokens between ORANGE and BLUE.
2 GREEN always flips a coin to decide his outcome.
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2 All participants were informed about the rules and had to answer control
questions.
2 GREEN’s outcome is either 0 or 800.
=⇒ ——— new section ——— ⇐=
Final Questionnaire
1. Gender
2 Male
2 Female
2. Age:
3. Field of study
2 Medicine
2 Physics, Biology, Mathematics
2 Computer science
2 Social sciences
2 Psychology
2 Other
4. Please indicate where you were born
2 Schleswig-Holstein
2 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
2 Hamburg
2 Bremen
2 Niedersachsen
2 Hessen
2 Nordrhein-Westfalen
2 Rheinland-Pfalz
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2 Saarland
2 Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
2 Bayern
2 Brandenburg
2 Berlin
2 Sachsen
2 Sachsen-Anhalt
2 Thu¨ringen
2 Outside Germany
5. In political matters, people talk of the left and the right. How would you place
your views on this scale, generally speaking?
O O O O O O O O O O
Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right
6. We now want you to indicate to what extent you agree with the following statement.
1 means that you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 means that
you agree completely with the statement on the right, and the numbers in between
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements.
A society should aim to
equalize incomes.
A society should not aim
to equalize incomes
O O O O O O O O O O
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
7. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
need to be very careful in dealing with people?
2 Most people can be trusted.
2 Need to be very careful.
In addition, subjects answered the 60-item version of the HEXACO Personality
Inventory-Revised Test (http://hexaco.org/hexaco-inventory).
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Instructions for beliefs and risk aversion in the lab2
Instructions for Part 2
In this part, we ask you to guess what people chose in the online assignment explained
before.
YOUR TASK. Please consider the decision between Option A that yields 300 tokens
for sure and Option B that yields 800 with a probability of 50% and 0 with a probability
of 50%. You will have to answer the following two questions:
• Question 1: What is the percentage of participants in the online assignment who
chose Option B (risky)?
• Question 2: Consider now the online participants who have chosen Option B:
what is the percentage of participants who reported Heads? Please recall that
Heads yielded 800 tokens for the participant and Tails 0 tokens for the participant.
YOUR PAYMENT. You can earn a substantial amount of money based on the
accuracy of your guess, as reported in Table B-4. If your guess is correct, you can earn
e22. If your guess deviates from the true value by 5 percentage points (plus or minus),
you can earn e20.90. If your guess deviates by more than 21 percentage points, you can
receive e2 for this part.
Table B-4: Your payment
deviation in percentage points payment
exact number e22.00
between 1 and 5 e20.90
between 6 and 10 e17.60
between 11 and 15 e12.10
between 16 and 20 e4.40
over 21 e2.00
2Translated from German. Original instructions are available upon request from the
authors. This set of instructions was used only in two Self-Report and two Externalities
sessions, for a total of 120 participants.
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After everyone has answered both questions, six participants will be chosen at
random for payment for this part. The selected participants will be paid for one of the
two questions, selected at random. Since you do not know in advance who and which
question will be chosen, it is important that you pay attention to both answers.
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Instructions for Part 3
YOUR TASK. Now, please select one option out of six different options. The six differ-
ent options are displayed in Figure B-5. You must select one and only one of these gambles.
Figure B-5: Options and payments
OPTIONS AND EARNINGS. Each option has two possible colors (green and
red), each with a 50% probabilitie of occurring. Your earnings for this part of the study
will be determined by:
• Which of the six options you select; and
• Which of the two possible colors (green or red) occurs
For example, if you select Option 4 and green occurs, you earn e52. If red occurs, you
earn e16.
At the end of this task, the computer will randomly select one participant for payment.
The computer will then randomly draw one of the two colors (green or red) and the
earnings for the selected participant will be determined. Please remember that for every
option, each color has a 50% chance of occurring.
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Instructions for beliefs in the classroom3
Instructions
Welcome. The purpose of this study is to investigate how people make decisions. [Ex-
perimenter only If you have a question please raise your hand, after the instructions
have been read and one of us will come to your desk to answer it. Your answers will
be treated anonymously.] More specifically, you will be asked to guess the results of a
previous study. [Experimenter only We will now explain both the previous task – an
online assignment – and your task in detail.] From now until the end of the study, any
communication with other participants is not allowed.
ONLINE ASSIGNMENT. We recruited over 100 participants via an international
online marketplace and asked them to make a series of decisions. Participants had to
choose between:
• Option A (safe) yields a safe payment, with the amount specified on your decision
sheet;
• Option B (risky) yields 800 tokens with a 50% probability and 0 tokens with a
50% probability. If a participant chose option B he/she was asked to flip a coin
and self-report the result:
– if the coin landed face-up on Heads the outcome was 800 tokens;
– if the coin landed face-up on Tails the outcome was 0 tokens.
Participants were asked to report the outcome of the coin flip truthfully. Participants
were aware that a self-reported coin toss would resolve the outcome for Option B before
choosing between the two options. All earnings were expressed in tokens and exchanged
at the rate of $1=300 tokens.
YOUR TASK. We ask you to guess what people did in the online assignment. You
will have to answer the following two questions:
• Question 1: What is the percentage of participants who chose Option B (risky)?
• Question 2: Consider now the participants who have chosen Option B: what
is the percentage of participants who reported Heads? Please recall that Heads
yielded 800 tokens and Tails 0 tokens.
3Translated from German. Original instructions are available upon request from the
authors. A total of 289 students participated in the classroom experiment.
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YOUR PAYMENT. You can earn a substantial amount of money based on the
accuracy of your guess, as reported in Table B-5. If your guess is correct you can earn
e22.00. If your guess deviates from the true value by 5 percentage points (plus or minus),
you can earn e20.90. If your guess deviates by more than 21 percentage points, you get
e2.00.
Table B-5: Your payment
deviation in percentage points payment
exact number e22.00
between 1 and 5 e20.90
between 6 and 10 e17.60
between 11 and 15 e12.10
between 16 and 20 e4.40
over 21 e2.00
After everyone has answered both questions, one out of every 20 students will be
chosen at random for payment. The selected students will be paid for one of the two
questions, selected at random. Since you do not know in advance who and which question
will be chosen, it is important that you pay attention to both answers. You can now
make your decisions. Please read the information on the decision sheet carefully.
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Decision sheet
Safe level for Option A = 100 tokens for sure
Participants in the online assignment had to make a decision between Option A and
Option B.
Option A (safe) Option B (risky)
100 tokens 800 tokens if Heads
for sure 0 tokens if Tails
Please answer the following questions
Question 1: What is the percentage of participants who chose Option B (risky)?
%
Please write an integer number between 0 and 100
Question 2: Consider now the participants who have chosen Option B: what is the
percentage of participants who reported Heads? Please recall that Heads yielded 800
tokens and Tails 0 tokens.
%
Please write an integer number between 0 and 100
Gender:
2 Male
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2 Female
Field of study:
2 Economics
2 Economics majoring in sociology
2 Sociology
2 Math
2 Other
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chapter 3
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR OF CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS – A FIRST SURVEY OF EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS RESULTS
Abstract
About 15 years ago, economic experiments with children and
adolescents were considered as an extravagant niche of economic
research. Since then, this type of research has exploded in scope
and depth. It has become clear that studying the development of
economic behavior and its determinants is important to understand
economic behavior of adults and to provide a basis for potential policy
interventions with respect to economic behavior in childhood and
adolescence. Given the huge increase of papers, we provide the first
overview of economic experiments with children and adolescents. We
focus on the following aspects: rationality of choices, risk preferences,
time preferences, social preferences, cooperation, and competitiveness.
All of these aspects are analyzed with respect to the influence of age
and gender, and we also consider the role of socio-economic status or
interventions.
This chapter is joint work with Daniela Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler and Matthias Sutter.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the late 1990ies, Bill Harbaugh, Kate Krause and co-authors pioneered
what has become a very lively field of research since then, namely the exper-
imental study of economic behavior by children and adolescents. Their early
work has set examples of how to run experiments with children and adoles-
cents and which topics can be studied with young experimental subjects,
covering, among others, risk taking, social preferences, rationality of choices,
or bargaining (Harbaugh and Krause, 2000; Harbaugh et al., 2001, 2002,
2003a,b, 2007). While in the early years after their seminal contributions the
number of experimental papers with children was still fairly small and it was
easy to keep track of the whole literature, in the past ten years the number
of experimental papers has flourished tremendously, if not to say that it
has exploded. For this reason, we think it is time to write a first survey of
the main topics in this field of research in experimental economics.1 Given
the explosion of papers, this survey will not be able to mention all of them,
and possibly we have overlooked some papers, but it will try to organize
the literature along different dimensions of economic behavior, and present
the general pattern of results that one can see from reading the literature.
In doing so, we will address children’s and adolescents’ (i) rationality of
choices, (ii) time preferences, (iii) risk preferences, (iv) social preferences,
including allocation games, bargaining games and games of cooperation, and
(v) competitiveness. We will put the main emphasis in each dimension on
the influence of age (typically from 3 year-olds to 18 year-olds) and gender on
economic decisions of children and adolescents. On top of that, we consider
further determinants of economic behavior, such as socio-economic status
of parents, or the social context of interaction (like in-group/out-group
scenarios). The selection of the aforementioned determinants of economic
preferences is based on the fact that these are the most common studied
1Please note that this survey focuses primarily on studies conducted in the field
of experimental economics, aiming to give a detailed insight into economic research
conducted with children. Literature in the field of psychology discussing experimental
settings with children will not be the main focus (see e.g., Warneken, 2018 for a survey
on psychology literature on cooperation in children).
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predictors of children’s economic behavior. Moreover, we will briefly address
very recent studies that have run policy interventions to influence children’s
and adolescents’ economic behavior. The latter type of studies rests on the
knowledge of how economic behavior of children and adolescents looks and
how it develops with age, for which reason this survey puts most weight on
a descriptive analysis of children’s and adolescents’ economic behavior.
In the early years of experimental research with children and adolescents,
editors and referees were often skeptical as to what could or should be learned
from examining the economic behavior of children and adolescents.2 Today,
this type of research seems to be accepted as an established research field,
also at the top journals, for a variety of reasons. First, studying behavior of
children and adolescents can reveal whether economic behavior develops in
characteristic patterns in the course of life. Similar to psychological research
on the development of moral judgments, for instance, economic research is
interested in whether fairness preferences, risk attitudes, impatience, rational
choice behavior or competitive preferences develop in certain ways. Most
behavioral models of social preferences, for instance (see, e.g., Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999a; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002),
have been based on experimental evidence from university students in their
early 20ies. Research with children and adolescents can reveal whether
such models (of non-standard preferences) also apply to pre-adulthood or
whether the behavioral patterns of adults are the consequence of a directional
development with age. Knowing more about such a potential development
is a precondition for possible policy interventions that might try to promote
particular types of behavior (such as patience with respect to attaining
education, or avoiding conflicts through a mutual understanding of fairness
and social norms). Second, from the viewpoint of economic theory it is
interesting to study whether children and adolescents are sophisticated
decision makers that make rational decisions and are capable of applying
fundamental game theoretic concepts (such as backward induction or mixed
2In the early 2000s, the first author of this survey got editorial decision letters
that called experiments with children exotic research that would not help the scientific
community in economics to better understand how markets work, for which reason the
editors recommended to look for outlets in psychology.
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strategy play) in their behavior. This would mean that such fundamental
concepts are useful also to describe (at least parts) of young children’s and
adolescents’ behavior. Third, and related to the first reason, the study
of economic behavior of children and teenagers has gained importance
through the research program of researchers like James Heckman who have
studied how non-cognitive skills influence subjects’ academic attainment,
social and economic success, in particular on labor markets, or their health
(Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Heckman, 2006; Heckman et al., 2006;
Kautz et al., 2014). As non-cognitive skills develop dynamically, early
childhood programs and interventions aiming at improving non-cognitive
skills have proven efficient and beneficial for lifetime outcomes (Heckman,
2006; Kautz et al., 2014). Hence, improving our knowledge of economic
preferences as an important subset of non-cognitive skills contributes to this
strand of literature in the tradition of Heckman.
Of course, experimental research with children and adolescents sometimes
differs in procedural and design details from experimental research with
adults. For example, with pre-school children, it is typically impossible to use
money as incentives. Rather, children can earn tokens that may be exchanged
for small presents (like stickers, candies or toys) in an experimental shop after
an experiment. Salience of rewards is often ensured by showing children the
presents before commencement of the experiment (see, e.g., Harbaugh and
Krause, 2000). Experiments are usually conducted in a controlled setting
in schools or day-care centers, minimizing self-selection effects (see, e.g.,
Harbaugh et al., 2003a, Sutter et al., 2013). To ensure understanding and
full attention experiments with very young children are conducted in a one-
on-one setting where an experimenter explains to a single child the rules of
the experiment, rather than explaining everything in front of a whole group
of participants (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 2008). In general, economic experiments
with children and adolescents, despite the aforementioned differences to
experiments with adults, have become more and more standardized over the
past 10 years, and this standardization is important for making the research
better comparable. For instance, it is customary nowadays to check for
correct understanding by adding control questions about comprehension or
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to preserve anonymity by the use of sliding walls (and by paying with sealed
envelopes or handing over presents in opaque bags). Careful attention is also
paid to avoid spreading information about the experiment among subjects
who have not yet participated in it (which is sometimes not easy in schools
or kindergarten). Most importantly, the standardization of the conduct of
experiments has become much more advanced, for example by extensive
training of experimental helpers to use the same wording and sequence
of explanations when explaining experimental rules to children. Recently,
Schunk et al. (2017) or Hermes et al. (2018) have gone one important
step further in this respect. They ensure comprehension with the support
of animated visual- and audio-aids. More precisely, they use tablets and
headphones to ensure identical delivery of instructions to children which
is a further advance in standardization. Despite these improvements in
methodology, the studies presented in this survey differ here and there in
design or procedural details, which means, for example, that cooperation
rates in a prisoner’s dilemma depend on the exact parameters. For this
reason we are not going into the details of the quantitative results of the
papers discussed here, but rather we focus on qualitative patterns of behavior
across different studies. There is a highly recommended companion paper
by List et al. (2018) that asks how experiments with children can inform
economics and that presents a state-of-the-art overview about the different
methods – and its pros and cons – to run economic experiments with children
and adolescents. The interested reader is referred to this paper for details.
In our survey here we focus on the main results of experimental studies with
children and adolescents.
In each section, we start the survey by presenting the main results
with respect to the influence of age and gender on economic preferences of
children and adolescents. In most sections, we will also refer to the relation
of socio-economic status (SES) of parents to economic preferences of their
offspring. Finally, in some sections we are also going to look at additional
factors, like cognitive factors, in-group favoritism, or policy interventions,
that are discussed in the literature as potentially affecting the economic
behavior of children and adolescents.
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By and large, the literature reveals the following pattern of the rela-
tionship of age and economic preferences.3 In early childhood, children are
relatively self-centered with respect to social preferences, impatient, and risk
tolerant. Only when getting older, in particular in adolescence, subjects’
social preferences shift towards egalitarian and more efficiency-oriented be-
havior, and subjects become relatively more patient and more risk averse
than in early childhood. With increasing age, parochialism becomes more
pronounced as well as subjects favor more often members of their own social
group. With respect to gender, we note large differences in competitiveness
and risk taking, but less clear-cut differences in other behavioral domains.
With respect to social preferences, girls tend to make more altruistic, coop-
erative, and inequality averse choices while boys are more concerned with
efficiency and tend to be more selfish. Concerning socio-economic status
(SES) of parents, it seems that children from a low SES-background are
often less patient, less pro-social and less competitive than children from
higher SES-backgrounds.
In the following, we present more details on economic behavior in child-
hood and adolescence in separate sections for different behavioral categories
and preferences.4 We start our survey with a brief section on the rationality
of children’s economic choices. This section is motivated to address the (un-
warranted) concern that economic choices of children and adolescents might
be random and would therefore contain no systematic insights. Section 3.2
will show that this is not the case, thus lending support that we can draw
meaningful conclusions when looking at different preferences and behavioral
patterns. Section 3.3 is devoted to time preferences, and section 3.4 to risk
preferences. The sections 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 shed light on social preferences,
3When we talk about developments with age, we refer to cross-sectional evidence
from cohorts of different age. Too few studies have a panel structure that could speak to
a within-subject development of economic behavior with increasing age.
4In each section, we concentrate on papers whose main research question addresses that
section’s preference. When a paper uses that section’s preference only as a control variable
to investigate yet another preference, we do not discuss such a paper in that section. To
illustrate the procedure with an example: Studies on children’s competitiveness often
include a measurement of risk attitudes as a control variable to explain competitiveness.
We are not going to include such papers in the section on risk preferences.
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once from individual allocations tasks (section 3.5), once with respect to
bargaining games (section 3.6), and once from games of cooperation (section
3.7). Section 3.8 deals with competitiveness. Finally, section 3.9 concludes
the survey with a short summary and a discussion of open questions and
an outlook about promising further avenues for experimental economics
research with children and adolescents.
3.2 RATIONALITY OF CHILDREN’S CHOICES
Harbaugh et al. (2001) have been the first to show that already at an early
age children are able to make decisions according to basic requirements of
rationality. In their experiment with 7 and 11 year-olds, children of both
age groups have to choose among different bundles to check whether their
choices obey the generalized axiom of revealed preferences (GARP). It turns
out that even the younger children are doing better than chance. Yet, it
is true that the number of preference violations decreases with age. For
instance, only 25% of 7 year-olds, but 60% of 11 year-olds make choices that
are consistent with utility maximization. Compared to an adult subject pool
there is no increase in the rationality of choices between the ages of 11 and
21, showing that rational behavior is prevalent already during adolescence
and comparable to the level of adults.
In addition to making rational choices, the ability to form reasonable
beliefs and make correct inferences further plays an important role in eco-
nomic decision-making. Barash et al. (2018) let children draw from an urn
with different compositions of colored balls in order to study the updating
of beliefs. Younger children (aged 6-8) make decisions based on the previous
outcome, using heuristics to determine their next move. With increasing age
children and young adolescents start to take the entire series of draws into
consideration, but frequently fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy. From age
15 onwards, adolescents increasingly play a Bayesian strategy, in line with
behavior shown by adults. Children hence move closer to behaving rationally
as they grow older (Barash et al., 2018). Similarly, Brocas and Carrillo
(2018a) let children make choices (in a non-interactive version of the game
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“Connect 4”) and check whether they are able to think ahead a few moves.
Similar to Barash et al. (2018), they find that older children are better
in anticipating future moves and thus to reason in a more sophisticated
way. Apesteguia et al. (2018) study imitation of successful choices of others
in children (aged 8-10) and adults (university students). They let their
subjects repeatedly (over 10 rounds) choose to draw a ball from six different
urns with different payoffs. In the baseline treatment subjects are not able
to observe other participants while in the observation treatment subjects
observe the outcome of a draw of another subject. The analysis of the
baseline treatment reveals that all subjects are able to learn across rounds.
However, adults have a steeper learning curve than children. Results from
the observation treatment indicate that children, unlike adults, are not able
to take advantage of the additional information received by observing others,
meaning that they do not engage in rational imitation.
Strategic sophistication is another fundamental requisite of economic
decision-making in interactive contexts. Being able to anticipate an interac-
tion partner’s rationality and incentives is crucial for success in strategic
interactions. Brocas and Carrillo (2018b) study two-person games with 4-7
year-olds where the games are characterized by different levels of iterative
complexity, i.e., the number of iterations before reaching the equilibrium
of the game. They find that older children in their sample are significantly
more likely to reach the equilibrium, but it is reassuring to note that younger
children can also play equilibrium strategies when the iterative dominance
is not too demanding. While Brocas and Carrillo (2018b) notice an age
trend in the degree of strategic sophistication for 4-7 year-olds, Czermak
et al. (2016) find hardly any changes in strategic sophistication in 10-17
year-olds. They let adolescents play two-person normal form games with
different degrees of iterated dominance. Only with respect to the likeli-
hood of eliminating dominated strategies, they observe older adolescents to
have a higher likelihood, but all age groups are equally likely to reach the
efficient (non-equilibrium) outcome of the normal form games. Moreover,
the estimation of strategic types reveals no age differences either, and the
distribution of types is similar to adult university students (Sutter, Czermak,
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and Feri, 2013). Related to the concept of strategic sophistication is the
ability to apply backward induction. Again, this ability seems to increase
with age. Brosig-Koch et al. (2015) examine how children aged 6-15 play
so-called race games in which two players can move sequentially in choosing
numbers (in a predefined interval) until a pre-specified number is reached.
These games can be solved by backward induction, and first movers have an
advantage. They find that first graders of age 6 perform significantly worse
than older children, but that the differences across age diminish as subjects
reach middle adolescence.
Neither rational decision making nor strategic reasoning differs signifi-
cantly by gender for most ages. In early childhood females play equilibrium
at higher rates than their male counterparts (Brocas and Carrillo, 2018b),
while boys are better able to do backwards reasoning than girls until early
adolescence, which is when the gender gap closes (Brosig-Koch et al., 2015;
Czermak et al., 2016).
Cognitive ability affects the extent of rational choice and strategic be-
havior displayed by adolescents. A better math grade positively correlates
with higher strategic sophistication and more rational choices, ultimately
leading to higher payoffs in the experimental games (Harbaugh et al., 2001;
Brosig-Koch et al., 2015; Czermak et al., 2016). Similarly, children who are
assessed by their teachers as suitable for “Gymnasium” (the higher track in
the Austrian school system) are shown to have a steeper learning curve than
those predicted not to reach the “Gymnasium” (Apesteguia et al., 2018).
SUMMARY RATIONALITY OF CHOICES: Already young children show
rational behavior to a considerable extent, obeying the laws of transitivity,
and making (often) correct inferences about the partner’s rationality, and
applying strategic reasoning in choosing their strategy in interactive games.
All of these skills develop and become more pronounced from childhood to
adolescence, implying that adolescents’ behavior assimilates more and more
towards behavior observed in adults. Hence, children and adolescents do not
make decisions randomly but are able to take strategic considerations and
basic principles of rational behavior into account when making economic
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decisions, thus gradually reaching the behavioral patterns observed in adult
subject pools.
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3.3 TIME PREFERENCES
Time preferences are typically measured by letting subjects choose between
a sooner, but smaller payment, and a larger, but later payment. Hence,
they are a measure of how the present and the future (or the nearer and
the more distant future) are traded off. Most studies find that children and
adolescents become more patient as they grow older – i.e., they choose more
often the larger, but later reward instead of a smaller, but sooner reward. In
other words, older subjects are more likely to delay gratification to a later
point in time. This pattern starts already at pre-school or kindergarten
age, as Sutter et al. (2015) have found for 3-6 year-olds who had to choose
between one small present today and two small presents tomorrow (see also
Lemmon and Moore, 2007). Bettinger and Slonim (2007) also report that
older children in their sample of 5-16 year-olds are more likely to wait for
larger rewards in the future. They estimate that one additional year of age
makes subjects about 2% more likely to be patient and choose the larger
reward in the future. The method to elicit time preferences does not seem to
matter, as Angerer et al. (2015b) show. They compare a simple choice list –
where subjects choose between either a specific amount at an earlier point
in time or a larger amount at a later date – with the elicitation method
based on Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), called a convex budget set where
subjects can allocate a specific amount between earlier and later points
in time (and allocations to later points in time are more valuable). Both
methods produce very similar results in a set of 7-11 year-old children, with
older children being more patient with both methods. Using a similar age
cohort of 7-10 year-olds, Deckers et al. (2015) also find older subjects to
choose more often the larger, but later rewards. Only for teenagers, Sutter
et al. (2013) fail to find a positive influence of age on the likelihood to delay
gratification, but rather age is insignificant there for 10-18 year-olds.
While age is predominantly positively related to patience, the evidence
with respect to gender is very mixed and all over the place. The earliest
study of Bettinger and Slonim (2007) finds boys to be less patient than
girls, and Castillo et al. (2011) report the same pattern. However, Golsteyn
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et al. (2014) and Deckers et al. (2015) show the opposite, namely that girls
are less patient than boys. Other studies, like Lu¨hrmann et al. (2018) and
Sutter et al. (2013) in their studies with teenagers or Sutter et al. (2015)
with kindergarten children, indicate no significant gender differences, or only
under very specific conditions (like in Sutter et al., 2013 where they show
weak evidence of females being more patient only in a high stakes condition
with no up-front delay).
Aside from the influence of age and gender, a few design parameters
have expected effects. Children and adolescents react to larger stake sizes
and to shorter waiting times (for the larger, but later reward) by making
more patient choices (i.e., waiting more often). This means that prices and
the duration of waiting influence behavior in a predictable way. Bettinger
and Slonim (2007) find evidence for hyperbolic discounting of children and
adolescents, meaning that if there is a positive upfront delay for the smaller,
but sooner, reward it is more likely that subjects wait for the larger, but
later reward (keeping the waiting time constant, of course).
Family background also matters. Typically, more patient parents have
more patient children which speaks in favor of an intergenerational trans-
mission of this preference (Kosse and Pfeiffer, 2012). Children from low SES
families have been observed to make substantially more impatient choices
compared to children from medium or high SES backgrounds (Deckers et al.,
2017). Regarding ethnicity, Castillo et al. (2011) not only find black children
to be more impatient, but this result to be especially pronounced for black
boys. The discount rate of black boys is on average 14 percentage points
larger than that of black girls or white boys.
Experimentally elicited time preferences have been found to be correlated
to important field behavior, such as health or educational outcomes. A
one standard deviation increase in the discount rate increases disciplinary
referrals in schools by 14% in Castillo et al.’s (2011) sample of 9th graders.
In a follow up, Castillo et al. (2018b) even find that time preferences are
a good predictor of dropping out of high-school or finishing it. Given that
disciplinary referrals in school or becoming a dropout are good indicators
for later outcomes in educational attainment or labor market success (Segal,
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2013), time preferences of adolescents are related to later labor market
outcomes. Subjects who are more patient in time preference experiments
are also more likely to save money from their available weekly allowance
(Benjamin et al., 2013; Sutter et al., 2013; Lu¨hrmann et al., 2018). Con-
cerning health related behavior, higher levels of impatience in children and
adolescents are a significant indicator of spending more money on health
endangering activities such as smoking or alcohol consumption (Sutter et al.,
2013).
Given the importance of time preferences for field behavior, recent
studies have started to investigate whether and how policy interventions
might affect children’s and adolescents’ time preferences such that they might
foster patience. Most notably, Alan and Ertac (2018a) have implemented an
educational intervention promoting forward-looking behavior and patience
in 9-10 year-old children in Turkish schools. The students have been exposed
to a curricular intervention for several weeks, during which they have
encountered various scenario techniques to imagine the trade-off between
present and future. Treated students demand on average about 25% smaller
rewards for a one week delay of gratification, compared to a control group.
The effect is especially pronounced for previously present-biased students
who reduce their demand by about 50%. Delay sensitivity also increases in
15 year-olds after an intervention on enhancing financial literacy in German
schools (Lu¨hrmann et al., 2018).
SUMMARY TIME PREFERENCES: Patience increases typically with
age, as older children and adolescents are typically more likely than younger
ones to choose a larger, but later reward instead of smaller, but sooner
reward. So far, the literature has not produced a clear-cut result on possible
gender differences as results are all over the place, sometimes finding girls to
be more patient, sometimes boys, and sometimes reporting no difference at
all. Socio-economic status of parents is related to children’s and adolescents’
time preferences as a low SES-background is related to more impatient
choices. Importantly, it has been shown that experimentally elicited time
preferences are correlated with important field behavior, such as health or
89
educational outcomes. Finally, patience seems to be a malleable skill as
interventions can have a positive impact on more forward-looking behavior.
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3.4 RISK PREFERENCES
Risk preferences are most of the time measured by letting subjects decide
between a safe amount of money (or a non-monetary reward) and a lot-
tery that pays either a higher or lower amount than the safe alternative.
Sometimes, risk preferences are also measured by giving subjects a fixed
endowment and letting them decide which part of it to invest into a lottery
that has typically a positive expected value (Charness and Gneezy, 2010).
Experimental studies with children and adolescents have elicited risk prefer-
ences for a wide age spectrum, ranging from kindergarten to the late teenage
years. Harbaugh et al.’s (2002) seminal study let children and adolescents
choose between a risky gamble and a safe outcome. They report that the
probability of choosing the risky gamble decreases in adolescents compared
to younger children (especially in the loss domain). The propensity to choose
the gamble over the safe payoff increases with the probability of a win and
decreases with a higher probability of a loss in their sample of 5-20 year-olds.
Harbaugh et al. (2002) conclude that children’s choices are consistent with
the use of subjective probability weights which decrease as children get
older, gradually reaching objective probability weighting in early adulthood.
Deckers et al. (2015) also find that the willingness to seek risk is getting
smaller with increasing age, covering an age range from 7-10 years. Yet, for
adolescents, there is less evidence for an age effect. In fact, Sutter et al.
(2013) find no age effects on risk taking in their set of 10-18 year-olds, nor
do Eckel et al. (2012) for 15-17 year-olds and Munro and Tanaka (2014) for
12-18 year-olds. This suggests that changes in risk preferences might occur
before the teenage years, with children becoming less risk seeking until they
reach teenager age.
Regarding gender differences in risk preferences, there is strong evidence
of girls being significantly more risk averse than boys (Levin and Hart,
2003; Borghans et al., 2009; Moreira et al., 2010; Booth and Nolen, 2012b;
Ca´rdenas et al., 2012; Eckel et al., 2012; Sutter et al., 2013; Deckers et al.,
2015; Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler et al., 2015; Khachatryan et al., 2015; Alan et al., 2017;
Castillo, 2017). This pattern reflects the common knowledge of adult women
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being, in general, more risk averse than adult men (Croson and Gneezy,
2009). The evidence for children and adolescents ranges from very early
childhood, starting at 4 years of age, all the way through adolescence, and
it also stems from many different regions of the world and cultures. One
example for the latter type of work is presented by Ca´rdenas et al. (2012)
who compare two samples of 9-12 year-old subjects in Columbia and Sweden.
In their risk task, children can choose between a lottery that yields 0 or 10
points with equal probability, or choose a safe amount that varies between 2
and 7.5 points. In both countries, boys have a certainty equivalent of the
lottery of about 4.5 points. Also, in both countries, girls are significantly
more risk averse, but the gender differences are much more pronounced in
Columbia (with girls’ certainty equivalent around 3.2 points) than in Sweden
(certainty equivalent around 3.8 points for girls). This evidence suggests that
there might be an interaction of gender and culture in the willingness to take
risks. Booth and Nolen (2012b) point towards another potential interaction
effect by studying how the gender composition in school might affect gender
differences in risk taking. They examine risk taking in single-sex and in
co-education schools. Girls in co-education schools are 36% less likely to
choose a risky lottery while there is no difference in the likelihood to take
risks between boys and girls from single-sex schools. The authors argue
that the environment significantly affects the propensity to take risks as
female-only groups in the experiment induced more moderate risk taking in
girls (irrespective of their school composition). However, Booth and Nolen
(2012b) also discuss the possibility of self-selection effects into single-sex or
co-education schools.
Several papers examine the transmission of risk preferences from parents
to their children and observe similar risk taking behavior within parent-child-
pairs. A mother’s willingness to invest in a lottery correlates significantly
with her child’s risk preferences. Especially mothers who are more involved
in the child’s upbringing have a closely related risk tolerance to that of
their daughters, as Alan et al. (2017) find in their sample of 7-9 year-olds.
This connection of similar risk taking propensities in parents and children
is already prevalent in early childhood, as parents’ and children’s number
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of risky choices are positively correlated, even though overall children from
age 5-8 are more risk seeking than their parents (Levin and Hart, 2003).
Family background also enters via SES as a determinant of children’s
risk taking. Low SES children are generally more risk taking. Deckers et al.
(2017) find that effect size is 23% of a standard deviation, compared to
medium and high SES children. This difference by socio-economic status
decreases with age and the effect diminishes around age 10 (Deckers et al.,
2015). Low socio-economic status has an especially large effect on girls
in Alan et al.’s (2017) sample, as girls in the lowest SES-quartile invested
on average 14 percentage points more in a risky lottery. Castillo (2017)
notes another important influence of family on risk taking. He shows that
domestic violence in families affects children to be significantly more risk
averse. A similar directional effect is observed by Eckel et al. (2012) who
show that having low income peers (outside of the family) makes children
more risk averse.
One other important factor that is often discussed in relation to risk
preferences is cognitive abilities. Yet, here the literature has produced fairly
divergent results. For instance, Benjamin et al. (2013) report high-school
students with higher math grades to make more risk neutral choices. Eckel
et al. (2012) and Sutter et al. (2013), however, do not find a correlation
between math grades and risk taking. Alan et al. (2017) administer sev-
eral tests of cognitive ability, but only one of them (inhibitory control) is
associated with lower risk taking and then only in boys. Castillo (2017)
fails to find any significant relationship of cognitive development in 5 and
8 year-olds and risky choices. Overall, the inconclusive pattern might be
driven by design details and small differences, yet so far it seems unclear
how cognitive abilities are related to risk taking of children and adolescents.
Experimentally elicited risk preferences have also been shown to relate
to relevant field behavior. Castillo et al. (2018a) find that more risk averse
adolescents are less likely to get disciplinary referrals in school and also less
likely to drop out of high school.
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SUMMARY RISK PREFERENCES: The overwhelming majority of studies
find that girls are more risk averse (i.e., less risk tolerant) than boys, and
this pattern persists across childhood and adolescence (and continues in
adulthood). There appears to be an age trend as well, especially in childhood,
as older children are less risk seeking or risk taking than younger children.
This seems to be driven by subjective probability weights that change across
age. Family background is important, as the risk preferences of parents are
typically correlated to those of their offspring, but also as low socio-economic
status of parents is associated with more (and sometimes excessive) risk
taking.
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3.5 SOCIAL PREFERENCES I: INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING
Broadly speaking, social preferences capture the different ways in which
subjects consider own payoffs (or rewards) and others’ payoffs. They capture
standard preferences – that are often defined as subjects caring only for
themselves and ignoring outcomes for others –, but also various forms of
non-standard preferences which allow for positive (and in case of spite also
negative) weights for others’ outcomes in a subject’s utility function. Social
preferences play a role when subjects have to make allocation decisions in
which they split up a pie among themselves and others, with others being
powerless, but also when subjects interact in a strategic game with others,
like in simple bargaining games or games of cooperation. We start the survey
about children’s and adolescents’ social preferences by looking at allocation
tasks that are a form of individual decision making, void of any strategic
interaction. In the following sections 3.6 and 3.7 we will consider interactive
games.
The most often used task to study social preferences of children and
adolescents is the dictator game where a dictator is endowed with a fixed
endowment and subsequently can distribute it between him- or herself and a
powerless recipient. While it is commonly called a game, the dictator game
is, in fact, an individual decision making task. A variant of the dictator
game lets subjects choose between different allocations where the sum of
money distributed in each allocation does not need to be constant across
allocations.
The dictator game (and its variants) has been the most often used
vehicle to study social preferences of children and adolescents. Concerning
the influence of age, the evidence is pretty straightforward: the older subjects
get, the more likely they are to transfer increasing parts of their endowment
to the recipient. This is not to say that subjects become hyper-fair by
offering more than 50% of their endowment, but older ones are less likely
to be selfish by keeping the whole endowment for themselves and also give
more often up to 50%. For instance, in Gummerum et al.’s (2010) study the
modal offer of 3-4 year-olds is to keep everything for themselves, while 5-6
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year-olds choose more often an equal split. Similar trends with very young
children are found in List and Samek (2013), Ben-Ner et al. (2017) or Brocas
et al. (2017), and for elementary school kids, aged 6 to around 10 or 11, it
is also typically observed that older children are more generous towards the
recipient (Harbaugh et al., 2003a; Bettinger and Slonim, 2006; Martinsson
et al., 2011; Blake et al., 2015; Deckers et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2016; Maggian
and Villeval, 2016; Brocas et al., 2017; Sutter et al., 2018).5 This trend
continues also into adolescence, where mean allocations to recipients increase
with age and can reach levels of around 35% of the available endowment
(Harbaugh et al., 2003a; Eckel et al., 2011; John and Thomsen, 2015), which
is a high average compared to about 28% found in a meta-study of dictator
games with adults (Engel, 2011).
A specific design invented by Fehr et al. (2008) allows to define different
types of social preferences. The design consists of three “games” (again
individual decision making tasks) in each of which a subject can choose
among two options. One option is always an egalitarian outcome, while the
alternatives differ in order to be able to classify the social preference type of
a specific subject from the three choices made. While this classification has
some limitations (see Bauer et al., 2014 for an explanation and extension),
the three types for classification are the following: an egalitarian type
who prefers the egalitarian options; a spiteful type who always minimizes
the recipient’s payoff; and an altruistic type that maximize the recipient’s
payoffs. The latter type is indistinguishable from an efficiency-maximizing
type, however. Fehr et al. (2008) study 3-8 year-old children and find
that egalitarian types, i.e., those with a strong aversion against inequality,
become considerably more frequent from age 3 to age 8. Children at the
age of 3-4 behave selfishly to a very large degree, whereas the majority of
children aged 7-8 prefer egalitarian allocations that avoid both advantageous
and disadvantageous inequality. More precisely, about 60% of 7-8 year-
old children can be classified as having egalitarian preferences, while the
5Maggian and Villeval (2016) combine their dictator game with an option to lie about
which allocation was randomly determined by a computer. They found that all children
in their set of 7-17 year-olds have a strong aversion against lying (about 85% do not lie
when it would potentially benefit them).
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corresponding share for 3-4 year-olds is only 20% (see also Bauer et al., 2014
for a similar pattern of age effects). In a follow-up, Fehr et al. (2013) show
that egalitarian types peak at around age 8. Looking at 9-17 year-olds, they
find that efficiency seeking becomes much more prevalent – at the expense
of egalitarianism – with increasing age. Prior to the latter finding, Alma˚s
et al. (2010), have already shown that efficiency seeking becomes the most
important social preference motive in adolescence. Yet, they have added an
interesting twist by letting their dictators divide a pie of money that has
been generated through a real effort task, executed by both the dictator and
the recipient. This allows examining whether social preferences – i.e., sharing
behavior – depend upon the effort invested by dictators and recipients to
generate the pie in the first hand. When efforts – and thus the contribution
to the pie – differ, 10-11 year-olds typically do not condition their allocation
choices on the differences in effort levels. However, adolescents around age 15
do so, and they are predominantly meritocrats who accept unequal earnings
if they are due to unequal effort provision. Most adolescents hence deem
it fair that those who have exerted less effort deserve to earn less (Alma˚s
et al., 2010, 2017).
When it comes to the examination of gender differences in allocation
choices, the predominant finding is that girls are more generous in classical
dictator games and more likely to be of an egalitarian type in the Fehr et al.
(2008) design (Harbaugh et al., 2003a; Bettinger and Slonim, 2006; Houser
and Schunk, 2009; Gummerum et al., 2010; Martinsson et al., 2011; Fehr
et al., 2013; List and Samek, 2013; Angerer et al., 2015a; Deckers et al., 2015;
Chen et al., 2016; Maggian and Villeval, 2016; Angerer et al., 2017). Boys
are more likely to be efficiency seeking types that try to maximize the sum of
payoffs when choosing between different allocations. If multiple options and
recipients are available (as in designs based on Engelmann and Strobel, 2004,
2004), one can also see that girls can be classified more often as a maximin
type that tries to maximize the minimum payoff in the set of people who are
affected by a specific allocation (Sutter et al., 2018). Whereas such gender
differences refer to the decision maker’s gender, Houser and Schunk (2009)
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report also an influence of the gender of the recipient, as both genders share
higher amounts when they are aware that the recipient is male.
Social preferences within families seem to be related between children
and parents, although the relation is not always significant. Ben-Ner et al.
(2017), for instance, find that the generosity of young children, aged 3-5,
in a dictator game is related to parents’ donation to a charity, but that
the relation is significant only for firstborn children (who might be most
strongly influenced by parents because parents could devote most time to
their oldest offspring). Kosse et al. (2018) show that maternal pro-sociality
and interaction patterns are able to predict pro-social behavior of 7-8 year-
olds. The socio-economic status of parents also plays a role. Children from
low SES-backgrounds are less altruistic and more spiteful (Bauer et al., 2014;
Angerer et al., 2015a; Deckers et al., 2015, 2017; Kosse et al., 2018). For
example, only 33% of low SES children prefer the egalitarian option of (1,1)
over option (2,0) in the sharing game of Fehr et al. (2008), while almost half
of high SES children select that option (Bauer et al., 2014).
Given the importance of SES for social preferences and given the relevance
of social preferences as a non-cognitive skill that facilitates cooperation,
Kosse et al. (2018) have run an intervention study to check whether social
preferences are malleable. From control groups they see that there is
a considerable gap in the social preferences of children from low SES-
backgrounds and those from high SES-backgrounds. By implementing a
mentoring program with a mentor who acts as a benevolent friend and
spends time with a child from low SES-families, these treated children score
about 25% of a standard deviation higher on the pro-sociality scale than
children in the control group with low SES, and the intervention even closes
the gap between treated low SES-children and those (untreated) from high
SES-backgrounds. Hence, their study provides causal evidence that social
preferences can be changed. One of the channels through which this works
is that the intervention affects beliefs about pro-social behavior of others.
Another intervention has been run by Cappelen et al. (2016) who have
studied the effects of early education on social preferences by admitting
either children to different preschool programs or by building up a parenting
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academy. These interventions on 3-4 year-olds lead to significantly higher
levels of prosociality at age 7-8, showing that education programs can make
children more prosocial. The literature has also examined other factors
that determine children’s and adolescents’ social preferences. One of them
refers to in-group favoritism, or in other words to the distinction between
in-groups and out-groups. If a recipient belongs to the same social group it
is typically associated with more generous behavior of the decision maker
towards the recipient (Fehr et al., 2008, 2013). The same social group is
usually defined as someone from the decision maker’s class in school, from
the same school or even only someone speaking the same language – whereas
the outgroup is formed by someone from a different class, a different school
or someone speaking a different language (Fehr et al., 2008, 2013). Even
when children act as spectators and have no stakes in the decision, in-group
favoritism is prevalent (Angerer et al., 2017). Especially boys’ allocation
choices are shaped by strong parochialism. While both genders discriminate
against children of a different language group, about one quarter of 6-11
year-old boys decide strongly in favor of their own language group compared
to only about one sixth of girls (Angerer et al., 2017).
Further factors that may affect sharing behavior of children and ado-
lescents range from the information about a recipient’s neediness or the
prevailing social norms in the child’s environment to a child’s level of self-
control. When the recipient is framed as “poor” (e.g., a child with no
toys) or the donated money is given to a charitable cause, children become
more generous. For example, Bettinger and Slonim (2006) observe higher
donations to charities than when children share with their peers (38% versus
26%). Announcing decisions publicly to the classroom – and thus appealing
to social image concerns – further increases the level of sharing in school
children, especially for popular children (Chen et al., 2016). At the same
time, however, a public announcement of decisions can reduce the amount
sent in a dictator game if the situation is framed as a competition where the
winner is the one who keeps the largest amount for him- or herself (Houser
and Schunk, 2009). Furthermore, social norms of sharing play an important
role for children and adolescents as making sharing norms salient induces
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higher rates of giving (Eckel et al., 2011; Blake et al., 2015). The level of
self-control and IQ can positively influence the amount sent, while risk and
time preferences affect donations positively, but in a non-linear way (Eckel
et al., 2011; Angerer et al., 2015a; Blake et al., 2015; John and Thomsen,
2015; Chen et al., 2016).
SUMMARY SOCIAL PREFERENCES IN INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAK-
ING TASKS: Very young children in kindergarten have mostly selfish
tendencies in the dictator game and variants thereof, especially if it is costly
to make a recipient better off. When entering school, children become more
generous towards recipients, in particular needy ones, and they become
in particular inequality averse in later childhood. The predominance of
egalitarianism is not sustained for adolescents, however, as they are pri-
marily motivated by efficiency and social welfare concerns. On top of that,
adolescents become meritocratic, meaning that they make their allocation
decisions dependent on subjects’ levels of exerted effort. Girls are typically
more generous and more inequality averse than boys who care more about
efficiency. Children from low SES-backgrounds are often less pro-social and
less generous, and there is a positive relation between parents’ and children’s
social preferences. Other factors like in-group favoritism or self-control also
play a role for social preferences.
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3.6 SOCIAL PREFERENCES II: BARGAINING GAMES
Social preferences – like a concern for fairness or efficiency – are also impor-
tant in interactive games where two parties bargain with each other (in a
stylized way). The two most often used bargaining games with children and
adolescents are the ultimatum game and the trust game. We deal with each
of them consecutively.
3.6.1 ULTIMATUM GAME
In an ultimatum game, a proposer is equipped with a fixed endowment and
can offer some of it to a responder. The responder can either accept the
offer – in which case the proposed allocation is implemented – or reject
it – in which case both the proposer and the responder receive nothing.
Obviously, fairness concerns of proposers play an important role in this
game, but also strategic considerations due to the responder’s power to
reject what he or she considers an unfair offer.6 Considering the development
of offers in the ultimatum game contingent on age, the literature does not
provide a clear-cut pattern. Harbaugh et al. (2003a) find that offers increase
significantly, but modestly, with age in their sample of 7-18 year-olds. They
use a one-shot ultimatum game with incentives. When any of these two
features is changed, results look differently. Murnighan and Saxon (1998) use
a purely hypothetical scenario, and in such a setting younger children made
larger offers in the ultimatum game than older children. Harbaugh et al.
(2007) repeated an incentivized ultimatum game, and there they find no
age effect on offers in their group of 8-18 year-olds. The pattern of behavior
is qualitatively similar to adult behavior (Gu¨th and Kocher, 2014). When
endowed with ten tokens almost half of children and adolescents propose the
egalitarian outcome of five tokens each, while 20% of proposals are lower than
three tokens (Harbaugh et al., 2007). Across repetitions, Harbaugh et al.
(2007) observe an interesting learning effect that is stronger for younger than
6The strategic considerations refer back to the ability of children and adolescents to
understand strategic games and act sophisticatedly in such games. Section 3.2 has dealt
with this aspect.
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for older children. Receiving a rejection prompts especially young children
in the role of proposer to increase their offer in the next round, indicating
reinforcement learning and strategic behavior. Sutter (2007) also reports
no age effects in his study of mini-ultimatum games with 7-15 year-olds.
In these mini-ultimatum games, proposers always face only two allocations
from which they can choose, and responders can then accept or reject the
selected allocation. One of the available allocations is very unfair, as it
yields 8 units of money for the proposer, but only 2 units for the responder
– noted as allocation (8,2). Varying the alternative allocation – that can
be (10,0), (8,2), (5,5) or (2,8) – it is possible to study the importance of
intentions. For instance, offering (8,2) when the alternative would be (10,0)
is a kind act, while it is not when the alternative is (5,5). It turns out
that both proposals and rejection rates are practically the same for children
(up to age 10) and adolescents (up to age 15), but that both children and
teenagers base their rejection decisions relatively more than adults on actual
outcomes (i.e., payoffs) rather than the proposer’s intentions. This means
that intentionality in a bargaining process is more important for adults than
in pre-adulthood.
Rejection rates in the standard ultimatum game increase monotonically
when offers get smaller, but they are also not contingent on age, as Harbaugh
et al. (2007) show. An insignificant age effect on rejections is also reported
in Castelli et al. (2010), although they note a trend that younger children
seem to accept unfair offers slightly more often. The focus of their paper
is, however, not on age (in their set of 5-10 year-olds), but on the effect of
theory-of-mind on ultimatum game behavior. In this respect, they find that
children who have developed theory-of-mind are more likely to accept unfair
offers.
None of the above mentioned papers report any statistically significant
differences in the size of offers or the acceptance rates between boys and
girls (Harbaugh et al., 2003a, 2007; Sutter, 2007; Castelli et al., 2010), so
gender does not seem to play a major role in ultimatum game behavior.
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3.6.2 TRUST GAME
In a trust game, a trustor has some fixed endowment and can transfer a
fraction (from 0% to 100%) to a trustee. The transferred amount is typically
tripled, and then the trustee can send back any amount that he or she finds
suitable (without any tripling of the return, though). The trustor’s decision
is usually interpreted as a measure of trust, whereas the trustee’s decision
is used to measure trustworthiness. Looking at how much children in the
role of the trustor transfer to the trustee, it is evident that younger children
transfer less than older children. Elementary school children (at roughly age
8-9) pass the smallest amount (Harbaugh et al., 2003b; Sutter and Kocher,
2007). Sutter and Kocher (2007) find a monotonic increase in transfers with
increasing age all the way to adulthood, while Harbaugh et al. (2003b) only
observe an increase until the 9th grade (around age 15), but a decrease in
transfers for 12th graders. Both papers, nonetheless, confirm children and
adolescents to be less trusting than adults.
Relative returns normalize the trustee’s return to the trustor by the
amount of the tripled transfer. These relative returns are reported to increase
with age in Sutter and Kocher (2007). 8-12 year-olds have the lowest return
rate ranging from 10% to 15%, while for adolescents it increases to roughly
30%. Harbaugh et al. (2003b), however, do not observe an increase in
relative returns with increasing age. One potential design difference is
that they use a strategy method for trustees by which the latter have to
indicate their return for each possible level of the transfer, while Sutter and
Kocher (2007) only ask for the return for the actual level of the trustor’s
transfer (so-called direct method). Both studies, however, note that returns
depend positively on transfers, which indicates that reciprocity is a prevalent
behavioral pattern already in childhood and adolescence. Both studies also
agree in the finding that, given the actual return rates, the payoff maximizing
strategy for children and adolescents is to send (close to) zero, while adults
maximize expected payoffs by showing full trust and transferring their full
endowment (Harbaugh et al., 2003b; Sutter and Kocher, 2007).
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Concerning gender effects, both studies find hardly any differences,
except for very narrow age brackets. Harbaugh et al. (2003b) observe higher
trust levels of 8-9 year-old boys, and Sutter and Kocher (2007) higher
trustworthiness of girls aged 8-9. Other than that, gender seems to be
uncorrelated with trust game behavior.
Felfe et al. (2018) present an interesting natural field experiment about
the effects of birthright citizenship on trust in German 15-16 year-olds.
They study the behavior of native and immigrant adolescents, exploiting
a law change in Germany in the year 2000 which automatically awards
newborns within Germany with German citizenship. The hypothesis is that
German citizenship for second-generation immigrants should lead to less
discrimination between natives and immigrants. In fact, this is what they
find, although the effect is significant only for boys. Those born immediately
after the law change almost close the gap in the transfers to natives or
immigrants, while for boys born immediately before the law change, there
is a strong gap of about 20%, thus yielding much lower efficiency levels in
interaction. This natural field experiment shows that behavior of adolescents
is influenced by legal conditions of citizenship.
SUMMARY SOCIAL PREFERENCES IN BARGAINING GAMES: Fair-
ness and efficiency concerns are important in bargaining games. When
running ultimatum games with children and adolescents, they accept equal
splits of the pie most often, and rejection rates increase in the spread be-
tween the proposer’s and responder’s share. Age effects are at best weak,
since fairness concerns seem deep rooted and early developed. In trust
games, transfers of trustors increase with age, which might coincide with the
increasing importance of efficiency when children turn into adolescence, as
shown in the previous section. There is some evidence that trustworthiness
of trustees also increases with age, meaning that the extent of reciprocity
might increase with age. In both games, there are hardly any gender effects
on behavior.
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3.7 SOCIAL PREFERENCES III: GAMES OF COOPERATION
Cooperation is almost always measured by either running a prisoner’s
dilemma game or the generalized version of it, a public goods game. These
games of cooperation are characterized by a tension between individual
incentives to defect (i.e., not cooperate) and a collective interest in coop-
eration as it maximizes social welfare, i.e., the size of the pie that can be
generated in these games.
The majority of studies on cooperation of children and adolescents reveal
that older children are more likely to cooperate, while younger children
defect more often or contribute less in public goods games with a continuous
action space (Fan, 2000; Harbaugh and Krause, 2000; Houser et al., 2012;
Angerer et al., 2016; Brocas et al., 2017). A variant of a prisoner’s dilemma
game is used by Brocas et al. (2017) who let children from age 5 onwards play
an alternating allocation task that is equivalent to a sequential, symmetric
prisoner’s dilemma game in which subjects have to trade off the short term
gains from defection (i.e., selfishly picking the more rewarding option) and
the long term gains from cooperation (going for the equal payoff for both
players). They observe an age trend all the way through childhood and
adolescence as cooperation increases with age. A similar pattern is observed
in Angerer et al. (2016) who let 6-11 year-olds play a prisoner’s dilemma
game (where each subject has 5 tokens and each token sent to the other
player is doubled in value). The 11 year-olds send about 25% more tokens
to their partner than then 6 year-olds, and the increase is fairly linear across
age. Some papers do not show a significant age trend, though. Lergetporer
et al. (2014) and John and Thomsen (2015) observe on average the same
cooperation levels across each age group for 7-11 (10-16) year-olds. Yet,
both papers report a slight – but insignificant – tendency for cooperation
rates to increase with age. Cipriani et al. (2013) find no significant age
effect as well. However, their sample size (with 38 observations) is by far
the smallest in the set of papers considered in this section, for which reason
their null result might be taken with care.
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Overall, girls and boys do not differ noticeably in their likelihood and
extent of cooperation (Fan, 2000; Harbaugh and Krause, 2000; Ca´rdenas
et al., 2014; Lergetporer et al., 2014; John and Thomsen, 2015; Brocas et al.,
2017; Hermes et al., 2018). There is, nonetheless, a slight suggestive tendency
for girls to cooperate more. For instance, Angerer et al. (2017) observe girls
between the ages of 6-11 to be more cooperative than boys. Investigating
gender differences in cooperation between Columbia and Sweden, results
suggest Columbian girls to cooperate less than Swedish girls and Swedish
girls to be more cooperative than Swedish boys. Children also tend to
cooperate more with boys than with girls (Ca´rdenas et al., 2014).
Not much is known about the influence of family background on coopera-
tion levels of children and adolescents. Cipriani et al. (2013) do not find any
effect of their controls for socio-demographic background characteristics, but
note the small sample size. They also fail to find a relation between parents’
behavior and their children’s behavior in the public goods game. Yet, family
bonds do matter for children’s level of cooperation, as Peters et al. (2004)
show. They let children and parents play a public goods game. In one
condition children are paired with their own parents, whereas in another
they are paired with other children’s parents. When the game is played only
among family members, children contribute substantially more to the public
good. Parents, however, do not condition their cooperation on whether or
not they are paired with their own children or children of strangers. Hermes
et al. (2018) study whether parents (and teachers) are able to predict the
level of cooperation of their children through a questionnaire. They find
that this is not the case.
Resembling the evidence from allocation tasks discussed previously,
cooperation of children and adolescents depends on distinctions between
in-groups and out-groups. Angerer et al. (2016) present an example of
this effect by exploiting group identity in a bilingual city (where half of
the inhabitants speak German and the other Italian and where schools
are segregated by language). In their set of 6-11 year-olds, they find that
children are least cooperative in a prisoner’s dilemma game when matched
with a child from the other language group (i.e., the out-group). The level
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of cooperation is higher when a child is matched with someone from the
same language group, but a different school, and highest if the match is
with someone from the same class (which implies the same language).
One way to increase cooperation in children may be through educational
interventions. Fan (2000) examines whether special lectures that teach the
value of cooperation can increase cooperation, but she fails to find an effect.
Another intervention can be the introduction of a third, uninvolved party
who has the ability to punish uncooperative behavior. This is usually called
third party punishment. Lergetporer et al. (2014) find that such a costly
punishment option for an uninvolved third party increases cooperation rates
of 7-11 year-olds considerably by doubling them, in fact. The increase is
due to two main reasons. The first, and straightforward factor is that the
fear of getting punished lets subjects increase their likelihood of cooperation.
Second, and less obvious, is the fact that players in the prisoner’s dilemma
become more optimistic about their partner’s likelihood of cooperation when
a third party with a punishment opportunity is present (who may punish the
partner as well). Due to more optimistic expectations about the partner’s
likelihood of cooperation, players become more cooperative themselves –
which proofs that already young children are conditional cooperators.
SUMMARY COOPERATION The level of cooperation is typically in-
creasing with age, in particular in childhood. Younger children free-ride
more often than older ones, while adolescents display more prosocial and
reciprocal motives in public goods and prisoner’s dilemma games. Gender
effects are largely absent, and so far there is also little knowledge about
the influence of family background. In-group favoritism promotes higher
cooperation levels, as does the presence of third parties with an option to
punish defectors.
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3.8 COMPETITIVENESS
Here we focus on competitiveness in the sense of a willingness to expose
oneself to a competitive situation. We are not looking specifically at per-
formance under competition, but rather at a preference to compete at all.7
Most studies that investigate competitiveness follow the seminal design by
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) where participants perform a specific task
in three different stages. In the first stage, they are paid a piece-rate, hence
there is no competition. In the second stage, there is a tournament where
only the winner gets paid (a higher piece rate than in the first stage). Finally,
in the third stage, subjects are free to choose their compensation scheme
by either selecting the piece rate or the tournament. It is the choice of the
tournament in stage three that measures the willingness to compete.
Looking at the development of competitiveness across age, it seems
to be the case that very early on, from age 3-6, children become more
likely to compete in several studies (Khachatryan et al., 2015; Sutter and
Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler, 2015; Sutter et al., 2016; Khadjavi and Nicklisch, 2018).
For example, Khadjavi and Nicklisch (2018) report in their study with 3-6
year-olds that the likelihood to compete increases by around 10 percentage
points with each year. Beyond this early age, the literature does not report a
clear-cut pattern in the willingness to compete (Sutter and Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler,
2015), while with respect to performance in a given task children and
adolescents become almost always better the older they get (Andersen et al.,
2013; Sutter and Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler, 2015; Sutter et al., 2016; Khadjavi and
Nicklisch, 2018).
Most studies with children and adolescents document a strong gender
gap in the willingness to compete (Booth and Nolen, 2012a; Andersen et al.,
2013; Buser et al., 2014; Dreber et al., 2014; Sutter and Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler,
2015; Alma˚s et al., 2016; Sutter et al., 2016). Overall, girls are much less
likely to choose a competitive payment scheme than boys. For example,
7Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) look at performance of 10-11 year-olds in a running
task under competition. They observe that when running alongside another subject, boys
improve their performance by a wide margin, while the performance of girls deteriorates.
In their case, children had no choice, however, whether they wanted to compete or not.
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in the study of Buser et al. (2014), 15 year-old girls have a 23 percentage
point lower probability of choosing the tournament after controlling for
performance and the associated likelihood of winning. In their subsample of
9-18 year-olds, Sutter and Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler (2015) report a similar magnitude
of the difference, since 40% of boys choose to compete in a math task, but
only 19% of girls.8 Again, a similar gap is found in Alm˚as et al. (2016) where
more than 50% of boys, aged 14-15, compete, while only 32% of girls choose
to enter competition. Interestingly, the gender gap, if anything, is slightly
getting larger in a panel study conducted by Sutter and Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler
(2015) who find that over a span of two years girls become even less likely
to choose competition during adolescence while for boys there is hardly any
change when they get two years older.
The literature is less clear about whether there is a specific age in which
the gender differences in the willingness to compete set in – which would be
important information for potential policy interventions. In her set of 3-5
year-olds in the U.S., Samek (2013) does not observe any gender differences
in competitiveness. Sutter and Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler (2015) – covering an age
range from 3-18 year-olds in Austria – find a gender gap for 5 year-olds
and the gap persists beyond that age. Going to less developed societies in
Northeast India, Andersen et al. (2013) do not find a gender gap until the
age of 12, but from then on the gap persists as well. This means that there
might be an interaction between the cultural and economic background of a
society and the gender gap in competitiveness. Andersen et al.’s (2013) study
is an example for that. They study matrilineal and patriarchal societies. In
societies based on strong patriarchal structures girls exhibit significantly
lower competitive preferences compared to girls in matrilineal societies. This
effect appears in adolescence and persists from then on. There is also some
literature documenting that in less developed countries there may be no
gender differences in competitiveness. Khachatryan et al. (2015) find no
gender differences in the willingness to compete in 7-16 year-old Armenians.
8Most worryingly from an efficiency point of view is the observation that the gender
gap is even more pronounced in the top-performing quartile of subjects where Sutter and
Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler (2015) and Sutter et al. (2016) find a gap of almost 40 percentage points
between boys and girls.
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Zhang (2011) investigates 11-15 year-old high school students in rural China
and finds no gap between boys and girls when they belong to the majority
group of Han Chinese. In ethnic minority groups, however, she observes
the typical gender gap of boys being more willing to compete than girls.
So, the evidence seems to suggest that in highly developed countries one
can typically observe a gender gap in the willingness to compete, while in
developing countries this is not the case or the gap emerges later or only for
subgroups. Alm˚as et al. (2016) provide a potential explanation for this cross-
country pattern. They show in a sample of 14 to 15 year-old Norwegians that
there exists a large and significant gender gap in the willingness to compete
among adolescents who have parents with high education levels. However,
there are no significant gender differences among adolescents with parents
who have low levels of education, indicating that it is, perhaps, the level of
parental education that matters. Generally speaking, these findings suggest
that the overall education level – which presumably influences economic
development – may explain why in less developed countries with lower overall
education levels like India, Armenia or rural China gender differences in the
willingness to compete seem not to exist among adolescents or at least set in
at a later age compared to highly developed countries like Sweden, Norway
or Austria.
The gender differences in competitiveness seem to be related to two
other factors that differ across gender: beliefs about one’s own (relative)
performance and risk preferences. Boys are typically much more confident
(i.e., often overconfident) that they win the tournament, for which reason it is
reasonable for them in expectation to choose a competitive payment scheme.
Evidence for such gender differences in expected performance abounds (Buser
et al., 2014; Dreber et al., 2014; Sutter and Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler, 2015; Sutter
et al., 2016). There is also a gender difference in risk aversion (see also section
3.4) that contributes to the gender difference in competitiveness. Since the
tournament payment scheme is risky (compared to the safe payment of
a piece-rate scheme), more risk averse subjects are less likely to choose
a competitive payment scheme. Given that girls are typically more risk
averse than boys (Ca´rdenas et al., 2012; Buser et al., 2014; Dreber et al.,
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2014; Khachatryan et al., 2015; Sutter and Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler, 2015), this
difference also explains part of the gender gap in the willingness to compete.
It is important, however, that controlling for both – beliefs about expected
performance and risk aversion – there is usually still a significant gender
gap left that is not explained by these two factors, and the unexplained gap
is usually in the range of around 10 percentage points (Buser et al., 2014;
Sutter and Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler, 2015; Alma˚s et al., 2016).
As already implied above, a low socio-economic status of a child’s family
has a negative influence on the likelihood to compete (Bartling et al., 2012;
Alm˚as et al., 2016). This effect is particularly strong for boys (Alm˚as et al.,
2016). Low SES can also be related to health issues, as Bartling et al.
(2012) argue. Children who have had more health issues in recent months
and come from a low SES background are about 10 percentage point less
willing to self-select into competition. Khadjavi and Nicklisch (2018) reveal
another facet of parental influence. Their ambitions for their offspring’s
achievements can positively increase preschoolers’ likelihood to choose a
competitive payment scheme (Khadjavi and Nicklisch, 2018). This means
that education styles and parental attitudes and wishes for their child seem
to affect the competitiveness of children and adolescents.
Experimentally elicited preferences for competition have been shown to
predict important field behavior of adolescents. Buser et al. (2014) let 14-15
year-old Dutch secondary school students make experimental choices on
their willingness to compete and then relate these choices to their selection
of academic tracks. The more math- and science-intensive tracks are not
only more prestigious, but they are also lead indicators of tertiary education
and labor market success later on in life. Buser et al. (2014) find that the
willingness to compete is a good predictor of choosing the more prestigious
academic tracks, even when controlling for gender, academic abilities and a
host of other relevant background variables.
Given the importance of a willingness to expose oneself to competition,
Sutter et al. (2016) have explored whether girls can be encouraged to compete
by introducing policy interventions like affirmative action programs. In their
experiment, they study the effects of quota rules (where among a set of
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winners a minimum number must be female) and of preferential treatment
(mimicking a rule that is applied in many countries, namely that in case
of equal qualifications women need to be given preferential treatment in
filling a position), and they find that both measures induce in particular
girls with high abilities to choose the competitive payment scheme rather
than the piece rate. By and large, both measures close the gender gap in the
willingness to compete. Another way of closing it is presented in Alan and
Ertac (2018b) who have ran an intervention on grit – by which elementary
school students learn the role of effort in achievement and are encouraged to
become more persistent in tasks. Treated children do not show any gender
gap in the willingness to compete, mainly because it seems to increase girls’
optimism about their future performance.
SUMMARY COMPETITIVENESS: There is a large gender difference in
the level of competitiveness, with girls typically shying away from compe-
tition much more often than boys do. This effect is in many, particularly
highly developed, countries prevalent already in childhood, and persists
during adolescence. Parts of this gender gap can be explained by gender
differences in (over)confidence and risk preferences. Competitiveness is lower
in children from low SES-backgrounds, and girls’ willingness to compete can
be increased through affirmative action programs.
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3.9 CONCLUSION
Over the past 15 years, and with accelerating pace, experimental economics
has discovered a strong interest in the economic decision making of children
and adolescents.The experimental method has created plenty of opportunities
to study the development of economic behavior in pre-adulthood. Age,
gender, and other factors such as socio-economic background or in-group
favoritism have been found to shape economic behavior of children and
adolescents, with the latter often showing patterns of behavior that are
similar to the evidence from adult subject pools. Acquiring knowledge on
the development of behavior and the factors shaping it is a prerequisite for
potential policy interventions that aim at promoting one type of behavior
more than another. On the basis of the research described in this survey, a
new wave of intervention studies has very recently got off the ground and it
will provide many very important insights in the years to come. For instance,
the intervention studies by Alan and Ertac (2018a) or Kosse et al. (2018)
have shown ways to make young children more patient in their intertemporal
choices and more prosocial and fairness-oriented in allocation tasks. This
survey may prove useful for future intervention studies as it has intended to
provide a diagnostic picture of what we know about the patterns of economic
behavior before adulthood.
As such, this survey, as any other, has been selective. We have concen-
trated on the types of economic behavior that we consider most important
and about which there has been most research done to date, namely risk,
time, and social preferences, and competitive behavior. For each of these,
subdivided into seven sections (including a section on rationality of children’s
choices), we have attempted to present an overview of the main determi-
nants identified in the main papers on a specific dimension of behavior. The
summaries at the end of each section have captured the main findings, in
particular the influence of age and gender. Given the summaries in each
section, however, we are not going to repeat the main findings here (please
refer to the end of each section), but rather devote the conclusion of the
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paper to a few topics not covered here and to a brief outlook of what might
come next.
While we have tried to focus on the topics that we deem most important
– and where most of the experimental economics research with children and
adolescents has been done – there are a few other fields that have not been
covered or where there is hardly any research up to date. There is a small
literature on honesty, respectively deception, in children and adolescents
(e.g., Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011, Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler and Lergetporer, 2015,
Houser et al., 2016, Maggian and Villeval, 2016). This literature deals with
the question how honesty as a social norm develops and what are the driving
factors as to why subjects do not exploit informational asymmetries. Since
informational asymmetries may trigger inefficiencies on markets, a better
understanding of the conditions under which humans act honestly even
under incentives for cheating may provide a better understanding of how
social norms (here: of honesty) affect market outcomes. A topic that has not
received attention in the experimental economics literature about children
so far is the study of coordination games (yet, there are psychological papers
on these games; see, e.g., Grueneisen et al., 2015a, Grueneisen et al., 2015b).
Given the multiplicity of equilibria, these games are interesting to study
with children and adolescents in order to see on which equilibria they might
be able to coordinate on and which cues might help to coordinate efficiently.
Likewise, information cascades might be interesting to study with children
and adolescents because that might help us to understand better how fads
(among youths) emerge and what is needed to break information cascades.
A recent line of work has started to investigate other non-cognitive skills
or personality traits and their relationship to economic preferences. For
example, Bucciol et al. (2011) have investigated the role of temptation –
and the ability to resist it – on productivity. Alan and Ertac (2018b) and
Alan et al. (2016) have studied the role of grit for economic behavior and
how curricular interventions can foster it. Deckers et al. (2017) draw an
even larger picture by asking how socio-economic status of families shapes
a child’s personality. Understanding all of these relationships better will
help us understand how policy interventions might have desired and how
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they might avoid undesired effects. So far, for instance, little is known
about what happens to one type of economic behavior – say with respect to
social preferences – when another type of economic behavior – for instance
intertemporal choice in time preference experiments – is targeted in a specific
intervention. While it is highly welcome to understand how interventions
shape economic behavior in one particular domain – like in the intervention
on time preferences in Alan and Ertac (2018a) or on social preferences
in Kosse et al. (2018) – one important avenue for future research will be
to examine also potentially unintended side-effects on other preference
types. Of course, as always in science, the community will take step by
step: first collect more knowledge about how specific interventions affect
specific behavior – and we need certainly more evidence about what works
and what does not – and then also consider interaction effects with other
behavior or other personality traits. Besides these immediate steps, another
challenge for the future will be to examine the long-run consequences of
economic preferences and behavior of children and adolescents on lifetime
outcomes, such as educational achievements, success on labor markets or a
subject’s health status. The relation of time preferences to these long-term
outcomes is already fairly well understood, but the knowledge about long-run
effects is more limited in the other domains discussed here. In sum, there
is plenty of promising work ahead for the ever growing community that
uses experimental economics as a tool to understand economic behavior of
children and adolescents.
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chapter 4
COORDINATION GAMES PLAYED BY CHILDREN AND
TEENAGERS – ON THE INFLUENCE OF AGE, GROUP
SIZE AND INCENTIVES
Abstract
Efficient coordination is a great source of efficiency gains. We
study in an experimental coordination game with 819 children and
teenagers, aged 9 to 18 years, what determines efficient coordination.
We find that, generally speaking, coordination gets less efficient with
increasing age, but that smaller group sizes and larger incentives
increase the likelihood of efficient coordination. Beliefs play an
important role as well, as subjects coordinate more likely on the
efficient equilibrium when they expect others to do so as well. All
of our results are robust to controlling for individual risk and time
preferences and for gender.
This chapter is joint work with Daniela Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler and Matthias Sutter.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
An efficient organization of groups requires that group members are able
to coordinate their actions successfully in order to achieve potentially large
efficiency-gains from interaction. Examples abound across many different
fields (Ochs, 1995; Camerer, 2003; Devetag and Ortmann, 2007). Think
of hunting together or defending one’s territory against potential invaders,
coordinating on a ceasefire in military conflict, but also working together
in modern companies with their manifold division of labor; or imagine
companies coordinating on a new technological standard when competing
platforms are available and customers benefit from a common standard. In
such situations, typically multiple equilibria exist, such as several platforms
that can serve as technical standards or all group members hunting a large
prey, like a stag, rather than each hunting a small animal like a rabbit
individually.
The ability to coordinate actions is a cornerstone for the flourishing
of groups and it has important welfare implications. In many cases the
multiple Nash equilibria in coordination games can be ranked according to
their overall efficiency that is generated from the players’ actions (Cooper
et al., 1990; Van Huyck J. et al., 1990; Duffy and Feltovich, 2006; Feri
et al., 2010; Cason et al., 2012; Cason et al., 2012; Brandts et al., 2016).
Coordination failure creates inefficiencies, which can take on two forms:
either players do not coordinate on the same action, but rather pick different
actions and therefore mis-coordinate, or they coordinate on an equilibrium
that is not the most efficient one (Brandts and Cooper, 2006; Weber, 2006).
Given the importance of the ability to coordinate actions when subjects
have to interact with each other and multiple equilibria exist, it is interesting
to note that there is hardly any knowledge about when humans learn to
coordinate efficiently. With the exception of very few papers discussed
below it remains an open question whether children and teenagers are able
to coordinate on efficient outcomes and whether this ability depends in
predictable ways on economic incentives and the number of interaction
partners in the group.
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In our paper, we study how 819 children and teenagers, aged 9 to 18 years,
played a simple coordination game – a stag-hunt game Cooper et al. (1990) –
in which there were only two actions available that could lead to two different
equilibria; one equilibrium that is Pareto-efficient – which we will call the
efficient equilibrium henceforth – and another equilibrium that is Pareto-
dominated, but less risky than the Pareto-efficient one – we call this second
equilibrium the inefficient one. Our primary interest lies in the influence of
age on the ability to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. Additionally,
we examine two important dimensions that have been investigated with
adults, but not yet with children: (1) whether economic incentives play
a systematic role, i.e., whether children and teenagers are more likely to
achieve the efficient equilibrium when it becomes more profitable or when
playing it becomes less risky, and (2) whether coordination is more efficient
when the group size is smaller. We want to examine whether already
children and teenagers react systematically to changes in these parameters
of a coordination game. In addition to studying the influence of external
parameters of the game, we are able to link a subject’s risk attitude and
self-control as well as expectations about other subjects’ behavior to the
strategy chosen in the coordination game.
To the best of our knowledge there are no papers in experimental eco-
nomics on how children play coordination games. However, a few develop-
mental psychologist have investigated how young children play such games.
Grueneisen et al. (2015b) have studied whether theory of mind is important
for efficient coordination in a type of stag-hunt coordination game, played by
6 year-old children. Theory of mind is developed around the age of 6, and
it allows subjects to put themselves into the shoes of another person. This
ability is supposedly influential in coordination games because the strategic
uncertainty about the interaction partner’s behavior is important for one’s
own choices. Grueneisen et al. (2015b) find that children with higher theory
of mind are better able to coordinate on more efficient outcomes. Their
study does not consider a broader age range, however. This is done in
Grueneisen et al. (2015a) where the authors let children aged 3 to 8 years
play coordination games. In these games, there is a focal point that can
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be used to coordinate the players’ actions. Yet, all possible equilibria of
the game are equally efficient, i.e. there is no ranking of equilibria possible.
Grueneisen et al. (2015a) report that 5-year-old children and 8-year-old
children are able to coordinate on the focal point with a likelihood that is
significantly greater than chance, but 3-year-old children are not yet able to
do so. Our paper differs from Grueneisen et al. (2015a) in several aspects.
First, our coordination games have two Pareto-ranked equilibria which al-
lows us to study whether children are able to coordinate on the efficient
outcome. Second, we do not implement any focal point, thus making efficient
coordination considerably harder. Third, contrary to both Grueneisen et al.
(2015b) and Grueneisen et al. (2015a) we do not only consider pairs of
subjects playing a coordination game, but we also study behavior in larger
groups, because many coordination games are played by multiple players.
Our treatment variation with respect to group size (pairs of subjects vs.
groups of five) allows investigating whether larger groups can also succeed
in efficient coordination. Fourth, we consider a broader age range than the
previous study by Grueneisen et al. (2015a) by considering children and
teenagers aged 9 to 18 years. This age spectrum has not yet been considered
in the literature on coordination games, and it covers the area in life where
subjects get increasingly involved in economic activities that are also related
to coordination problems (e.g., when downloading or exchanging music from
different platforms or when choosing a social media platform).
From the experimental economics literature on the behavior of children
in economic games we can form some expectations about the potential
influence of age on behavior in coordination games. Reasoning in economic
games seems to develop below the age of 10 and is rather stable in the
teenage years, as Brosig-Koch et al. (2015) have shown in an experiment
on a backward-induction task (that has a unique equilibrium). Similarly,
Czermak et al. (2016) have found in a series of normal form games (also
with unique equilibria) that strategic thinking (i.e., the ability to take into
account the interaction partner’s choice set when making one’s own decision)
is rather stable in the teenage years. Yet, in some of the games strategic
thinking seems to improve slightly with increasing age. A priori, it is unclear
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what the implications for coordination games would be. In coordination
games, strategic uncertainty is given because a player needs to form an
expectation about the other players’ actions in order to best respond. This
does not necessarily imply that more sophisticated strategic thinking would
lead to more efficient coordination. The direction of influence will depend on
expectations, and they might depend on age. More pessimistic expectations
might lead to less efficient coordination with increasing age, if larger strategic
uncertainty leads to more pessimistic expectations as subjects get older.
Besides investigating age effects, we also examine the influence of in-
centives and of group size. With respect to incentives, the prediction is
straightforward (see Schmidt et al. (2003) or Brandts and Cooper (2006) for
coordination games with adults). The efficient equilibrium in our stag-hunt
game should become more likely when it becomes more profitable – by
increasing the payoffs in the efficient equilibrium – or when it is less risky
– by increasing the payoffs in case of failure to coordinate on the efficient
equilibrium. With respect to the effects of group size, experimental coordi-
nation games show typically more efficient play in smaller groups than in
larger groups, and such patterns have been found consistently with adult
participants (see Weber (2006) and his Table 2 for a summary of group
size effects, but also the survey of Devetag and Ortmann (2007)). We vary
group sizes by letting subjects play once in pairs and once in groups of five,
expecting more efficient coordination in smaller groups.
Our experiment has the following major results: (1) Pooling across group
sizes and different incentives, we find hardly any significant influence of age.
When looking into more detail, we see that in groups of five coordination
becomes systematically less efficient with age. This is largely driven by
older subjects having more pessimistic expectations about the other players’
choices in larger groups, meaning that strategic uncertainty gets more of a
concern for older subjects. In groups of two subjects, there is no clear cut
age effect in the aggregate, while for different incentives there are opposing
age trends. (2) As expected, incentives play a systematic role. The efficient
equilibrium strategy is chosen more often as it gets more rewarding and less
risky. (3) Coordination is much easier and more efficient in groups of two
132
subjects than in groups with five subjects. A larger group size entails more
strategic uncertainty, which has a negative effect on efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the
experimental design and our experimental treatments. In section 3 we present
the results, starting with the highest level of aggregation and continuing
with a more detailed description of results by investigating behavior in the
different treatments. Section 4 concludes the paper.
4.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
4.2.1 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
We conducted our study in seven different schools in Tyrol (Austria), in-
cluding 28 different classes that comprised fourth grade (with 9-10 years
old children), sixth grade (11-12 years), eight grade (13-14 years), tenth
grade (15-16 years) and twelfth grade (17-18 years).1 In total, we had 819
participants, with a slight surplus of girls (see Table 41), as one of the schools
was a girls-only school. Our study was approved by the internal review board
at the University of Innsbruck and the state board of education in Tyrol.
Further consent was given by the headmasters of each school. Prior to the
experiment, parents received an information leaflet explaining the nature
of the study, without revealing details of the experiment, though. Parents
could opt their child out of the experiment, but none did. Participation was,
of course, voluntary for children, but all of them agreed to participate. The
experiment was run during regular school hours. Given that all children
of the randomly selected classes in each school participated, there was no
self-selection effect into experimental participation.
The experiment was computerized (using zTree, Fischbacher (2007)) and
run with a portable lab. Instructions were handed out in written form, but
also explained verbally by taking great care that children and teenagers
could understand the rules of the coordination game and in particular how
1This study was part of a larger experimental series over the course of 2 years in which
we also elicited (at different dates) risk and time preferences or competitive preferences
(see Sutter et al. (2013) and Sutter and Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler (2015))
133
Table 41: Number of participants and gender composition
School grade Number of subjects Total
(age of students) per treatment (female)
“9/1” “9/5” “13/1”
4 (9/10 years) 42 39 41 122
(61)
6 (11/12 years) 88 59 59 208
(118)
8 (13/14 years) 79 61 83 223
(126)
10 (15/16 years) 62 36 44 142
(88)
12 (17/18 years) 49 32 45 126
(67)
Total 320 227 272 819
(female) (194) (105) (161) (460)
Notes: Experimental participants earned points in the
experiment that were exchanged into Euro at the following
age-dependent rates: e0.3 per point for 9-10-year-olds, e0.5
for 11-12-year-olds, e0.7 for 13-14-year-olds, e1.4 for 15-16-
year-olds and e2.2 for 17-18-year-olds.
to interpret the payoff matrix. Before proceeding to the experiment, we had
two control questions that were checked by the experimenter. If a child had
picked a wrong answer the experimenter carefully explained the instructions
once more.
The experiment was incentivized, and each point earned in the experi-
ment was exchanged into Euro at a pre-specified exchange rate which was
announced in the beginning. This exchange rate differed by school grades,
and was made proportional to the average weekly allowance across the whole
age range. In the legend to Table 41 we present the exchange rate for each
age group.
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4.2.2 THE EFFECTS OF INCENTIVES – BETWEEN-SUBJECTS
TREATMENTS
The experimental design had both a between-subjects and a within-subjects
variation. The between-subjects variation concerned the payoff matrix of the
coordination game. Here we had three different treatments which are shown
in Table 42. In each treatment, subjects could choose between action “One”
and action “Two”. The combination of one’s own action and the minimum
action chosen by the other players in one’s group determined the payoffs.
This general structure yielded two equilibria of the game, one where all
players in a group play “Two” – which is the Pareto-efficient equilibrium –
and one in which all players play “One” – which is the inefficient, but less
risky equilibrium. The choice of “One” always yielded 8 points for the active
player.
Table 42: Payoff matrices in the three treatments
Treatments “9/1” “9/5” “13/1”
Minimum action of other group members
Own
action
Two One Two One Two One
Two 9, 9 1, 8 9, 9 5, 8 13, 13 1, 8
One 8, 1 8, 8 8, 5 8, 8 8,1 8, 8
Notes: The Pareto-efficient equilibrium (Two, Two) is depicted in
the top left corner of each treatment, the inefficient equilibrium
(One, One) in the bottom right corner. First numbers in a cell
present the row player’s payoff. All players saw themselves in the
role of the row player. The options “One” and “Two” in the columns
of each treatment indicate the minimum choice of all other players
in the group (excluding the row player), and second numbers in
each cell show the payoffs of the second player only in the games
with a group size of two subjects.
The three treatments shown in Table 42 differed with respect to the
possible payoffs from choosing strategy “Two”. The treatment labels indicate
the two possibilities in case of picking “Two”. In treatment “9/1”, presented
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on the left hand side of Table 42, a player earned 9 points if the minimum
choice in the group was “Two”, but earned only 1 point if someone in the
group chose “One”. Of course, the efficient equilibrium (of all players earning
9 points) requires all group members to choose “Two”, but this is risky,
because if only one group member chooses “One”, then the payoff drops to
1 point for all players who chose “Two”.
The other two treatments, shown in the middle and on the right hand
side of Table 42, vary either the payoff in the efficient equilibrium or the
payoff in case of mis-coordination (i.e., the payoff for the row player in the
upper right cell of the matrix). In treatment “9/5” it becomes less risky to
play “Two” because of a payoff of 5 – rather than 1 as in “9/1” – if another
group member chooses “One”. Finally, in treatment “13/1” the payoff in the
efficient equilibrium increases from 9 - as in “9/1” - to 13, keeping everything
else constant.
Given that playing “Two” becomes less risky in “9/5” and more profitable
in “13/1” we expect to observe more choices of “Two” in these two treatments
than in “9/1”. It is unclear what to expect from a comparison of “9/5” and
“13/1”, however. Both treatments yield an expected payoff of 7 from playing
“Two” under the assumption that it is equally likely that the minimum chosen
by the other players is “One” or “Two”. If increased payoffs in the efficient
equilibrium (13 points instead of 9) weigh in larger than the increased payoffs
in case of mis-coordination (5 points instead of 1), then we should observe
more choices of “Two” in “13/1”, otherwise the reverse should be true.
4.2.3 THE EFFECTS OF GROUP SIZE – WITHIN-SUBJECTS
VARIATION
While the effects of incentives were examined in a between-subjects variation,
we examined the possible effects of different group sizes by letting each
subject play two games (with the same incentives each) with different group
sizes. The “2-persons groups” had a two members, meaning that the row
player’s payoff in any of the treatments shown in Table 42 depended on
the own choice and the choice of the only other player in the group. The
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“5-persons groups” had five group members. Given the row player’s choice,
the payoff for the row player from choosing “Two” was then determined by
the minimum choice of the other four players in the group. In other words,
choosing “Two” paid off for the row player only when all four other group
member chose “Two” as well.
Both games were explained in the beginning of the experiment (see
experimental instructions in the appendix), yet we balanced the order in
which the two games were introduced in order to control for potential order
effects. After we had worked through the instructions and participants had
answered two control questions, we let them make their decisions in the
order as explained in the instructions. At the end of the experiment, it was
randomly determined which game (first or second) was payoff relevant.
Subjects had no information about the other group members other than
that they were attending the same school grade, and would therefore be of
the same age. It was additionally explained that the matched subjects did
not attend the same school to exclude any potential influence of personal
relationships in the decision making process. Given the latter matching
procedure, all subjects were only paid after all data had been collected. This
was done within 1-2 weeks after executing the experiments. The money was
handed over in sealed envelopes with an anonymous ID-code on it.
4.3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We start the results section by presenting first a descriptive analysis of our
data. After that, we present a regression analysis that includes further
controls, such as personal characteristics and risk and time preferences and a
subject’s expectation about other group members’ behavior. Recall that the
effects of group size were examined in a within-subject design in which the
group size was randomly ordered (first two persons and then five persons, or
vice versa). We did not find any order effects (see Table A-1 in the appendix)
for which reason we pool the two different orders.
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4.3.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
We begin with a highly aggregated analysis by first looking at the main
effects of age, incentives, and group sizes. Figure 41 presents the relationship
between age (on the horizontal axis) and the likelihood of choosing strategy
“Two” (on the vertical axis). It shows for each age group the relative frequency
with which subjects across all treatments and across both group sizes chose
strategy “Two”. The overall relative frequency is 22.7%. Across the five
different age groups, we notice an up and down, with a slight tendency of
less efficient choices as subjects get older. In the next subsection we are
going to examine this potential age trend in more detail.
Figure 41: Efficient Coordination by Age
Notes: Relative frequency of choosing the efficient strategy
“Two”, contingent on age.
Figure 42 shows a very clear treatment effect of incentives on playing
the efficient strategy. Here we pool over all age groups and over both group
sizes. As predicted, the relative frequency of choosing strategy “Two” is
lowest in treatment “9/1” with only 15%. Both of the other treatments
have a considerably larger fraction, with 22% in “9/5” and 33% in “13/1”,
indicating that higher payoffs in the efficient equilibrium (of “13/1”) are
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even more conducive to efficient play than reducing the risk of failing to
coordinate on the efficient equilibrium (in “9/5”).
Figure 42: Efficient Coordination and Incentives
Notes: Relative frequency of choosing strategy “Two”, con-
tingent on incentives (between-subjects treatments)
Figure 43 presents results for the potential group size effect, studied
through our within-subject variation. Here we pool across all age groups and
across the three between-subjects treatments. As expected, we see a much
higher relative frequency of choosing the efficient strategy “Two” in groups
with two players (32%) than in groups with five players (14%). Obviously,
children and teenagers react to the increased strategic uncertainty in larger
groups by choosing the safe strategy “One” much more often, i.e., in about
six out of seven cases in groups with five players.
In a next step, we consider several interaction effects of our main factors
of interest. 44, we show how age and group size interact with each other. The
figure shows the relative frequency of choosing strategy “Two”, separately for
each age group in the 2-persons groups and the 5-persons groups. The larger
degree of strategic uncertainty in 5-persons groups induces fewer attempts
to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. While for 2-persons groups there
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Figure 43: Efficient Coordination and Group Size
Notes: Relative frequency of choosing strategy “Two”, con-
tingent on group size (within-subjects variation).
is no significant age trend, for 5-persons groups we observe a downward
trend (p<0.01, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend), indicating that older
subjects choose the efficient strategy less often in 5-persons groups than
younger subjects do.
The downward trend in choosing “Two” in the 5-persons groups is nicely
mirrored in subjects’ expectations about the other group members’ behavior,
as we show in Figure 45. There we display the relative frequency with
which subjects expect the strategy “Two” as the minimum choice of their
other group members. This relative frequency is clearly higher in 2-person
groups (light bars) than in 5-person groups (dark bars), reflecting more
pessimistic expectations when the group size – and thus the extent of
strategic uncertainty – gets larger. We observe also a clear downward trend
with age in Figure 45, which might be a driving force for subjects to choose
less often the efficient strategy “Two” when they get older. The regression
analysis in section 3.2 will get back to this relationship.
Figures 46 and 47 add the treatments on incentives to the picture drawn
in Figure 44, and present the data separately for 2-persons groups (Figure
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Figure 44: Efficient Coordination and Age and Group Size
Notes: Relative frequency of choosing strategy “Two”, con-
tingent on interaction of age and group size.
Figure 45: Beliefs - Relative Frequency of expecting
“Two” as the Minimum Choice in a Group
Notes: Subjects’ expectations about others’ behavior. Rel-
ative frequency with which subjects expect “Two” to be the
minimum choice in their group, contingent on group size.
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46) and 5-persons groups (Figure 47). In Figure 46 we see from the light
bars that the choice of the efficient strategy “Two” gets less likely with age
in treatment “9/1”, from the gray bars in the middle of each age group
that it is basically stable in treatment “9/5”, and from the dark bars that it
increases strongly in treatment “13/1” from around 30% in the younger age
groups to around 60% in the older age groups. Hence, there is a diverging
effect of age here. When efficient coordination is very risky in treatment
“9/1” it becomes less likely with age (p<0.05, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test
for trend), when it is very profitable in treatment “13/1” it becomes more
likely with age (p<0.01, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend).
In Figure 47 we show the data for the 5-persons groups, contingent
on age and incentives. Here we notice an overall pattern of a decline in
efficient coordination with increasing age, and this trend is similar in all
treatments, hence independent of the prevailing incentives. This means that
the larger strategic uncertainty in 5-persons groups leads to fewer attempts
of achieving the efficient equilibrium, and that the increased incentives in
“13/1” or the lower risk in “9/5” do not have an impact on this downward
trend in larger groups.
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Figure 46: Efficient Coordination in 2-Persons Groups
Notes: Relative frequency of efficient strategy “Two” in 2-
persons groups, contingent on age and incentives (between-
subjects treatments).
Figure 47: Efficient Coordination in 5-Persons Groups
Notes: Relative frequency of efficient strategy “Two” in 5-
persons groups, contingent on age and incentives (between-
subjects treatments).
143
4.3.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
In the following, we present an econometric analysis of coordination behavior.
We use probit regressions to estimate the likelihood of subjects choosing
the efficient strategy “Two”.2 Recall that each subject played both in the
2-persons and 5-persons groups (in random order), but that the incentive
effects were studied in a between-subject design. Hence we present in Table
43 separate estimations for treatments “9/1”, “9/5”, and “13/1”. In each
estimation we cluster at the level of the individual subject because each
subject made two choices, one for each group size.
The first model for each treatment includes as independent variables age
(measured in years and months), a dummy variable for 5-persons groups, an
interaction term for age and large group, and a subject’s expectation about
the minimum choice of the other group member(s). We code the variable
“Expected efficiency” as 1 if a subject expects the minimum choice to be
“Two” in the group, and as 0 if the expectation is that at least one other
group member chose “One”.
In the second model for each treatment we add gender (with a female
dummy) and data on (most) subjects’ risk and time preferences. Risk
attitudes were elicited utilizing the framework of Ellsberg’s two-color choice
task (Ellsberg, 1961) (see Figure A-1 in the appendix for further information).
Subjects could choose either a lottery that paid e10 or zero with equal
probability, or a safe amount of money that increased in increments of e0.50
from e0.50 to e10. As a measure of a subject’s risk aversion r we use
r = 1− CE10
where CE denotes the certainty equivalent of the risky prospect. The variable
risk aversion can range from 0 (very risk loving) to 1 (very risk averse), with
0.5 as risk neutral.3
2OLS estimations yield basically the same results as those reported in the main text
from the probit regressions.
3For roughly one quarter of the sample we examined the effects of stake sizes by
increasing the lottery prize from e4 for 10-year-olds in steps of e2 up to e12 for 18-year-
olds. We did not find any stake size effect and hence control for this stake size variation
by normalizing the CE to e10.
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A subject’s impatience was measured using time preferences decision
sheets, giving students the option of choosing a fixed amount at an earlier
point in time or waiting for an increased payoff at a later point in time
(see Figure A-2 in the appendix).4 The variable “Impatience” measures the
frequency with which a subject chose the earlier (and smaller) payoff. Larger
values indicate higher impatience.
Table 43 presents the results of our estimations. Below the table we
present a series of post-estimation Wald-tests to test for joint significance
effects. Overall, the following main patterns emerge from our data (and
confirm our descriptive analysis). When subjects make choices in 2-persons
groups, there is a negative age trend for choosing the efficient strategy “Two”
in treatment “9/1”, but a positive age trend in treatment “13/1”. Hence,
only when incentives to aim for the efficient equilibrium are relatively high,
then older subjects are more likely to choose this strategy. When playing
this strategy is very risky (as in treatment “9/1”), however, older subjects
shy away from it more often.5 In 5-persons groups, we find a negative and
significant age effect for treatment “9/5”. We observe no significant age effect
in treatments “9/1” and “13/1”, even though the likelihood of choosing
“Two” goes down, by and large, with age (see Figure 47).
4Each subject faced 8 different decision sheets with 20 decisions each. Only one of the
choices was paid out in the end. The decision sheets varied in a 2x2x2 factorial design the
size of the fixed payoff at the earlier point in time (either e10.10 or e4.05), the waiting
time between the earlier payoff and the later payoff date (3 weeks or 1 year) and the
up-front delay (no up-front delay or 3 weeks up-front delay).
5The explanatory variable “age” in the regression shows the age effect for the reference
category 2-persons groups. The post-estimation Wald-tests beneath the table repeat this
age effect (for completeness) and show the age effect for 5-persons groups.
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With respect to group size, we find that efficient coordination becomes
less likely in 5-persons groups, as one can see from the Wald-tests beneath
Table 43. Only from these tests it becomes clear that the positive coefficient
for the main effect (from the dummy “5-persons group”) is reversed to a
negative effect when the significantly negative interaction term of age and
large group is taken into account properly.6
In each single estimation, we note that expectations play a significant
role and in the anticipated direction. If subjects expect the other group
member(s) to play the efficient strategy “Two”, they are more likely to do
so themselves. Not a single estimation shows any gender effect, meaning
that efficient coordination behavior of children and teenagers does not seem
to depend on gender. Risk aversion has always a negative sign, but is only
significant in treatment “9/5”. Impatience is also always negative, but never
significant.
4.4 CONCLUSION
We have studied the evolvement of coordination behavior of children and
teenagers in a large experiment with 819 participants, aged nine to 18 years.
We have focused on the influence of age, group size, and incentives on the
likelihood to play the efficient equilibrium strategy in an experimental stag-
hunt game. While the effects of group size and monetary incentives have
been investigated previously in coordination games with adults (Van Huyck J.
et al., 1990; Brandts and Cooper, 2006; Weber, 2006), the relationship of age
and the ability to coordinate efficiently has not received proper attention so
far. Given that coordination problems abound also in the pre-adulthood
age (e.g. selecting on which social media to be active), we consider it as
6More precisely, the joint effect of 5-persons group and the interaction term of age
and 5-persons group is significantly negative – thus showing that coordination is less
efficient in the larger groups – in all age groups of treatment “9/1”, except the 18 years
old teenagers; in treatment “9/5” for all age groups except for 14 years old teenagers,
and in treatment “13/1” for all age groups except those 10 years old. In treatment “9/5”
we observe a reverse group size effect – that coordination is more efficient in the larger
groups – but only for 10-years-olds.
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important to understand the development of efficient coordination in the
(pre)teenage years.
Overall we have found the following main results: age does not have
an unambiguous effect, as it shows interaction effects with group size and
monetary incentives. In small groups, older subjects are more likely to
coordinate on the efficient equilibrium when the payoffs in this equilibrium
are highest (in “13/1”), but older subjects are less likely to choose this
strategy when it is very risky to do so (in “9/1”). This pattern of results
indicates that older subjects react more sensitively to monetary incentives
than younger subjects do. In other words, incentives lead to stronger
behavioral changes when our subjects are older. The pattern observed for
older subjects has the side-effect that, in the aggregate, it looks as if age
had no effect at all in small groups.
In large groups, older subjects are less likely to choose the efficient
equilibrium strategy in treatment “9/5”. In the other treatments, there is
no significant age effect, even though the average likelihood of choosing the
efficient strategy tends to go down with age. The lack of a clear age effect
on coordination behavior is reminiscent of previous results in other domains
of economic preferences. Risk and time preferences (Sutter et al., 2013) or
preferences for competition (Sutter and Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler, 2015) do not seem
to be affected significantly by age during the teenage years. Similarly, the
ability to use backward induction (Brosig-Koch et al., 2015) or the strategic
sophistication in normal-form games (Czermak et al., 2016) does not change
considerably in the teenager years either.
Our third main finding concerns the relationship of monetary incentives
and efficient coordination. The larger these incentives, the more likely it is
that subjects choose the strategy that can lead to the efficient equilibrium.
Here we have found that increasing the profits in the efficient equilibrium
(in “13/1”) seems to work better than providing a cushion (in “9/5”) for
subjects who choose the efficient strategy, but where groups fail to achieve
the efficient equilibrium. Overall, our results about the effects of incentives
seem to be in line with what has been found in experiments with adults
(Brandts and Cooper, 2006; or Devetag and Ortmann, 2007), indicating
148
that already children and teenagers react in a predictable way to monetary
incentives in coordination games.
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APPENDIX A: TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure A-1: Sample choice list for the measure of risk attitudes
Notes: Subjects could either draw from bag A or choose fixed
payment. Bag A contained 10 white and 10 orange balls – if right
color was picked from bag payment of e10.
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Figure A-2: Sample choice list for the measure of impatience
Notes: Impatience calculated by summing up all the instances
where a subject chose the earlier (and smaller) payoff across all 8
different choice lists High value – impatient, Low value – patient.
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APPENDIX B: INSTRUCTIONS
Experimental instructions (for “9/1” treatment)7
Welcome to our game. Before we start, we will explain the rules of our game. From now
on, please don’t talk to your neighbor and listen carefully. We will frequently stop during
our explanation and allow you to ask questions. Therefore, please raise your hand and
one of us will come to you to answer your question. You can earn money in this game.
You will receive your payments in an envelope marked with your ID within 2 weeks.
Your payment is denoted in points. At the end of the session we will convert these points
into Euros. We apply the following conversion rate:
1 point = 0.3 e(30 cents)8.
You will receive a conversion table which will tell you how much your earned points are
worth. (Carefully explain the conversion table with a few examples.)
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately.
For this game we will build random groups. You will play one part in a 2-persons group
and one part in a 5-persons group. Your partner(s) are at a different school but attend
the same grade level as you do. The screen will tell you whether you’re playing in a 2- or
5-persons group.9
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately.
In this game you have to pick a number (either 1 or 2). Each group member will decide
independently of each other. Your payment will depend on your decision and on the
decision(s) made by your partner(s). Your payment can be inferred from a table.
For example:
7The other two treatments are analogous by changing the respective payoffs.
8Conversion rates were age dependent: e0.3 per point for 9-10-year-olds, e0.5 for
11-12-year-olds, e0.7 for 13-14-year-olds, e1.4 for 15-16-year-olds and e2.2 for 17-18-
year-olds.
9Here we present the order in which the 2-persons game was explained first and
the 5-persons game second. This was balanced in other classes where we explained the
5-persons game first and 2-persons game second.
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Your number
Your number
TWO ONE
TWO 9 1
ONE - 8
You have 1 partner!
Playing with one partner:
If you choose 1, you will receive 8 points for sure. If you choose 2, your payment will
depend on your partner’s choice. If your partner chooses 2 as well, you will receive 9
points. If your partner chooses 1, then you will receive 1 point.
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately.
Lowest number of all 4 partners
Your number
TWO ONE
TWO 9 1
ONE - 8
You have 4 partners!
Playing with four partners:
If you choose 1, you will receive 8 points for sure. If you choose 2, your payment will
depend on your partners’ choices. Specifically, the minimum number (lowest number)
chosen by your four partners will count. If all four partners choose 2 (and you choose 2
as well), then you will receive 9 points. If one or more of your partners choose 1 (and
you choose 2), then you will receive 1 point.
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately.
After completing these two parts, please answer an estimation-question which will appear
on your computer screen. If you answer the estimation-question correctly, you will receive
one additional point. Before we start, you will have to answer two control questions,
which we will check before we start playing the game.
Everybody ok so far? Leave time for questions and answer them privately. If nobody has
any further questions, please start the experiment.
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chapter 5
BUSY LITTLE BEES – AN EXPERIMENT ON DILIGENCE
AND ENDOGENOUS TIME SCHEDULING IN EARLY
CHILDHOOD
Abstract
Diligence, being able to work hard, is a positive predictor of
educational success. In an experimental setting we analyze the devel-
opment of diligence and the impact of exogenous versus endogenous
time scheduling on effort provision in early childhood. A total of
429 children aged 3 to 6 worked on a real effort task for as long as
they wanted to. Giving the children the possibility to decide when to
work on the task - either today or tomorrow - shows that those who
procrastinate the task to the following day provide significantly less
effort. While younger children are more likely to procrastinate, the
effort provision under procrastination is lower for all age groups. In
addition, we find that children’s ability to work extensively on a task
relates to their willingness to challenge themselves in an unrelated
task. Our results shed light on the development of diligence and can
be used as a first step for designing interventions fostering the skill
of being hard working in a real effort task.
This chapter is joint work with Matthias Sutter and Anna Untertrifaller.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
The importance of non-cognitive skills has become prevalent in the economics
and psychology literature, emphasizing their influence on lifetime success,
health, and education and asserting them as a fundamental requisite in the
labor market (Heckman et al., 2006; Duckworth et al., 2007; Roberts et al.,
2007; Almlund et al., 2011; Kautz et al., 2014). Among these non-cognitive
skills grit has been proven to be highly indicative of educational achievement
(Duckworth et al., 2007; Duckworth and Quinn, 2009; Burks et al., 2015),
outperforming IQ as a predictor of success. Grit is defined as the ability to
work persistently on a task, related to being self-disciplined, setting long-
term goals, and pursuing them in response to negative performance feedback.
Grit is highly correlated with long term success including higher earnings
even when controlling for schooling (Diaz et al., 2013), predicts employees’
likelihood to keep their jobs (Eskreis-Winkler et al., 2014), and is an indicator
of innovativeness and success for entrepreneurs (Mooradian et al., 2016).
Non-cognitive skills have furthermore been shown to be malleable in children
(Almlund et al., 2011; Kautz et al., 2014; Alan et al., 2016). In a recent
study Alan et al. (2016) stage a successful school intervention on grit for
10 to 11 year-old children, aimed at improving children’s beliefs about the
malleability of their own ability. The authors find a significant increase in
children’s willingness to undertake a more challenging and rewarding task,
a decrease in the likelihood to give up after failure, and an improvement of
ability accumulation, consequently improving children’s success and their
payoffs.
Larbi and Christian (2016) split grit into two components - tenacity,
a nuanced interplay of perseverance and stubbornness, and diligence, the
notion of being hard-working. We focus on the latter aspect, diligence, as
it plays an especially critical role as a predictor of educational success -
even more so than tenacity - during childhood and adolescence (Larbi and
Christian, 2016). With this study we aim to further examine the development
of diligence, the influence of time scheduling on effort provision, and its
driving determinants. We extend our focus to early childhood, namely 3 to
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6 year-old children, as this age span has already proven particularly relevant
for the formation of preferences (Fehr et al., 2008). We investigate how
giving children the decision power of when to do a tedious task impacts
their diligence in the task. While even very young children face increasing
pressure of time schedules - be it for their leisure activities or later on
class schedules - we analyze whether young children’s effort provision can
be increased by allowing them to choose the time setting for themselves.
Companies, for instance, increasingly offer flexible work hour arrangements
to their employees (Katz and Krueger, 2016). This practice could indicate a
positive correlation between endogenous time setting and effort provision.
However, little empirical evidence in this domain exists (Shepard et al., 1996;
Wolf and Beblo, 2004; Mas and Pallais, 2017). We address this vacancy and
investigate whether children’s effort provision is dependent on having the
decision power over their “work” schedule. Specifically, we consider whether
children’s level of diligence can be increased by giving them more flexibility
on when to do a tedious task. For this purpose, we measure children’s
diligence in a real effort task under exogenously given or endogenously set
scheduling.
Furthermore, we consider the underlying determinants of diligence and
whether the decision to challenge oneself serves as an indicator of more
diligent behavior. Both diligence and the willingness to challenge oneself
are important components of grit. While experimental papers by Gerhards
and Gravert (2015) and Alan et al. (2016) so far focus on grit as one
single fundamental skill we consider diligence and the willingness to take
a challenge separately. By teasing these two aspects apart we are able to
examine whether children who are hard workers are also more willing to
challenge themselves in an unrelated task. Both aspects have individually
been proven to be important for later success. While we have emphasized
the role of diligence for educational success, a study by Ashby and Schoon
(2010) shows that the willingness to challenge oneself is as well important
for life outcomes. Specifically, the authors find that young people for whom
it is important to succeed at their job earn more money in adulthood
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compared to their less ambitious1 peers. Niederle and Yestrumskas (2008)
observe heterogeneity in students’ willingness to seek a challenge. Male
students chose a difficult task 50% more frequently than women did even
when controlling for actual or expected performance levels. As Niederle
and Yestrumskas (2008) implemented a fixed time span they cannot make
any inference regarding the correlation between seeking challenges and
persistence in effort. This study is able to address this point.
We find evidence of a negative procrastination effect on diligence. Chil-
dren who actively postpone the task to the next day display significantly
lower levels of diligence by producing a lower output in the real effort task.
Procrastination in our sample is mostly driven by younger children (3 and
4 year-olds), however the effort provision under procrastination is vastly
lower irrespective of age. This is in line with findings by Larbi and Christian
(2016) who show a higher likelihood of procrastination in less diligent adult
subjects.
Concerning the influencing factors of diligence, we find support for more
diligent children to be more likely to choose the challenging task over the easy
option. Children were presented with two identical puzzles with different
levels of difficulty, where the difficult puzzle yielded a higher reward. We
find that the mere choice of the difficult puzzle is highly indicative of being
more diligent in the real effort task. Children were also given the option on
whether to actually follow through on their choice and complete the puzzle
(by themselves, after the main part of the experiment was over) or whether
to shirk from their decision. We find that those who follow through on their
choice display more diligent behavior.
Literature concerning economic decision making during childhood and
adolescence has highlighted the importance of time preferences for children.
More patient children who are willing to wait for larger rewards have been
shown to have higher grades at school, better conduct, and are less likely
to engage in health damaging behavior like smoking or drinking alcohol
(Castillo et al., 2011; Golsteyn et al., 2014; Sutter et al., 2013; Alan and
1Ambition stands for teenagers’ willingness to be challenged in their job and to move
up.
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Ertac, 2018a). We, therefore, elicited time preferences to investigate whether
delay of gratification for a greater reward and working for a greater reward
are interrelated. Our sample shows that younger children who are more
impatient are also less diligent but we fail to find an overall influence of
patience on diligence. This is in line with findings of Non and Tempelaar
(2016) who report no correlation between university students hypothetically
elicited time-preferences and their study effort measured by the time they
were logged in on an electronic learning platform, their number of solved
exercises on this platform, the fraction of topics completed on the platform as
well as their participation in an online summer course. Similarly, Gerhards
and Gravert (2015) report no significant correlation for adults between
self-reported, unincentivized time preferences and the decision not to shirk
in a real effort task.2 Likewise, Burks et al. (2012) do not find any evidence
on truck drivers’ β , δ values (their discount rates for present and future
delays) and their tendency to stay at least 6 months on the job.
Family background has been shown to heavily influence children’s be-
havior. Socio-economic background, for instance, affects children’s social-,
time-, risk-, and competitive preferences (Bauer et al., 2014; Deckers et al.,
2015; Alma˚s et al., 2016, 2017; Deckers et al., 2017). We use a parental
questionnaire to elicit demographic data, and self-assessed levels of diligence
and procrastination, as well as incentivized time preferences. Parents who
report to procrastinate more frequently have children who procrastinate
more often in the experiment. We find no evidence of parental diligence
to be correlated with the children’s diligent behavior. Higher education of
parents positively affects the child’s diligence.
Overall, our paper sheds light on the development of diligent behavior
in early childhood. The following sections give a detailed insight into the
design and the procedures. Section 5.3 discusses the results, section 5.4
focuses on the influence of family background, and section 5.5 concludes.
2Gerhards and Gravert (2015) run a real effort task where students were asked to
solve anagrams. They consider shirking as the decision to skip anagrams as well as the
decision to switch to easier anagrams.
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5.2 DESIGN
We ran an experimental study with three to six year-old children in eight
different kindergartens in Innsbruck, Austria.3 Overall 429 children, among
those 219 (51%) females, participated in our study (see Table 51). Children
were paid in tokens which could be exchanged one-to-one for small presents
like balloons, hair clips, key chains, or “minion”-themed stationary etc. Each
child received one show-up token at the beginning of the experiment. All
decisions were collected anonymously by assigning a code to children. The
experimenter additionally emphasized that the child’s answers were to be
kept a secret to avoid spill-over effects.
Table 51: Number of observations
age male female total
3 21 22 43
4 64 72 136
5 73 69 142
6 52 56 108
210 219 429
We visited each kindergarten on two (or three - if the number of children
was very large) consecutive days. Each session followed the same procedure.
Children were asked by a trained experimental assistant (experimenter,
henceforth) whether they wanted to participate and were then accompanied
to a separate “game” room (only two children opted out of participation).
On day one, all children were seated one-on-one with an experimenter for
3The experiment was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Innsbruck
and the municipal authorities of the city of Innsbruck. Kindergartens were informed about
our study by the city authorities but were blind to the research question. Participation of
kindergartens was voluntary. 8 kindergartens participated in our study. 6 kindergartens
used an opt-out option, where parents could inform teachers if they did not want their
child to participate, which only one parent did. Two kindergartens required an opt-in
option where over 70% of parents consented.
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the first part of the experiment, namely the elicitation of time preferences,
the puzzle task, and the explanation of the diligence task - a real effort
task. On day two, children were able to collect their payoffs for the delayed
tokens of the time preference task. Additionally, children in the tomorrow
treatment option were brought back to complete the diligence task (more
information in subsection 5.2.3). At the end of each session the child was
able to trade her tokens for presents and was then accompanied back to the
teacher. To ensure comprehension all children had to answer questions for
each task (see Appendix for more details).4
5.2.1 TIME PREFERENCES
We adapted the convex budget set procedure developed by Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012) and presented children with three options of consumption
allocation.
• Option 1 yielded 2 tokens today and none tomorrow.
• Option 2 yielded 1 token today and 2 tokens tomorrow.
• Option 3 yielded no tokens today and 4 tokens tomorrow.
By measuring children’s preferences for delaying gratification to the next
day we assess children’s level of patience. Children opting for option 1 are
therefore classified as impatient, whereas very patient children will delay
all gratification to the next day doubling the amount of tokens received.
To make the tomorrow payoff more salient, children collected their tokens
for today in one bag and tokens for tomorrow were put in a separate bag
with the child’s name written on it. The tomorrow bags were returned to
children the following day, to allow children to exchange the saved tokens
for additional presents.
4Overall, 91% of the children could answer all control questions correctly, indicating
that we succeeded in sufficiently explaining the task even to the youngest children. Our
results remain valid when we exclude all children who didn’t answer all control questions
correctly from our sample.
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5.2.2 PUZZLE TASK TO CHALLENGE ONESELF
The puzzle task measured children’s willingness to challenge oneself. Children
were presented with two puzzles with the same picture which differed in piece
size and number of pieces. The experimenter showed the child two identical
puzzle boxes and took out one piece each to show the difference in piece size
(see Figure A-1). The puzzle with larger pieces was identified as easy and the
puzzle with smaller pieces as difficult. Children were asked to repeat why
the puzzle was either easy or difficult. Taking into account that the difficulty
of doing such a task differs with age, we presented children aged 3 and 4
with an easy puzzle with 6 pieces while the difficult puzzle entailed 12 pieces.
5 and 6 year-olds were given the option of an easy puzzle with 12 pieces and
a difficult puzzle with 24 pieces. For all age groups the completion of the
easy puzzle yielded 1 token and the completion of the difficult puzzle paid 2
tokens. The tokens were presented next to the respective puzzle to make the
payoff difference salient. During the experiment, children’s choices of easy
versus difficult were recorded and the chosen puzzle was handed over for the
child to keep. Children were not required to complete the puzzle, however,
they were informed that in order to receive the tokens for the puzzle they
had to complete it at the very end of the experiment by themselves.5
5.2.3 DILIGENCE TASK
As a third task children were introduced to the diligence task. It consisted
of a real effort task where children were told to collect only yellow beads
from a bowl of small, multicolored beads (see Figure A-2). Children could
autonomously decide for how long they worked on this task and how many
beads they collected. They were asked to notify the experimenter (e.g. by
raising their hand) once they decided to stop working on the task.
First children were introduced to the task. The experimenter then showed
them a bowl with 20 yellow beads and explained that they are worth 1
5After children received their presents at the end of the experiment, the experimenter
reminded them of the potential additional payoff if they completed the puzzle. Children
could voluntarily do the puzzle by themselves and once an experimenter verified the
puzzle, they received their additional present(s).
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token. If they were to collect more yellow beads, they would receive more
tokens. To control for ability, children were asked to practice the task for
30 seconds.6 To avoid any external influences, children were seated in a
separate “cubicle” while working on the real effort task (RET, henceforth).7
This was done, because of evidence showing that individual productivity is
affected by the peers one is surrounded by (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and
Moretti, 2009).Once children signaled that they were “done” with the task,
the experimenter weighed the sorted beads and paid children their earned
tokens. Additionally, the time spent on the RET was recorded as a control
measure.8
Treatments. To test the effect of time scheduling on diligence we intro-
duce a between-subjects treatment variation. After completing stages 1 and
2 of the experiment (time preferences and puzzle task) the subject pool was
split into two groups where the timing of the RET was set either exoge-
nously or endogenously. Specifically, after the ability check children in
the exogenous treatment were instructed to either work on the RET today
or tomorrow, while children in the endogenous treatment autonomously
decided whether to work on the RET today or tomorrow. We hence con-
sider four different dimensions: a) exogenous today, b) exogenous tomorrow,
c) endogenous today, and d) endogenous tomorrow.
Children that (actively or passively) postponed the task to tomorrow
were fetched from their group by the experimenter the following day to work
on the RET. It was common knowledge to children that the experimenter
would return the following day. Children were then seated in their respective
“cubicle” and again briefly reminded of the instructions. The remaining
procedure closely followed the today condition, where children worked on
6Children were not aware that they were being timed to avoid inconsistent results
due to time pressure.
7Strict no talking and no peeking rules were enforced during the RET. A different
experimenter oversaw the RET to reduce demand effects.
8Again, children were not aware of the time measure to avoid confusion about time
pressure. The payoff relevant variable was the output and not the time spent on the task.
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the task for as long as they chose to and were then paid out according to
the number of beads collected.9
5.2.4 PARENT QUESTIONNAIRE
In addition to collecting data from children, parents received a questionnaire
asking for information on demographic variables like the socio-economic
status of the family, parents’ assessment of their child in terms of diligence,
patience, and willingness to take a challenge, and parents’ assessment regard-
ing their own behavior. Specifically, parents were asked to fill out the grit
scale10 (Duckworth et al., 2007; Breyer and Danner, 2015), a questionnaire
about their tendency to postpone tasks (Lay, 1986), and to state their time
preferences. The latter task presented parents with a choice list where they
could choose between a fixed amount of money (e 50) earlier in time versus
a higher monetary reward in the future (max e 70). Among all participants
five parents were randomly chosen to be paid out. To maintain anonymity,
parents received a code that was matched to their child’s decisions.
5.3 RESULTS
The result section first gives an overview of the decisions made in each
task (see Table 52). Section 5.3.2 provides a detailed analysis for treatment
results, of the effect on time scheduling on diligence. Section 5.3.3 presents
the regression analysis and discusses various driving factors of diligence in
early childhood.
9Note that the order of tasks remained the same for all children for the following
reasons: First, we did not want children to be distracted during the RET. Children might
cut down on effort and time out of sheer curiosity for upcoming tasks. Second, as the
RET is a non-cognitive task and the other tasks demand more cognitive skills we opted
to start with the more demanding skills. As all children completed the tasks in the same
order, our results also account for possible depletion effects across the experiment.
10By considering parents agreement with the statements “I am a hard worker” and “I
am self-disciplined” - two items taken from the grit scale used in the PIAAC field trial
(Tamassia and Lennon, 2013) - we infer parents’ level of diligence.
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5.3.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
TIME PREFERENCES. In the time preferences task we measure children’s
patience. 40% of children chose the very patient option of delaying all tokens
to tomorrow, forgoing all immediate rewards to maximize their payoff. 29%
of the children display high impatience opting for two tokens today and
nothing tomorrow. The same fraction of children split consumption between
today and tomorrow (1 token today and 2 tokens tomorrow) choosing the
intermediate option. For the data analysis we use a measure of impatience
accounting for the total number of tokens claimed for immediate consumption.
In line with previous literature on time preferences we observe a slight decline
of impatient choices with increasing age (p=.047, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type
test for trend), which is more pronounced for strictly impatient choices of two
immediate rewards (p=.010, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend) as shown
in Figure 51. Females in our sample are slightly more impatient compared
to males (33% vs. 26% for two tokens today; p-value=.084, Mann-Whitney-
U-test), choosing the strictly patient option significantly less often (37% vs.
45% for four tokens tomorrow; p-value=.067, Mann-Whitney-U-test).
PUZZLE TASK TO CHALLENGE ONESELF. The second task measures
children’s willingness to challenge themselves. Children were asked to choose
between an easy and a difficult puzzle. A little more than half (56%) of
children opted for the difficult puzzle. As the number of pieces for the
difficult puzzle varied between the younger (3 and 4 year-olds) and older
cohort (5 and 6 year-olds) we consider children’s choices in the respective
age groups. We again observe a significant age trend where the choice of
the difficult puzzle increases with age with 30% of 3-year-olds taking the
challenge compared to 49% of 4-year-olds (p=.036, Mann-Whitney-U-test),
and 52% of 5-year-olds compared to 81% of 6-year-olds (p<.001, Mann-
Whitney-U-test). Additionally, we find a significant gender effect for males
being more likely to challenge themselves compared to females (61% vs
51%; p=.032, Mann-Whitney-U-test). This is in line with previous findings
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who also find males to be more willing to seek a challenge (Niederle and
Yestrumskas, 2008).
FOLLOWING THROUGH ON THE CHALLENGE. Children only re-
ceived tokens for the puzzle once they completed it at the very end of the
experiment. While the easy puzzle paid one token, the difficult puzzle
awarded two tokens. We use this as an additional commitment measure
to test for who follows through on their choice. Overall, 87% of children
chose to complete the puzzle and earn their additional reward. The fraction
of children completing the puzzle does not differ over their choice of easy
or difficult (86% vs 89%; p-value= .328, Mann-Whitney-U-test). Again,
we find an age trend where the likelihood of completing the task increases
with age (p=.025, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend). Pairwise com-
parisons, however, do not yield statistically significant results. Specifically,
77% of the 3-year-olds completed the puzzle compared to 88% of 4-year-olds
(p=.087, Mann-Whitney-U-test), and 87% of 5-year-olds compared to 93%
of 6-year-olds (p=.133, Mann-Whitney-U-test).
Table 52: Summary statistics
Variable Mean N
PATIENCE
2 tokens today 0.30 429
1 token today, 2 tokens tomorrow 0.30 429
4 tokens tomorrow 0.40 429
WILLINGNESS TO CHALLENGE ONESELF
chose difficult puzzle 0.56 429
completed the chosen puzzle 0.87 429
DILIGENCE
postponed the task 0.34 241
beads collected in ability check 10 429
beads collected in RET 73 429
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DILIGENCE TASK. The third task assesses children’s level of diligence
in a real effort task measured by the output, namely the number of yellow
beads collected. The output increases significantly from 31 beads collected
by 3 year-olds, to 55, 74 and 113 beads for 4-, 5- and 6 year-olds respectively
(p<.001, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend). The maximum number of
beads collected was 440 confirming great variance for the measured output.
Girls display higher levels of diligence, sorting significantly more beads
than their male counterparts (80 vs. 66, p=.0163, Mann-Whitney-U-test).
Average time spent on the task was 7.9 minutes, increasing with age from
5 minutes for 3 year-olds to 10 minutes for 6 year-olds (7 and 8 minutes
for 4- and 5 year-olds respectively, p<.001, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for
trend).11 As expected, the ability check also reveals different levels of ability
between younger and older children. While 3 year-olds sorted on average 7
beads in the 30 seconds, this number steadily increased to 12 beads for 6
year-olds (p<.01, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend).
The next sections discuss correlations between the experimentally elicited
variables and show that children who sort more beads are (i) more likely to
choose the difficult puzzle (p<.001, Mann-Whitney-U-test), (ii) more likely
to follow through on their choice by completing the puzzle (p<.001, Mann-
Whitney-U-test), (iii) less likely to procrastinate the sorting task to the next
day (p<.001, Mann-Whitney-U-test), and (iv) more likely to score higher in
the ability check (p<.01, Spearman’s rank correlation). Concerning the last
point, namely children’s performance in the ability check, we observe that
children who score higher in the ability check are more likely to choose the
difficult puzzle (p<.001, Mann-Whitney-U-test), and to complete the puzzle
independently of the chosen level of difficulty (p<.001, Mann-Whitney-U-
test). The other measured choices are not correlated according to Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficients at a 5% significance level.
11While we tried to time children as closely as possible to their actual working time
this measure is not as exact as we wished and leaves some room for errors. Hence, we use
the number of beads as our dependent variable for further analysis, relying on time as a
separate control measure.
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Figure 51: Development by age
5.3.2 IMPACT OF TIME SCHEDULING ON DILIGENCE
In this section we consider the treatment variations on exogenous and
endogenous time scheduling of the diligence task. Children were randomly
allocated to the different treatment groups12: 188 children participated in
the exogenous treatment of which 91 were told to do the diligence task
today (exogenous today) and 97 children were told to do the diligence task
tomorrow (exogenous tomorrow). The remaining 241 children were assigned
to the endogenous treatment, where they could decide whether to work
on the diligence task today or tomorrow. About one third of the children
(N=83) in the endogenous treatment decided to postpone the task to the
12Treatments were randomized at class level.
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next day (endogenous tomorrow), while 158 children preferred to work on
the task today (endogenous today).
Figure 52: Diligence over treatments
First, we examine whether an exogenously given time schedule reveals
differences in diligence compared to children who could autonomously decide
the scheduling of the diligence task. Children who were given a schedule
for either today or tomorrow collected on average 77 beads, while children
who decided for themselves when to work on the diligence task collected
on average 70 beads. Comparing the exogenous vs endogenous treatment
does not yield any differences in diligence (p=.622, Mann-Whitney-U-test).
Letting children decide autonomously when to work on the real effort task
did not yield a more efficient outcome compared to exogenously imposing
the schedule upon children.
We now continue to split the treatments into their sub-groups of either
today or tomorrow. This additional level of detail reveals diligence to be
contingent on the time scheduling of the task (see Figure 52). While in the
exogenous today sub-treatment children sort on average 85 beads, the level of
displayed diligence slightly declines to 69 beads for the exogenous tomorrow
sub-treatment. This difference in diligence, however, is not significant
(p=.234, Mann-Whitney-U-test). Children’s diligence levels when actively
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selecting to work today (endogenous today) are on par with children who
were told to do the task today (81 vs 85 beads, p=0.700, Mann-Whitney-
U-test). Those children who actively procrastinated the task endogenous
tomorrow sort significantly fewer beads (51 beads) compared to all other
treatments (p=.002 for exogenous today vs endogenous tomorrow; p=.024
for exogenous tomorrow vs endogenous tomorrow; p<.001 for endogenous
today vs endogenous tomorrow, Mann-Whitney-U-tests). We hence observe
a self-selection effect of children who procrastinate to sort less beads.
Focusing only on the children who procrastinate, we examine the driving
forces behind procrastination. Due to the lower number of observations we
pool the data by age groups into the younger (3 and 4 year-olds) and older
cohort (5 and 6 year-olds) to receive 47 and 36 observations, respectively.13
Age plays a relevant role in procrastination behavior. Younger children in
our sample are more likely to procrastinate the task to the next day (see
Figure 53a). 44% in the younger cohort and 27% of the older cohort chose
to postpone collecting beads (p=.006, Mann-Whitney-U-test).
Result 1. Younger children are significantly more likely to procrastinate
the real effort task to the next day.
We examine whether lower effort provision under procrastinators is
merely driven by the age effect of younger children producing less output.
We can refute this claim by looking at the number of beads collected in the
endogenous tomorrow sub-treatment again split by age groups. Figure 53b
displays the difference in output between endogenous today and endogenous
tomorrow. Both age groups significantly reduce their performance under
procrastination (p=.011 for 3- and 4 year-olds, p=.013 for 5- and 6 year-olds,
Mann-Whitney-U-test) accounting for a difference in output of approximately
19 beads for younger children and 29 beads for older children. As an
additional check we standardized diligence over age which further supports
the difference in output under procrastination (see Figure A-3 and Figure
A-4). Children who self-selected into endogenous tomorrow performed
13The number of children who procrastinated the task by increasing age was 15, 32,
24, and 12.
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Figure 53: Procrastination
(a) Procrastination by age (b) Difference in number of beads
Notes: Figure 3a reports the fraction of children delaying the RET by age group. The
left bar stands for the younger (3- and 4 year-olds) and the right bar for the older (5-
and 6 year-olds) cohort. Figure 3b reports the difference in collected beads between the
endogenous today and endogenous tomorrow treatment by age group.
significantly worse, independent of their age. Procrastination is, hence, an
indicator of lower levels of diligence.
When controlling for other factors, ability seems to play a role in the
decision to procrastinate. Table A-1 shows that those who have a high
ability in the task are less likely to choose to postpone it. Ability is, however,
positively correlated (p<.001) with age and running separate regressions for
the age groups reduces the significance of the ability effect on procrastination.
While effort provision under procrastination is significantly lower, we
detect less procrastination behavior of older children. Hence, with increasing
age children select more frequently into the endogenous today option. From
this we can infer that with increasing age not only do children display
more diligence in executing a task but also become more proficient in
self-management by choosing not to delay the task itself.
Result 2. Children who self-select into the procrastination option display
significantly lower levels of diligence, independent of their age.
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5.3.3 INFLUENCING FACTORS
In this section we investigate underlying driving factors of diligence by
examining the influence of the willingness to challenge oneself and time
preferences on the number of beads sorted. First, we consider diligence
overall. We find the choice of the difficult puzzle and the willingness to
complete the chosen puzzle to be indicators of higher levels of diligence.
Then, we split the sample by age groups to deduce the development of the
driving factors with age.
The willingness to challenge oneself was measured with the choice between
two almost identical puzzles, differing only in number of pieces and therefore
in the level of difficulty. The choice of the difficult puzzle (”difficult” dummy
in Table 53) is representative of choosing the challenge over an easier, lower
paying option. A little more than half of the children (56%) chose the
difficult puzzle, with boys being more likely to take the challenge. The
choice of the difficult puzzle is highly indicative of the level of diligence,
sorting on average 20 additional beads as shown in column (1) in Table 53,
which is equal to one token in payoff.
As an additional measure we control for those who have actually com-
pleted the chosen puzzle (”complete” dummy in Table 53). While completion
of the puzzle was voluntary, the tokens for the puzzle task (1 token for easy,
2 tokens for difficult) were only paid out if the child completed the puzzle.14
Completing the puzzle is another strong indicator for providing more effort
and exhibiting higher levels of diligence. Children who completed the puzzle
collected on average additional 16 beads as shown in column (1) in Table 53.
Irrespective of whether children chose the difficult or the easy task, those
who persist and follow through on their choice also collect a greater number
of beads. Overall, it is therefore not only beneficial for diligence to be willing
to challenge oneself but also to follow through on the choice made.
The variable impatience has a negative coefficient, indicating that more
impatient children exhibit lower levels of diligence. For the whole sample it
is, however, not significant. Girls in our sample provide significantly more
14The child was required to complete the puzzle by herself without help or supervision.
88% of children completed the puzzle.
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output in the RET than boys. Moreover, high ability, which increases with
age, shows that those who are more able also provide more output in the
RET.15 16
Result 3. The choice of the (more rewarding) difficult task over the easy
one is highly indicative of higher levels of diligence. Additionally, follow-
ing through on that choice (irrespective of the level of difficulty) is highly
correlated with higher diligence.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 53 consider the driving factors for diligence
in the respective age groups for 3- and 4 year-olds and 5- and 6 year-
olds. While the effect of ability on diligence is stable over all age groups,
we observe some distinctions in the importance of the influencing factors
between the younger and older age cohort. Most prominently, the influence
of the willingness to take a challenge (difficult) and following through on
the task (complete) on diligence both emerge at the ages of 5 and 6 but
not for younger children. Those children of the older cohort who chose the
difficult puzzle collected on average 26 beads in addition, which is more
than one additional reward. Those who completed the puzzle show very
similar effects of collecting 24 beads in addition. It seems the importance of
challenging oneself and the decision not to shirk from completing the puzzle
gains importance at age 5 and 6. Impatience, on the other hand, plays a
significant role for the younger cohort resulting in a reduction of 7 beads
in output. With increasing age, however, this effect disappears. Females
become significantly more diligent with increasing age leading to an overall
improvement of output of 20 beads.
15Table A-2 replicates the regression using productivity (number of beads collected
over time spent on task) as dependent variable. The influence of female, ability, difficult
and complete are robust to this measure. We consider the measure of number of beads
as dependent variable as nonetheless more accurate measure for diligence compared to
productivity. While the number of beads measures exactly the output (contingent for
payment) productivity only considers the efficiency of children in the task.
16In Table A-3 we additionally control for treatment differences. Our results do not
change. For the whole sample, we see that the children who decide to procrastinate the
RET (“en. tomorrow”) collect on average 25 beads less.
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Table 53: Diligence and influencing factors by age groups
Dep. var.: number of beads (1) (2) (3)
all 3/4 year olds 5/6 year olds
female 14.87*** 8.123 20.13**
(5.531) (5.162) (8.627)
ability 5.717*** 3.383*** 4.832***
(0.867) (0.839) (1.305)
difficult 20.65*** 7.841 25.80***
(5.109) (5.361) (7.705)
complete 15.71*** 8.836 24.01***
(5.645) (5.961) (9.129)
impatience -1.502 -7.480** 2.691
(3.227) (2.883) (5.239)
Constant -14.17 13.92 -13.36
(9.298) (8.900) (15.63)
Observations 429 179 250
OLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5.4 PARENT DATA
In this section, we focus on information regarding family background in
order to gain better understanding of its influence on children’s behavior.
Approximately half of parents (48%) agreed to our request and returned the
filled in questionnaire17. As highlighted in Table 54, we find no differences
in children’s time preferences, their tendency to procrastinate, to choose
the difficult puzzle, to actually complete the puzzle, and their performance
17As submission of the questionnaire was voluntary we acknowledge that the data
analysis in this section may be influenced by a selection bias of parents regarding parental
behavior. Some questionnaires did not contain full information on all questions, accounting
for the difference in number of observations.
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in the RET task between the samples including parent data and excluding
parents, making it a representative sample for the children subpool. First,
we give an overview of the parent sample and their provided information.
Next, we analyze the effects of socio-economic background of parents and
the estimation of their child’s behavior on children’s level of diligence.
Table 54: Means by parental participation
Variable Parents Parents p-value
participated didn’t participate M.-Whit.-U-Test
N=206 N=223
impatience 0.90 0.87 0.702
difficult puzzle 0.58 0.55 0.524
completion of puzzle 0.87 0.88 0.756
procrastination 0.32 0.37 0.377
ability 10 10 0.741
number beads 74 72 0.896
5.4.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Among all participating parents 87% are mothers. Our sample of parents
proves to be highly educated with 57% reporting at least one parent with a
university degree. 71% of mothers report to work part-time compared to
7% of fathers, and 11% of mothers work full-time while 88% of fathers work
full time. The vast majority (90%) of the participating families prevalently
speak German at home. 10% are single-parents. On average families have
2 children and a monthly net income predominantly between e2,500-3,500
(35%), and in 28% of cases above e3,500.
Focusing on the role of parental education18, we observe that parents with
higher education displayed more patience in the incentivized intertemporal
18The variable for education is coded as an ordinal scale where a value of 1 equals
minimum amount of schooling required (9 years in Austria) and the maximum value of 5
equals a PhD.
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choice task (p<.01, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend). Specifically, we
presented parents with a choice list between a fixed amount of e50 earlier
in time or an increasing amount of money (between e50-70) three months
later. While parents with vocational training or lower education required on
average an additional e14 in order to be willing to wait three months for
the reward, parents with a high-school degree required an additional e10
and those with a university degree an additional e8. We find that parents
with a higher level of education score higher on the (self-reported) grit scale
(p<.001, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon-type test for trend) confirming previous findings
regarding higher levels of grit and educational achievement (Duckworth
et al., 2007; Duckworth and Quinn, 2009; Burks et al., 2015).
5.4.2 PARENT DATA ON DILIGENCE
To investigate the influence of socio-economic background of the child’s family
on diligence, we asked for information on family composition, occupation,
and education. Table 55 shows that we do not observe any influence of
having at least one parent staying at home full time (“stay-at-home parent”)
or working part-time (“working part-time”) on children’s level of diligence.
Also, the number of siblings or whether parents raise their children without
a partner does not affect the number of beads children sorted. Families’
highest obtained degree has a positive - albeit only weakly statistically
significant - effect on children’s diligence when controlling for parents’ own
behavior. This effect becomes significant when we additionally control for
income in column (3) providing suggestive evidence for parents who hold a
higher degree having children who display higher levels of diligence.19
19When asking parents about family’s net monthly income we explicitly framed it as a
voluntary disclosure in order not to be invasive. 80% of the parents agreed to answer this
question.
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Table 55: Diligence and parental data
Dep. var.: number of beads (1) (2) (3) (4)
age 13.78*** 13.62*** 12.01*** 16.62***
(4.456) (4.530) (4.546) (5.413)
female 12.37* 15.88** 16.60** 18.26**
(7.391) (7.265) (7.504) (8.460)
ability 5.223*** 5.236*** 5.809*** 5.757***
(1.159) (1.147) (1.106) (1.391)
difficult 17.48** 16.88** 17.68** 22.11**
(6.753) (6.799) (7.323) (8.552)
complete 16.86** 14.62* 13.18 13.78
(8.025) (8.493) (9.730) (12.56)
impatience -1.424 0.431 0.338 3.577
(4.406) (4.453) (4.550) (5.065)
siblings -3.581 -1.854 -6.688
(4.714) (4.873) (6.076)
single -10.61 -9.303 -20.18
(12.12) (14.04) (19.57)
stay-at-home parent -3.051 -1.274 -6.258
(15.69) (15.71) (17.27)
working part-time 5.167 6.628 -3.188
(13.70) (14.03) (17.27)
education 4.485 6.808* 9.579**
(3.341) (3.782) (4.473)
parent’s procrastination 0.433 0.268
(0.603) (0.682)
parent’s diligence -1.645 -5.086
(3.455) (3.549)
parent’s patience -1.563 -1.802
(0.960) (1.153)
income -5.165
(6.513)
Constant -70.30*** -86.15*** -70.57* -48.98
(20.58) (27.38) (38.17) (44.64)
Observations 206 206 197 157
OLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Parents were furthermore prompted to fill in self-reported scales on grit
(Duckworth and Quinn, 2009; Breyer and Danner, 2015), and procrastination
(Lay, 1986) (see Appendix for details). The grit scale - besides informing
us about parents self assessed level of grit - also helps in inferring parents’
self assessed level of diligence by considering two items of the grit scale,
namely their agreement with the notions “I am a hard worker” and “I am
self-disciplined”. We find no evidence of neither parents’ assessed level of grit
(see Table A-4) nor diligence to influence their child’s diligence (see Table
55). While parental self assessed procrastination has no effect on children’s
diligence, we see that parents who score high on the procrastination scale
are also more likely to have children who procrastinate (p=.058, Mann-
Whitney-U test). In this sense, procrastination behavior seems to be more
transferable from one generation to the next than diligence.
Result 4. Parents who score high on the procrastination scale are more
likely to have children who procrastinate. While parental education seems to
positively affect children’s diligence, there is no evidence for parent’s diligence
to correlate with that of their child’s.
5.4.3 PARENT’S ESTIMATION OF CHILD’S BEHAVIOR
As a next step we analyze the correlations between the parent’s assessment
of their child on an ordinal scale from 1 to 5 and a child’s actual behavior.
Parents’ estimation about whether their child likes to spend a lot of time on
a given task20 and their believed child’s level of patience significantly corre-
late with children’s actual behavior in the RET task (p<.001, Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficients) and the time preferences elicitation (p=.014,
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients). The same is true for parents’ be-
liefs about their child’s willingness to take a challenge and children’s actual
choice of the more difficult puzzle (p=.077, Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficients). Parents’ assessed procrastination behavior of their child does
not correlate with children’s actual procrastination (p=.298, Spearman’s
20Note: We asked parents whether their child liked to spend a lot of time on any given
task and did not specify the RET from the experiment.
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rank correlation coefficients), while we have previously shown that parents’
self-assessed and children’s displayed procrastination behavior does.
Table 56: Parental assessment and children’s behavior
Parental assessment Child’s behavior Spearman p-value
coefficient
spends a lot of time on a task no. sorted beads .280 <.001
has a hard time waiting impatience .178 .014
likes challenging games difficult puzzle .128 .077
procrastinates unpleasant jobs procrastination RET .104 .298
5.5 CONCLUSION
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on grit - a skill found
to be highly predictive of success in life. We focus on diligence, a crucial
component of grit, in early childhood. We measure diligence as the output
in a real effort task where children aged 3 to 6 were able to not only decide
on how much effort to invest but also when to schedule the task. While it
did not matter in terms of effort provision whether children were given an
exogenous schedule or were able to decide for themselves when to do the
task, there is a significant negative effect of self-selected procrastinators on
exerted effort. While younger children are much more likely to procrastinate
the task, effort provision under procrastination is lower, irrespective of the
age group. Procrastination behavior is thus more pronounced in 3- and 4
year-olds, while 5- and 6 year-olds are significantly more likely to do the
task right away. As effort provision in the self-selected today treatment is
higher, older children in our sample seem more proficient in knowing when
they will exert maximal effort and thus select the immediate option, earning
more tokens.
Considering the determinants and influencing factors of diligence, the
willingness to choose the challenging and more rewarding task over the easy
task serves as an indicator for the child to provide more effort, displaying
180
more diligent behavior. Additionally following through on the choice, irre-
spective of level of difficulty, and not shirking is also highly indicative of
being more diligent. In this sense we are able to show that diligent behavior,
taking a challenge, and not shirking from a made choice - all important
aspects of grit - highly affect each other. This effect is especially pronounced
for older age cohorts.
Additionally we see an age effect, where effort provision increases signifi-
cantly with age even when controlling for ability. Girls also display more
diligent behavior, outperforming boys in the real effort task. When analyzing
children’s diligence and their family background we find a statistically weak
effect of parent’s education on their children’s level of diligence. While
parents self reported diligence does not correlate with children’s diligence in
the RET, we see that procrastination behavior of parents is correlated with
that of children.
This paper is the first to study the development of diligence and how
it is affected by time scheduling in early childhood. From a policy stand
point, it is important to foster diligent behavior in children starting at early
childhood. While we are able to show that with age children become more
proficient, one might identify those who are more prone to procrastination
and offer them advice and support in their endeavor to work more diligently.
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APPENDIX A: TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure A-1: Puzzle task to challenge oneself
Notes: Children could choose between two different puzzles with the same picture which
differed in the piece size and consequently the number of pieces. We presented children
aged 3 and 4 with an easy puzzle with 6 pieces while the difficult puzzle entailed 12 pieces.
5 and 6 year-olds were given the option of an easy puzzle with 12 pieces and a difficult
puzzle with 24 pieces. The experimenter showed the child the two identical puzzle boxes
and took out one piece each to show the difference in piece size.
Figure A-2: Setup diligence task
Notes: Children were seated in separate “cubicles” while working on the RET. The
RET consisted of collecting the yellow beads out of the green bowl putting them into the
yellow bowl.
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Figure A-3: Standardized diligence in endogenous treatment
Notes: Diligence standardized over age to account for age and ability.
Figure A-4: Standardized diligence in endogenous treatment by age groups
Notes: Diligence standardized over age to account for age and ability.
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Table A-1: Procrastination
Dep. var.: endogenous delay (1) (2) (3)
all 3/4 year olds 5/6 year olds
number of beads -0.00172*** -0.00278** -0.00106
(0.000636) (0.00137) (0.000650)
ability -0.0218** -0.0184 -0.0172*
(0.00847) (0.0175) (0.0102)
female -0.0516 -0.00286 -0.0744
(0.0586) (0.0936) (0.0734)
difficult 0.00137 0.0291 -0.0173
(0.0612) (0.0974) (0.0780)
complete -0.0643 0.0395 -0.161
(0.0957) (0.146) (0.123)
impatience 0.0332 0.0539 0.00477
(0.0342) (0.0557) (0.0436)
Observations 241 107 134
Probit regression with average marginal effects and robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A-2: Productivity and influencing factors by age groups
Dep. var.: productivity (1) (2) (3)
all 3/4 year olds 5/6 year olds
female 0.994** 0.729 1.308**
(0.488) (0.896) (0.537)
ability 0.299*** 0.0604 0.221***
(0.0750) (0.163) (0.0730)
difficult 0.995** 0.140 1.228**
(0.480) (0.737) (0.569)
complete 1.202** 2.102** 0.471
(0.585) (0.878) (0.748)
impatience -0.358 -0.571 -0.173
(0.251) (0.416) (0.324)
Constant 5.817*** 6.573*** 7.655***
(0.868) (1.553) (0.987)
Observations 426 178 248
OLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Productivity defined as number of collected beads over time spent on task. We
miss three observations because due to technical difficulties time recording did not work
for those three children.
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Table A-3: Diligence by treatment
Dep. var.: number of beads (1) (2) (3)
all 3/4 year olds 5/6 year olds
female 14.06** 8.548 20.05**
(5.504) (5.184) (8.666)
ability 5.360*** 3.152*** 4.615***
(0.889) (0.858) (1.320)
difficult 20.95*** 7.520 25.94***
(5.099) (5.312) (7.731)
complete 16.86*** 8.053 24.70***
(5.500) (5.866) (8.787)
impatience -1.418 -7.033** 1.784
(3.234) (2.937) (5.254)
ex. tomorrow -12.32 3.804 -16.17
(8.774) (9.259) (12.38)
en. today -9.067 10.77 -16.47
(8.404) (8.905) (11.48)
en. tomorrow -24.69*** -1.977 -31.29**
(8.531) (8.598) (13.37)
Constant -0.624 11.92 3.666
(11.37) (11.22) (18.50)
Observations 429 179 250
OLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A-4: Diligence and parental data
Dep. var.: number of beads (1) (2) (3) (4)
age 13.78*** 13.62*** 13.09*** 17.25***
(4.456) (4.530) (4.455) (5.258)
female 12.37* 15.88** 16.80** 18.86**
(7.391) (7.265) (7.311) (8.365)
ability 5.223*** 5.236*** 5.452*** 5.417***
(1.159) (1.147) (1.147) (1.445)
difficult 17.48** 16.88** 15.54** 20.90**
(6.753) (6.799) (6.987) (8.404)
complete 16.86** 14.62* 13.55 12.96
(8.025) (8.493) (8.886) (12.03)
impatience -1.424 0.431 0.149 2.943
(4.406) (4.453) (4.409) (5.005)
siblings -3.581 -3.702 -8.611
(4.714) (4.816) (5.935)
single -10.61 -10.64 -25.66
(12.12) (12.27) (17.25)
stay-at-home parent -3.051 1.629 -2.193
(15.69) (15.85) (17.50)
working part-time 5.167 8.298 0.157
(13.70) (13.78) (17.35)
education 4.485 6.651* 9.510**
(3.341) (3.660) (4.246)
parent’s procrastination 0.835 0.838
(0.620) (0.723)
parent’s grit 0.712 0.446
(0.771) (0.896)
parent’s patience -1.814* -2.030*
(0.953) (1.166)
income -7.712
(6.016)
Constant -70.30*** -86.15*** -93.64*** -86.02**
(20.58) (27.38) (29.06) (34.74)
Observations 206 206 206 163
OLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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APPENDIX B: INSTRUCTIONS
Instructions translated from German. German instructions available upon request.
Hello! My name is .... [name of experimenter]. What’s your name? Would you like to
play a game with us? [Experimenter and child walk to experimenter room, showing the
presents at the entrance and sit down in dedicated space. Two bags with the child’s name
are prepared.]
I will explain how the game works, so listen closely. In this game you can collect tokens
which you can exchange for some presents afterwards. After I explain the game you will
repeat it back to me, alright? And since you’ve been paying close attention I will already
give you one token, which you can exchange for one present at the end of the game. Let’s
put the token over here and start the game. [token placed in “today” bag]
TIME PREFERENCES
In this game you can collect tokens for today and for tomorrow, which you can exchange
for presents either today or tomorrow. Look, here I have pink and blue bowls. The tokens
in the pink bowl can be exchanged into presents TODAY, the tokens in the blue bowl
can be exchanged into presents TOMORROW. Do you know what tomorrow means?
Tomorrow means that you will sleep for one night to receive the tokens from the blue
bowl and then you can exchange them into presents. I’m sure your kindergarten teacher
has told you that we will be back tomorrow. We will be back tomorrow morning and
also bring the same presents with us.
Now, the tokens from the pink bowl can be exchanged for presents today and the tokens
from the blue bowl can be exchanged for presents tomorrow. Got it?
Here we have three possibilities and you can pick one: [show three sets of cardboards with
bowls]
• Option 1: If you choose option 1, there are 2 tokens in the pink bowl and none
in the blue bowl. That means you will receive 2 presents today and no presents
tomorrow.
• Option 2: If you choose option 2, there is 1 token in the pink bowl and 2 tokens
in the blue bowl. That means you will receive 1 present today and 2 presents
tomorrow.
• Option 3: If you choose option 3, there are no tokens in the pink bowl and 4 tokens
in the blue bowl. That means you will receive no presents today and 4 presents
tomorrow.
You may now choose one of these three options. But first please answer some questions:
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• How many options can you choose? [child: one]
• What happens if you choose option 1? How many tokens will you receive today
and how many tokens will you receive tomorrow? [let child count tokens in each
bowl]
• What happens if you choose option 2? How many tokens will you receive today
and how many tokens will you receive tomorrow? [let child count tokens in each
bowl]
• What happens if you choose option 3? How many tokens will you receive today
and how many tokens will you receive tomorrow? [let child count tokens in each
bowl]
[repeat instructions if child cannot answer correctly – repeat up to two additional times]
Control questions asked in randomized order for each experimenter.
Well done! Now please choose one option. Great, you have chosen option ... . That
means you will receive X tokens presents today and X presents tomorrow. Can you tell
me why you chose this option? [note down answer] Let me put the tokens you will receive
tomorrow into this bag. See, I wrote your name on it so I can save it for tomorrow.
Tomorrow you will come back and exchange these tokens for presents. [put tokens into
today and tomorrow bags]
PUZZLE TASK
[prepare puzzles: 3 and 4 year-olds - 6 and 12 pieces; 5 and 6 year-olds 12 and 24 pieces]
You’ve done a great job so far! Would you like to play another game? Look, here I have
two puzzles. Both puzzles have exactly the same picture. But one puzzle is more difficult
and one puzzle is easier to do. This puzzle is difficult [show puzzle with more pieces],
because the puzzle pieces are smaller. This puzzle is easier because the puzzle pieces
are bigger [show one larger and one smaller puzzle piece for comparison]. Do you see
the difference? If you manage to do the difficult puzzle, you will receive two additional
tokens. If you manage to do the easier puzzle, you will receive one additional token. You
will have until lunch time to do the puzzle.
Now, before you decide which puzzle to keep, I have some questions for you.
• Which puzzle is more difficult?
• How many presents will you receive if you complete the easy puzzle? How many
presents will you receive if you complete the difficult puzzle?
• Until when do you have to do the puzzle to still receive your presents for this task?
[repeat instructions if child cannot answer correctly – repeat up to two additional times]
Great, now you can decide which puzzle you would like. You will be able to keep that
189
puzzle and take it home with you afterwards.
REAL EFFORT TASK
Well done! Now I have one last task for you. You can collect some additional tokens in
this task, which you can again exchange for presents afterwards. Should I explain how
the task works?
Look, here I have another bowl. There are many colorful beads in this bowl. The task is
to collect ONLY YELLOW beads. The more yellow beads you collect, the more presents
you will get. You can collect the yellow beads for as long as you want to. If you want
to stop collecting beads, just say “stop” and we will count how many beads you have
collected. Depending on the number of yellow beads you collect you will receive a few or
many presents. If you, for example, collect this many yellow beads - these are 20 beads -
[show bowl with 20 yellow beads] you will receive one present.
Do you understand how the task works?
• What do you have to do? [child: collect yellow beads]
• If you collect many yellow beads, will you receive more presents or fewer presents?
[child: more]
• When will you stop the task? [child: when I want to]
Great! So let’s do a trial round to see how it works. You can start picking yellow beads
from the bowl. Ready? Go! [stop child after 30 seconds, note number of beads]
Great job!
[Read assigned treatment only!]
T1a (today): Since you’ve done such a good job, you can sit down over there right now
and start collecting yellow beads from the bowl. You can collect yellow beads for as long
as you want to. If you want to stop collecting yellow beads signal to .... over there and
she/he will count your beads and exchange your tokens into presents.
T1b (tomorrow): Since you’ve done such a great job, you can do this task tomorrow.
Tomorrow we will come back to this room and then you can sit in one of those spots over
there and collect yellow beads. You will be able to collect yellow beads for as long as you
want to. If you want to stop collecting yellow beads you will signal to ... over there and
she/he will count your beads and exchange your tokens into presents tomorrow. [repeat
explanation of RET when child comes back the next day]
T2 (endogenous): Since you’ve done such a great job, you can decide when you want to
do this task. You can either do the task right now or you can do it tomorrow – remember
we will be back tomorrow with the same presents. For this task you will sit in one those
spots over there and collect as many yellow beads as you want to. You can collect yellow
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beads for as long as you want to. If you want to stop collecting yellow beads signal to ...
over there and she/he will count your beads and exchange your tokens into presents.
When would you like to do this task? Now or tomorrow? [note down decision and read
the according paragraph below]
• You have decided to the task now. That means you can sit down over there and
start collecting yellow beads. If you want to stop collecting yellow beads just signal
to ... over there. Then you can exchange your tokens for presents afterwards.
• You have decided to the task tomorrow. That means we will pick you up tomorrow
and take you to this room again. We’re almost done for today! Now you get to
exchange your tokens for presents and then I’ll take you back to your class. Thank
you for doing such a great job today!
RET
[different experimenter is responsible for supervising RET; child signals to stop the task,
note down time and weigh beads on scale, convert into tokens] You’ve done a great job!
Can you tell me how much fun it was to collect beads? Look, here I have five smiley
faces. This face is sad because it did not like the task at all. The face next to it didn’t
think it was that much fun either but not as bad as the first one. The face in the middle
thought it was kind of ok. This face is smiling because it liked the task. And this face
here is laughing a lot because it really liked the task. How much did you like the task?
Can you show me the face that fits you the most?
Alright that’s it for today! Now let’s exchange your tokens for presents! Then I will
take you back to your class (if applicable: and I’ll see you again tomorrow). Thank you
for doing such a great job today! [exchange tokens into presents with child; put chosen
presents into bags, add parent questionnaire and seal them; take child back to class and
leave bag at child’s spot in wardrobe]
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PARENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Parental questionnaire translated from German. German version available upon request.
Dear parents, we kindly ask you to fill in this anonymous questionnaire. All answers are
voluntary. Thank you for your collaboration!
Demographic information about your person
Gender:
O female
O male
Age: .... years
Occupation:
O full-time job
O part-time job
O momentarily unemployed
Highest educational degree:
O Mandatory schooling
O Vocational training
O High-School
O University (Bachelor/Master Degree)
O University (PhD)
Language, primarily spoken at your home (please indicate only one):
O German
O Turkish
O Serbian/Croatian
O other: .............................
Number and age of children:
O 1 child, age: .... years
O 2 children, age: .... years & .... years
O 3 children, age: .... years & .... years & .... years
O 4 children or more, age: .... years & .... years & .... years & .... years & .... years
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I’m raising my children:
O alone
O with my partner
Age of my partner: .... years
Partner’s occupation:
O full-time job
O part-time job
O momentarily unemployed
Partner’s highest educational degree:
O Mandatory schooling
O Vocational training
O High-School
O University (Bachelor/Master Degree)
O University (PhD)
Net monthly income of our family (voluntary disclosure):
O below e1,500
O e1,500- e2,500
O e2,500- e3,500
O above e3,500
We live in a:
O rental flat/house
O own flat/house
Self assessment
Please indicate for each of the following statements how well it describes you.
1= not at all to 5= to a very high extent
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I am a hard worker. 1 2 3 4 5
I get enthusiastic about ideas for
a short time but later lose interest. 1 2 3 4 5
I am self-disciplined. 1 2 3 4 5
I can cope with setbacks. 1 2 3 4 5
New projects sometimes distract me from previous ones. 1 2 3 4 5
I am good at resisting temptation. 1 2 3 4 5
I finish whatever I begin. 1 2 3 4 5
I have difficulty maintaining focus on projects or
tasks that take more than a few months to complete. 1 2 3 4 5
I have trouble concentrating. 1 2 3 4 5
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I often find myself performing tasks
that I had intended to do days before. 1 2 3 4 5
I often miss concerts, sporting events, or the like
because I don’t get around to buying tickets on time. 1 2 3 4 5
Even with jobs that require little else except sitting down
and doing them, I find they seldom get done for days. 1 2 3 4 5
In preparing for a deadline, I often
waste time by doing other things. 1 2 3 4 5
New projects sometimes distract me from previous ones. 1 2 3 4 5
I usually return an RSVP request very shortly
after receiving the invitation. 1 2 3 4 5
I often finish a task sooner than necessary. 1 2 3 4 5
I usually accomplish all the things I plan to do in a day. 1 2 3 4 5
I have difficulty maintaining focus on projects or
task that take more than a few months to complete. 1 2 3 4 5
I am continually saying “I’ll do it tomorrow”. 1 2 3 4 5
I usually take care of all the tasks I have to do
before I settle down and relax for the evening. 1 2 3 4 5
Lottery
Among the parents who will return the filled in questionnaire we will randomly pick five
parents. In case you get picked, the following part will determine your earnings.
In the following lines (1-11) you are asked to choose between:
- receiving e50 directly after the end of our study (end of June), or
- receiving an amount between e50 and e70 at the end of September (hence, three months
after the end of our study).
Please choose in each of the following lines, which of the two options you prefer. One of
these lines will ultimately be randomly drawn for payment.
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Example: In case line 6 will be randomly picked for payment and in this line you have
chosen the amount in the right column (e60) you will get e60 in three months.
End of June or End of September
1) e50 or e50
2) e50 or e52
3) e50 or e54
4) e50 or e56
5) e50 or e58
6) e50 or e60
7) e50 or e62
8) e50 or e64
9) e50 or e66
10) e50 or e68
11) e50 or e70
In the envelope – which contained your questionnaire – you will find a code. This code
facilitates your payment. Please transfer your personal code into the following box. Please
ensure that you transfer the code correctly.
Participation code: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The codes of the winning participants will be announced via the information board in the
kindergarten. The winners will be notified when to pick up their payments (either right
away or in three months). In case you are one of the winners, you are kindly asked to
present the piece of paper with your participation code in kindergarten. Please present
this piece of paper at the communicated point in time in order to get your payment. 21
You will receive your payment in a sealed envelope. Please store your participation code
in a safe place so we can verify your code for the payment.
For your information: The participation code ensures full anonymity.
21In case your child has left kindergarten at this point in time, please notify us and
we will send your payments.
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Assessment of your child
In the following we will report several statements. Please indicate for each statement how
well it describes your child.
1= not at all to 5= to a very high extent
If I ask my child to perform an unpleasant task
he/she tries to postpone the task for as long as possible. 1 2 3 4 5
My child likes to dawdle. 1 2 3 4 5
My child likes to spend a lot of time on a given task. 1 2 3 4 5
My child gets easily distracted. 1 2 3 4 5
Whatever my child begins, he/she wants to finish. 1 2 3 4 5
It’s hard for my child if he/she has to wait. 1 2 3 4 5
My child likes playing challenging games. 1 2 3 4 5
During our project in kindergarten, we asked children to choose between
three alternatives:
1) Option 1: two presents today, nothing tomorrow.
2) Option 2: one present today, and two presents tomorrow.
3) Option 3: nothing today, and four presents tomorrow.
We promised children to come back the next day with presents, which were just as exciting
as the ones they could get on the first day. Independently of what your child might have
chosen, which option would you prefer for your child? The decision you make now has no
impact on your child’s outcome.
Which option would you choose for your child?
• © Option 1: two presents today, and no present tomorrow
• © Option 2: one present today, and two presents tomorrow
• © Option 3: no present today, and four presents tomorrow
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We also played the following game with the children. Now we are interested
in your opinion.
The children were told to collect only yellow beads from a bowl of small, multi-colored
beads. The children could autonomously decide for how long they wanted to work on
this task and how many beads they collected. Moreover, children could decide whether
to do the task right away or to postpone it to the next day.
Which option would you choose for your child?
• © “What is done, is done.” My child should do the task right away.
• © “Better late than never.” My child should take his/her time and conduct the
task on the following day.
Thank you for your participation.
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